THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS IN FAITH-BASED TRANSNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS: A GROUNDED THEORY STUDY

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A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Capella University

September 2012

Abstract

Transnational partnerships formed between faith-based organizations and churches to address humanitarian needs have grown dramatically in recent years, yet the characteristics of accountability of intermediary organizations in these partnerships are not well understood. These partnerships address a broad variety of activities with annual flows of financial resources in the billions of dollars and they involve millions of people. They include supporting organizations and churches that provide resources, intermediary organizations that broker or manage these partnerships, and organizations and churches that implement the activities. Research was conducted to explain the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations in transnational partnerships to supporting and implementing organizations and churches. The theoretical framework of agency theory and the methodology of grounded theory informed this exploration of the perspectives of 19 key informants involved in transnational partnerships between organizations and churches of the Evangelical Christian religious tradition. All the participants were based in either the United States or Costa Rica and served in a wide variety of roles in a broad range of partnerships. They answered open-ended questions, and responses were coded through open, axial, and selective coding processes. Then, a conditional relationship guide and reflective coding matrix were utilized to further develop emergent theoretical categories, inter-relationships, and a core category around which a theory was built. Research results were illustrated using the voice of participants and significant conclusions about accountability included the role of money and power, who is accountable to whom, degrees of commitment and formality, linkages to learning, and the evolution of accountability. The importance of intermediation and the means by

which to establish appropriate accountability relationships were also significant areas of conclusions. The research generated a substantive grounded theory focused around a central category of optimizing intermediary accountability, and the theory develops aspects of partnership formation, intermediary services, and intermediary accountability. The research also generated a framework that can be used by practitioners in faith-based intermediary organizations, as well as by supporting and implementing organizations and churches, to more effectively structure, manage, and evaluate intermediary accountability in these relationships.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, William and Lesley Bassett. Many years ago, as I made a first choice about university education, you pointed me in a direction that took me far from home, both literally and figuratively. That direction and that education thoroughly permeate who I am today. For this, and many other blessings from both of you along the way, I will always be indebted and deeply grateful to you.

Acknowledgments

There are several people I wish to acknowledge. I begin by thanking Dr. Kevin McKemey. In his own unassuming and seemingly unintentional way, long ago in Honduras and later in El Salvador, he became a mentor in so many aspects of international development and relief work. Two of the things I gained from him were an appreciation for participatory approaches and for the qualitative in evaluation, beliefs that fueled the curiosity that has driven professional and academic interests, and this research. For these and many other things I learned and experienced with Kevin, I am grateful. I also want to express my gratitude to Compassion International for financial assistance for my coursework through its Employee Assistance Program. That support for me and so many other employees has given us the opportunity to expand our understanding and vision, and it is my sincere hope that the academic projects realized through the program and that this dissertation have returned benefits to the organization.

I want to thank my dissertation committee for their guidance and support. Dr. Lillian Chenoweth and Dr. Rudolph Ryser were insightful and responsive, and I appreciate the direction they gave as they interacted with my research topic. Dr. Reid Zimmerman, the faculty chair of my committee, demonstrated from the very beginning his great knowledge of issues related to the research topic and provided wise and timely direction on many occasions. I especially benefitted from his efforts to keep me focused as well as his understanding when progress faltered as I was consumed in my work responding to the Haiti earthquake and its aftermath. He was a great faculty mentor.

While the names of the 19 research participants will need to remain confidential, I thank them for their time and the many things they shared. Their observations were enlightening for me and also proof of the many knowledgeable and good people working in all aspects of transnational partnerships. It was a great encouragement to learn from them and an affirmation of why I so believe in the participatory.

I am especially thankful to my children Allison and Daniel. You gave the time without which I could not have done this, and you have waited and adjusted and adapted on more days than I remember. You and your mother have been a constant source of joy and focus of my motivation, and I pray that your sacrifice may bring tangible blessing for you in the future. More than any person, I am deeply grateful to my wife Bea. You covered for me on too many occasions to count, took on more responsibilities than you should have had to assume, and even contributed directly to the research as you transcribed many hours of interviews. Nonetheless, your greatest contribution was in believing and encouraging and persevering. Challenges came our way from our move to Costa Rica, to the earthquake, to the robbery, to things unstated, yet your steadfast support was greater and was the difference between success and failure. I thank you for all you have done on this stretch of our journey together.

I conclude by giving thanks to God. Many things that I learned in the research are but another confirmation of our need for His light, guidance, and grace. The things that I experienced in the research are but another reminder of the great pleasures of the life of the mind and the great joys of experiencing life with others, two of His many good gifts.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter Introduction

In Chapter 1, the research is introduced with important background on the study and the problem that it is addressing. Also, the purpose of the study and supporting rationale are provided and key research questions identified. The nature of the study and its significance are indicated, along with the definition of important terms, and assumptions and limitations of the research.

Introduction to the Study

Faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) act as intermediaries between organizations, churches, and individuals of different nations in a variety of areas; one of the most important and rapidly growing areas is the provision of humanitarian assistance (Wuthnow, 2009). Nonetheless, the roles and processes by which faith-based intermediary organizations are held accountable in these transnational partnerships have not been clearly understood. This includes items such as their organizational mechanisms (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008), principles of good practice (James, 2008), and the effectiveness of such partnerships (Butin, 2001). A better understanding of the intermediation process and corresponding accountabilities of faith-based organizations is needed by practitioners who manage such partnerships; by partner organizations and churches, clients, and donors; and by scholars who study international humanitarian assistance and transnational religious trends.

Background of the Study

The flow of people, services, goods, and other resources across national boundaries between those of the same religious tradition is called *transnational religious connection* (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008). In recent years, there has been a rapid growth in American churches and their members' involvement in transnational humanitarian work and ministries. They spend close to $4 billion annually on international ministries with 44% of churches reporting that they place a great emphasis on international activities (Wuthnow, 2009). This growth has produced a great demand for intermediaries, and transnational partnerships are regularly brokered by faith-based NGOs who serve as intermediaries between churches and groups in the United States and churches in other parts of the world, and they are continuing to try to learn how best to manage such partnerships and the competing demands of stakeholders (Bassett 1993, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008; Lister, 2000; Wuthnow, 2009; Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008). Much needs to be understood about how practitioners in faith-based NGOs manage faith-based transnational partnerships. It should also be noted that a more generalized understanding of such partnerships is also needed by secular NGOs engaged in transnational partnerships, by government regulators, by organizations that monitor charitable organizations, and by donors.

As this phenomenon has grown, there have been increasing efforts to map out the activities of religious nonprofit organizations working internationally (Berger, 2003). These efforts have included typologies (Clarke, 2006), case studies (Ebaugh, 2004; Levitt, 2003; Menjivar, 1999; Tilson, 2005; Whaites, 1999), broad surveys (Wuthnow,

2009), and internal organizational research (Bassett, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008). Faith-based transnational partnerships fall into the realm of *civil society*, which is sometimes referred to as the nonprofit sector or the third sector (Najam, 1996b; Teegan, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). This distinction serves to contrast it with the public sector and the private sector, the latter referring to market-related organizations. In the context of this third sector, the terms nonprofit organization (NPO), private voluntary organization (PVO), and nongovernment organization (NGO) are often used interchangeably (Vakil, 1997). There are many terms used to describe civil society organizations, and it is necessary to understand general terms and then further focus on organizations that are religious, and then those that are within the specific religious tradition of the research that was conducted.

The organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships are first part of the broader category of *non-governmental organizations*. Non-governmental organizations are a category of organizations that provide a good or service, cannot distribute profits to individuals, are voluntary, and are motivated by values (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001). They cover a broad range of nonprofit organizations, and faith-based organizations are a sub-category of NGOs. Clarke (2006) looked at faith-based organizations working in international development and presented a typology of the five major types (p. 840), and three of these are applicable to this research. First of all, there are *faith-based representative organizations*, which take positions on doctrinal matters and can be seen as denominations in the Protestant Christian religious tradition or the Roman Catholic Church. *Faith-based charitable or development organizations* are a second category, and

they seek to motivate those of the same tradition to address the needs of the poor. The third relevant category is that of *faith-based missionary organizations* which spread faith messages and also carry out humanitarian activities.

Organizational typologies are further addressed in the literature review, but for purposes of clarity, this dissertation defines three key terms. First of all, *implementing organization* refers to an organization, church, or individual in the transnational partnership that has a primary role of implementing activities within their own country. Secondly, *supporting organization* refers to an organization, church, or individual in the transnational partnership that has a primary role of providing financial, technical, and volunteer support or resources for agreed to activities in another country. Finally, *intermediary organization* refers to an organization in a transnational partnership that serves as an intermediary between one or more supporting organizations and one or more implementing organizations.

Broader trends in accountability that are affecting NGOs also impact intermediary organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships. Previous research in the broad category of international partnerships has explored this subject (Nielsen & Tierney, 2003; Rowat & Seabright, 2006; Sanyal, 2006; Warren, 2003), and there has been research specifically focused on religious non-governmental organizations (Lister, 2000; Morse & McNamara, 2006). Accountability expectations have increased for nonprofits as a result of public scandals (Iyer & Watkins, 2008), increased government regulation (Grunewald, 2008), and a more general trend of expecting organizations to respond to their stakeholders (Antonacopoulou & Méric, 2005). Stakeholders broadly include funders,

sector regulators, clients, and communities (Ebrahim, 2007), and all of these are meaningful categories for faith-based NGOs.

Accountability leads to questions of agency. Ross (1973) indicated that "an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative for the other, designated the principal" (p. 134). The theoretical framework of *agency theory* is well developed to analyze agency relationships, which are relationships in which one party contracts another party to perform a service (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory has been used in diverse fields including economics, accounting finance, political science, marketing, sociology, and organizational behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory is widely used and accepted in the for-profit sphere, but there is not yet a consensus about its application amongst nonprofits (Caers et al., 2006).

Agency theory recognizes a problem that the goals of the parties are sometimes not fully compatible and that there is different access to information such that the principal finds it expensive or difficult to determine the agent's performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). A second problem is that sometimes there are varying degrees of tolerance for risk which can lead the parties towards different decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Ellis (2000) described that a principal faces the risk of *adverse selection* in which it selects an agent without completely knowing its capabilities and *moral hazard* in which the agent does not fulfill its commitments. Further, the agent may find that it is asked to assume more risks than it would like. Therefore, the central goal of agency theory is to define optimal

contractual relationships between principal and agent that address these two problems (Ellis, 2000).

Eisenhardt (1989) referred to three of the assumptions which are constructs of agency theory. The first is *partial goal conflict,* which refers to the two parties sometimes having diverging goals. Secondly, there is *information asymmetry,* which describes the fact that the agent has more information on performance than does the principal. Finally, there is the idea of *efficiency,* which is the cost in effort and resources associated with the principal's understanding the agent's capacity and performance. There is a trade-off identified in agency theory between measuring agent behavior and the costs associated with having to do that or measuring outcomes achieved by the agent and transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Statement of the Problem

The research problem was that the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations in transnational partnerships with supporting organizations and implementing organizations was not understood by practitioners.

Purpose of the Study

The research study generated a substantive theory and framework explaining the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations in transnational partnerships to stakeholders, specifically supporting organizations and implementing organizations. The framework can be used by practitioners in faith-based intermediary

organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations to more effectively structure, manage, and evaluate these relationships.

Rationale for the Study

This research was needed because of the magnitude, importance, and growth of transnational religious connections that are being engaged in with faith-based nonprofit organizations (Wuthnow, 2009). These connections are increasingly driving nonprofits to be intermediaries in transnational partnerships, and practitioners in these organizations are seeking to better understand their roles in brokering transnational relationships with churches (Bassett, 1993, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008).

This study of accountability in these partnerships addressed questions from the point of view of distinct stakeholders and not only from the point of view of the intermediary. This focus provided new knowledge regarding the motivations for entering into these partnerships; identified key roles and processes; determined how the parties in the relationship see their status as principal, agent, or both; and identified areas of goal conflict and information asymmetry. These findings contributed to the development of a framework regarding the accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations and led to exploration of other related phenomena that emerged in the course of the research.

Research Questions

The central question of this research was as follows: What are the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations working in transnational

partnerships to the supporting organizations, churches, and individuals that provide resources and to the implementing organizations, churches, and individuals that carry out the activities of the partnership? In order to address the central question, the researcher posed six broad questions that were used to explore the phenomenon. The questions are listed below, and potential follow-up questions that were associated with each question are listed in Appendix E.

1. What are the general reasons that intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations enter into faith-based transnational partnerships?
2. What are the processes that need to be managed by the intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
3. How is accountability managed in faith-based transnational partnerships?
4. Who is accountable to whom in faith-based transnational partnerships?
5. What are the major areas of similarities and differences that arise between organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
6. What are the elements that need to be defined in contractual relationships between intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?

Nature of the Study

The central phenomenon that was researched was the accountability of the faith-based intermediary organization in faith-based transnational partnerships, and the research utilized a qualitative approach. A qualitative approach was selected because intermediation in faith-based transnational partnerships needed to be more deeply understood, as indicated by the academic literature (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008), and reported through documentation by practitioners (Bassett, 1993, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008). A second reason for using a qualitative approach was the desire to incorporate individual perspectives of different stakeholders and reduce the influence of power (Lister, 2000), and a qualitative approach could achieve these goals through participation (Creswell, 2009). Finally, qualitative approaches are useful when applying a theory to new populations or settings, as was the case in this research in the context of organizations and churches in transnational relationships (Creswell, 2009).

The researcher selected *grounded theory* for this research. Grounded theory is unique amongst the qualitative approaches in that it seeks to achieve a systematic understanding of a phenomenon and develop it into an explanation or theory (Creswell, 2007), and that was the purpose of this research. A second benefit to utilizing this approach was that there are systematic procedures that have been developed which can guide the researcher (Creswell, 2007). Finally, the use of such an approach was a good initial step towards the eventual development of a theory that might have broader application to practitioners. Qualitative research is not generalizable beyond the population being studied, but grounded theory can lead to theories which could

eventually be used to carry out quantitative research and to seek to generalize to broader populations (Creswell, 2007).

In selecting the grounded theory approach, two issues needed to be managed. The first was the use of the academic literature in the process. Qualitative research seeks to understand the participants' meaning so theoretical frameworks are brought in only later (Creswell, 2007; 2009). Nonetheless, knowledge of the literature is useful in designing the research, especially for less experienced researchers (Backman & Kyngas, 1999). Therefore, in this case, the researcher sought to use *bracketing* in which he set aside what he had learned from the literature (Backman & Kyngas, 1999). Bracketing was also used to manage other preconceptions of the researcher which could have arisen from his own experiences.

The second issue that the researcher needed to manage was the sample size. The methodology requires the use of interviews, and these are conducted until *saturation* occurs, meaning that no new information is arising from the process (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Creswell (2007) recommends a sample of 20 to 30 interviews (p. 64), but in grounded theory the sample size can be smaller or larger than that number, depending on how the research is designed. Therefore, the research was narrowly focused so as to reduce complexity and enhance the researcher's capability of developing tentative hypotheses without too large a sample.

Significance of the Study

There is a need for more research on the management of transnational religious connections, and Wuthnow and Offutt (2008) specifically recommended the study of the "organizational mechanisms through which they are refracted" (p. 228). Their research pointed to the need to examine the intermediary roles that are vital in making these connections.

There is also a need to more closely study how agency theory relates to faith-based transnational partnerships. Such partnerships must manage issues of how the principal and agent manage sometimes differing goals, asymmetric information, and distinct risk tolerance. The research study's findings provided new areas of application of this theory. For instance, this research determined to what extent the constructs of partial goal conflict and information asymmetry are applicable in religious partnerships, who should be defined as principal and agent, and how to apply the theory to situations which are not dyadic.

Definition of Terms

Accountability. A process in which people or organizations respond to an authority that they recognize and in which they are held responsible for what they do (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

Adverse selection. A construct of risk in agency theory which refers to when a principal has selected an agent without having the information to verify the agent's capacity to fulfill the contract (Ellis, 2003).

Agency theory. A theory which seeks to resolve the contracting problems that can occur in a relationship between two parties, one of which is acting on behalf of the other. Those problems are related to agency and risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Agent. The party in a contractual relationship to whom work is delegated (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Efficiency. A construct in agency theory which looks at the most efficient way to establish a contract and takes into account the cost of information as a critical aspect of the contractual relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). The categories of costs include search, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement related to the contractual relationship (Ellis, 2003).

Evangelical. A broad tradition within the Christian religion that holds to strong views on the authority of the entirety of the Bible and the need for personal conversion to Christianity through Jesus Christ (National Association of Evangelicals, 2012).

Faith-based. This term refers to being motivated by a religious tradition, and this motivation manifests itself in many ways, some of them being self-identifying as religious, being staffed by individuals committed to the religion, providing religious services, being guided by religious values, etc.(Jeavons, 1997).

Faith-based intermediary organization. A faith-based organization in a faith-based transnational partnership that serves as an intermediary between one or more supporting organizations and one or more implementing organizations. It is also referred to as intermediary organization. Mission agencies are also assumed to be included within this definition in the field research.

Faith-based transnational partnership. A partnership between one or more supporting organizations and an intermediary organization, one or more implementing organizations and an intermediary organization, or all three types of organizations together. The purpose of the relationship is to support, coordinate, and implement the activities of the partnership.

Implementing organization. An organization, church, or individual in a transnational partnership with the primary role of implementing the agreed to activities within their own country. They are located in Costa Rica in the field research.

Information asymmetry. A construct in agency theory which indicates that the principal and the agent have differing levels of information about contract performance and that this imbalance favors the agent who has more information (Ellis, 2003).

Intermediation. A relationship in which a party buys a good or service from one party and sells it to another or simply brokers the direct relationship between the other two parties (Hacket, 1992).

Intermediary organization. An organization in a transnational partnership that serves as an intermediary between one or more supporting organizations and one or more implementing organizations. It is also referred to as a faith-based intermediary organization. Mission agencies are also assumed to be included within this definition in the field research.

Moral hazard. A construct in agency theory which refers to when the principal is unable to ensure that that the agent has fulfilled an already agreed to contract (Ellis, 2003).

Non-governmental organization. An organization that provides a good or service, cannot distribute profits to individuals, is voluntary, and is motivated by values (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001).

Partial goal conflict. A construct in agency theory which refers to the problem that the principal and the agent sometimes have differing goals (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Partnership. A relationship between two or more parties to achieve an agreed upon goal or goals.

Principal. A party in a contractual relationship that delegates work to a second party (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Risk sharing. A construct in agency theory that refers to the differing tolerance or preference for risk of the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Supporting organizations. An organization, church, or individual in a transnational relationship with the primary role of providing financial, technical, or volunteer resources for the agreed to activities. They are located in the United States in this field research.

Transnational religious connections. This refers to the flow of people, services, goods, and other resources across national boundaries between those of the same religious tradition (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008).

Assumptions and Limitations

Assumptions

An important theoretical assumption was made related to agency theory, and the sample did not define ahead of time who is the principal and who is the agent. Faith-based intermediary organizations generally see themselves as the principal in relationships with implementing organizations who receive financial and other assistance from them. Because the intermediary organizations usually have greater power and size, they also see themselves as the principal in relation to the supporting organizations which provide the resources . Some supporting organizations see themselves as the principals in a partnership because they are providing the funding with the expectations of developing a program that meets their requirements, but other supporting church partners see themselves as the agent because they are smaller and must seek to meet the nonprofit organization's conditions. Implementing organizations tend to see themselves as the agent, but there is often a hidden tension, as they believe that they have a better understanding of the context and the people being served and should therefore define more of the conditions. The issue of who is the principal and who is the agent was explored in this research, but research questions were framed so as to not make any assumptions about these distinctions ahead of time so that it could emerge from the data.

An important methodological assumption was that the methods needed to work within the boundaries of limited resources and limited access to the interview sample. In order to manage this, the scope of the research was limited, and the number of key informants interviewed was limited. Also, the research interviews were conducted in two

different countries, the United States and Costa Rica, in dispersed locations but with priority given to the following metropolitan areas: Colorado Springs, Colorado; Fort Lauderdale/Miami, Florida; and San Jose, Costa Rica. The researcher was regularly in these locations and designed the research so that many first-round interviews could be conducted face-to-face, with the rest being by telephone, and with all subsequent interviews to follow-up on the emerging hypotheses also being conducted either by telephone or face-to-face.

Limitations

There were three limitations on the sample. First of all, it did not include the clients of the activities carried out through faith-based transnational partnerships. While they would have been able to add some unique perspectives, the reason for excluding them was that they are focused primarily on the programmatic benefit and not involved with the management of the relationships between churches and nonprofit organizations. Therefore, their observations were less likely to address the purpose of the research. In addition, their inclusion would have added significant complexity by necessitating an increase in the sample size and introducing additional issues of informed consent.

Secondly, there was a limitation of the sample to Evangelical Christian nonprofit organizations and Evangelical Christian churches. The selection criteria were the churches' or organizations' affirming one of two doctrinal statements generally affirmed by Evangelical Christian churches and organizations in the United States and Costa Rica. This limitation was implemented, first of all, because the researcher had relatively easy

access to this sample. In addition, it enabled the researcher to avoid adding complexity through the inclusion of religious traditions such as other Protestant Christian traditions, Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism. As a qualitative approach, the results cannot be generalized beyond the sample, and furthermore they cannot be generalized to these other religious traditions and their own particularities of transnational religious connections.

A third limitation is that the sample did not have a requirement to link any of the faith-based intermediary organizations to the respective supporting or implementing organizations with whom they worked in a specific partnership. To do so would have greatly increased complexity of geographical locations and Institutional Review Board review. In addition, it would have added ethical concerns about adverse consequences that implementing church partners might fear could occur in participating in research so directly studying their own specific partnership relationships which may have had negative or sensitive aspects.

There were two methodological limitations. The first was that the research sought to generate tentative hypotheses for a *substantive* theory for one area of inquiry rather than a *formal* grounded theory applicable across areas of inquiry (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). That limitation grew out of a need to be realistic about what could be accomplished given limited time and financial resources. A second limitation was the researcher's involvement in the research process; his own perspectives needed to be managed through the methodology. These limitations are covered more fully in Chapter 3.

Chapter Conclusion

In Chapter 1, the research was introduced with important background on the study and the problem that it addressed. Based on that foundation, the purpose of the study and supporting rationale were provided and key research questions identified. The nature of the study and its significance were indicated along with clarification of important terms, and assumptions and limitations of the research. Important aspects that were introduced in this chapter were the choice to use the theoretical framework of agency theory and the methodology of grounded theory.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Introduction

The broad outline of the research study was introduced in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2, the academic literature is reviewed in order to understand critical aspects of the theoretical foundation, methodology, and other substantive areas in the literature. Agency theory is developed as the theoretical foundation, and its constructs and applicability to faith-based partnerships is examined. Methodological issues are identified, and the grounded theory methodology is reviewed for its applicability to the research. The literature is reviewed in other substantive areas related to the research, those being organizational typologies, transnational religious connections, accountability, stakeholder theory, partnership, and intermediation. Finally, the literature is synthesized and a critiqued.

Theoretical Orientation of Agency Theory

Agency Theory

In order to address the research question, the researcher used the theoretical framework of *agency theory*. One of the oldest types of relationships is that of agency (Ross, 1973). Agency theory explains the nature of the agency relationship between a party which delegates work, that being the principal, and a party that carries out the work, that being the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory recognizes a problem that the goals of the parties are sometimes not fully compatible and that there is different access to information such that the principal finds it expensive or difficult to determine the agent's

performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). A second problem is that sometimes there are varying degrees of tolerance for risk which can lead the parties towards different decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, the central goal of agency theory is to define optimal contractual relationship between principal and agent that address these two problems (Ellis, 2003). Agency relationships arise for a number of reasons including that a principal is not able to fulfill the task, finds it too costly to perform the task directly, finds symbolic reasons to assign it to another, or has a need to act on behalf of collective interests (Mitnick, 1982).

There are several constructs which are fundamental to grounded theory. *Partial goal conflict* refers to two parties sometimes having diverging goals (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In that context, the concern is that the agent makes choices in his/her own self-interest (Donaldson, 1990; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007). In such a context, principals are best off assuming goal conflict (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007). Beyond simply differing goals, the differing time horizons between principal and agent also contribute to the conflict (Caers et al., 2006). In the context of nonprofits, Miller (2002) found that board members do not assume goal conflict between the executive director's interests and those of the organization.

Another significant construct is *information asymmetry*, which describes the fact that the agent has more information on performance than does the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). The reason that the agent has more information is due to their being immersed in the task or responsibility (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007). Sharma (1997) indicated that this problem is further exacerbated when there is technical knowledge involved that

it is hard for the principal to judge. This difference in information creates an opportunity for the agent to take advantage of what the principal does not know (Ben-Ner, 2002). If both principal and agent have perfect information, the problem of agency between them is reduced (Steinberg, 2008).

There are also two important constructs related to the contracting problems of agency: *moral hazard,* which is when agent does not fulfill its commitments (Eisenhardt, 1989; Steinberg, 2008) and *adverse selection,* when an agent which has been selected is unable to perform its responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989). The contracting problem of *risk sharing* refers to the differing risk preferences of the parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, agency relationships have costs for the principal. These are policing costs, which are focused on monitoring and enforcing of the contract, and specification costs to identify the actual actions to meet the principal's expectations (Mitnick, 1982). Ellis (2003) referred to search, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement costs.

In order to address the contracting problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk sharing, agency theory has developed different solutions or control mechanisms (Saam, 2007). The solutions include reward systems, monitoring systems, vertical integration (in which the principal has formal authority over the agent), self-selection (in which the agent is offered different arrangements such as the choice between outcome-based or behavior-based contracts), signaling (in which the agent indicates his risk preference), bonding (in which the agent is bound to certain actions), and improvement of screening processes (Saam, 2007).

Contracts are a central idea in agency theory, and they take two primary forms. Behavior-based contracts are effective where the task is highly programmable and information is available regarding performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). On the other hand, outcome-based contracts are useful when there is greater risk of opportunistic behavior and when less information is available (Eisenhardt, 1989). In outcome-based contracts, the agent bears more of the risk and generally receives greater incentives (Eisenhardt, 1989). Geringer and Woodcock (1995) identified other factors that are important in considering which type of contract is best, and these include outcome uncertainty, risk aversion of each party, measurability of the outcome, programmability of the task, and length of the relationship. Steinberg (2008) added the issue of whether or not it is a one-time or recurring contract.

There is an alternative to contracts within an agency relationship which is useful when task programmability and outcome measurability are both low. It focuses on people and working with or contracting people whose goals align with the principal (Eisenhardt, 1985). Variations on this idea include social capital (Johnson & Droege, 2004), social context (Lubatkin, Lane, Collin, & Very, 2007), loyalty (Sappington, 1991), and social power (Saam, 2007).

There have been a number of criticisms of agency theory. One major source of criticisms has already been identified, which is an over focus on performance through contracts and not enough of a focus on other human factors that align the agent's behavior with the principal (Johnson & Droege, 2004). In addition, there are a set of factors that are not adequately addressed in the simple framing of a dyadic relationship

between one principal and one agent focused on one task. These factors include that a party can sometimes be both a principal and an agent (Caers et al., 2006; Ebrahim, 2003b; Steinberg, 2008), that there can be multiple tasks or conflicts between tasks (Dewatripont, Jewitt, & Triole, 2000), that there can be multiple parties in the relationship (Ebrahim, 2003b), and that there can be multiple principals (Geringer & Woodcock, 1995).

Application to Faith-based Transnational Partnerships

Overall, agency theory is highly applicable to the study of faith-based transnational partnerships. It has been developed to address multiple management and organizational contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989), including that of intermediaries (Ellis, 2003). The issues of agency theory and intermediation have also been applied in the context of international aid, providing some useful background to the problem for future research (Ebrahim, 2003a, 2003b; Rowat & Seabright, 2006). Steinberg (2008) provided a very systematic view of the challenges of agency for nonprofits in accountability and performance. An especially interesting concept that Steinberg highlighted is *chained agency* which captures multiple levels of delegation in the agency relationship. Overall, the theory is considered to have broad applicability to nonprofit organizations and their work, and therefore applies as well to faith-based transnational partnerships.

While there is a general fit of agency theory with an examination of faith-based transnational partnership, there is also great relevance of the constructs it utilizes. The concepts of principal and agent can be applied in a variety of ways to that of the nonprofit

organization, donor, beneficiary, and other stakeholders of the nonprofit. Partial goal conflict and asymmetric information have been identified within the literature as issues for nonprofits in general. Formal contracts between donors and nonprofits, as well as informal contracts with other stakeholders, are central to the work of nonprofits.

Nonetheless, the literature is less developed in agency theory's applicability to nonprofits and even less so with faith-based transnational partnerships. Areas that need to be developed include the determination of who is the principal and who is the agent, the theory's applicability with multiple principals or multiple agents, and the relevance of forms of control other than formal contracts, such as social capital, which depend less on formalized and explicit reward and punishment mechanisms. Overall, agency theory is very applicable to the study of faith-based transnational partnerships, yet there are important aspects of it which need to be further developed in the literature for these unique partnerships.

Methodological Issues

The central phenomenon that was researched was the accountability of the faith-based intermediary organization in faith-based transnational partnerships, and this research study utilized a qualitative approach. A qualitative approach was selected because accountability in faith-based transnational partnerships needs to be further explored, as indicated by the academic literature (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008) and reported through practitioner documentation (Bassett, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008), and this is a primary strength of qualitative approaches (Creswell, 2007). A second reason for using

a qualitative approach was the desire to incorporate individual perspectives of different stakeholders and reduce the issue of power (Lister, 2000), and a qualitative approach achieves this through participation (Creswell, 2009). Finally, qualitative approaches can be useful when applying a theory to distinct populations or settings, as was the case in this research in the context of churches in transnational relationships (Creswell, 2009).

The academic literature revealed distinct qualitative approaches that have been used. The vast majority of research studies that were identified were case studies with the study of Ebaugh (2004) being an example that was already documented. A *case study* is an approach that seeks to study a particular issue by looking at one or more cases (Creswell, 2007). Such an approach is bounded, which means that it is limited to a well-defined context or setting which it thoroughly explores. Case study develops a rich analysis that helps interpret and give meaning to the selected case or cases. The use of a case study approach would not have worked effectively in addressing this research because the research purpose was not conducive to a limited number of cases in a bounded system. Rather, it sought a broader framework that could explain accountability in faith-based transnational partnerships in general. A case study approach is not intended to generate an explanation or theory, and a small number of cases could not begin to address the diversity of faith-based transnational partnerships that exist.

A second kind of approach that was identified but not common was *ethnography* as in the research conducted by Bornstein (2001), which looked at child sponsorship and World Vision. This approach describes and interprets a culture sharing group (Creswell, 2007). It seeks to understand from the point of view of the members of the culture and is

generally a very intensive approach that requires a long period of immersion in the cultural group (Creswell, 2007). In the case of faith-based transnational partnerships, there is not a clear culture sharing group, as those that are engaged in faith-based transnational partnerships are a diverse and heterogeneous collection of organizations and churches with unique beliefs, languages, and other characteristics of culture. Those aspects, as well as the fact that the approach would not contribute to theory development, are reasons that it was not a good alternative for this research.

A third type of qualitative research that was located was *phenomenology* which seeks to depict the lived experiences of individuals related to a certain phenomenon or concepts (Creswell, 2007). An example of this type of research is a study by Apprey and Talvik (2006) which looked at the work of nongovernmental organizations in conflict resolution and the sense of project ownership that had been achieved. Phenomenology provides a rich understanding of individual experiences and their accompanying insights. It requires that a phenomenon be clearly defined and then different individuals can be interviewed, and they can describe what they have experienced of these partnerships (Creswell, 2007). The information can then be used to write a description of what the participants experienced and a summary of the context or setting in which they experienced it (Creswell, 2007). Phenomenology would not have been effective for this research as it focuses narrowly on the experiences of individuals, and it could not generate a theory to explain the processes of faith-based transnational partnership.

Grounded theory was the fourth type of research study that was identified. Lawrence, Hardy, and Philips (2002) used this approach to study how collaboration

between non-governmental organizations led to new institutions. The grounded theory approach seeks to develop a theory that explains a phenomenon (Creswell, 2007). It draws data from participants who have experienced different aspects of the phenomenon and can contribute to describing and explaining it. Grounded theory follows a systematic methodology in which it seeks to discover underlying processes, and it seeks to minimize preconceptions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). It is the only qualitative approach that specifically is intended to develop explanations and theories and which provides systematic steps to accomplish that.

Grounded Theory Methodology

Origins and Usage

There are numerous forms of qualitative research, but five of the most common and well-documented procedurally are ethnographies, case studies, phenomenology, narrative, and grounded theory (Creswell, 2007). Qualitative approaches are characterized by inductive methods, the researcher as a collector of data, collection of data in the place where the phenomenon is experienced, understanding the participants' meaning, a complex description of the issue, emerging design that may change during the research, and interpretation (Creswell, 2007). Grounded theory is unique amongst these qualitative approaches in that it seeks to generate a theory (Creswell, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This generation of a theory is also fundamentally different from quantitative approaches, which seek to test or verify existing theories but not generate new ones (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Grounded theory was first developed in Glaser and Strauss's seminal work, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory* (1967). It has had a far-reaching impact on research methodology in the social sciences, and within leadership and management studies. It is an approach to research that came about as a reaction to a perceived excessive positivism in the social sciences in the middle of the twentieth century and the emergence of the need for a method to develop new theory in the social sciences (Charmaz, 2006). Its theoretical roots were in *symbolic interactionism,* which examines how individuals create meaning through their interactions and active processes (Charmaz, 2006; Goulding, 2002; Locke, 2001).

Grounded theory can be defined as a systematic method of generating theory from data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). It is grounded in that it is not based on starting assumptions but rather on data that is collected in a natural setting and which reflects interactions and processes that involve people (Creswell, 2007). Theory that is generated from data has a greater likelihood to be objective because of its very proximity to the data and to better reflect reality for that same reason (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Hunter, Hari, Egbu, & Kelly, 2005). Grounded theory methodology proposes a number of significant strategies, including carrying out data collection and data analysis at the same time, systematic procedures, and sampling focused on developing the theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Methods

Grounded theory consists primarily of data from individual interviews, though it can utilize other data such as documents and observations (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Douglas, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The researcher utilizes an open-ended question or questions to begin the process, and these should provide flexibility and freedom as it is assumed that there is a need to explore as concepts surrounding the phenomenon being studied are not all known (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). The questioning focuses on the individuals' experiences (Creswell, 2007).

Grounded theory utilizes a sampling approach that is sequential (Draucker, Martsolf, Ross, & Rusk, 2007). It begins with selective sampling in a first phase of data gathering with a sample of participants who meet certain criterion and can generate an understanding of the phenomenon (Draucker et al., 2007). The data is collected and analyzed, and as the process moves forward, *theoretical sampling* is used in which individuals are identified who can provide data related to emerging understandings from the initial coding process and thus contribute to theory development (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Draucker et al., 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Theoretical sampling continues throughout the subsequent data collection and analysis process and accompanying coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Draucker et al., 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Selective sampling is determined before the start of the research so the procedure is easy to identify, but theoretical sampling is much more difficult to determine because initial data has not yet been

collected (Draucker et al., 2007). In the case of theoretical sampling, there is great value in utilizing a sampling guide to select the best strategy that can be employed to identify the sample (Draucker et al., 2007). The process of sampling continues until *theoretical saturation* becomes evident in which no new data is emerging (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

One of the distinctions of grounded theory is the *constant comparative method* which Glaser and Strauss (1967) first proposed. It is a method of data analysis in which data is compared to data and which moves towards increasing levels of abstraction (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). As new data is gathered, it is compared to existing data to determine what is similar and what is different, and this process helps in the emergence of concepts, and eventually categories emerge, while creating ever greater precision (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). This method reflects a process of interrelating data collection and analysis.

Strauss and Corbin (1990) have developed systematic procedures for this process, and the actual analysis occurs at three levels through open coding, axial coding, and selective coding (see also Corbin & Strauss, 1990, 2008; Creswell, 2007). This process breaks down data and reformulates it into concepts (Backman & Kyngas, 1999). In *open coding*, data is compared to identify what is similar and dissimilar and grouped, and categories gradually emerge with properties which describe them and dimensions which indicate the variation in the property (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). *Axial coding* follows, in which categories identified in open coding are related to sub-categories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As a result of axial coding,

new questions may arise, resulting in additional data gathering. The final level of analysis is *selective coding,* which involves identifying a core category and mapping how other categories relate to it (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Throughout this process of increasing abstraction, the constant comparative method is utilized (Charmaz, 2006). In addition, the researcher writes *memos* in the process which explore the meanings, and properties and dimensions of the concepts; and contribute to specifying in detail the developing theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Glaser (2004) described memos as being very flexible so as to develop categories to later be sorted and as forming the basis of the theory development and writing. Differences arose between Glaser and Strauss regarding the coding process because Glaser felt that techniques used by Strauss forced preconceived ideas onto the data (Glaser, 1992).

Glaser and Strauss (1967) indicated that grounded theory should result in a theory. They refer to *substantive theory* about a specific area of inquiry and *formal theory* which is applicable across areas of inquiry. The theory that emerges based on Strauss and Corbin's work is a detailed and complete description of a process (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Elements of this theory include interrelationships of categories and accounting for variations and conditions, and it results in a well-integrated and thorough theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

There are analytical tools which can help in organizing this information. Scott (2004) and Scott and Howell (2008) developed a *conditional relationship guide* that organizes categories and their interrelationships and links them to a *reflective coding*

matrix which develops relationships of categories with a core category. Corbin and Strauss (1990, 2008) referred to this tool as a conditional/consequential matrix, and asserted that these analytical tools contributed to building a storyline for the theory. Given the positivist nature of this approach, the theory is usually written up in an objective and impersonal manner (Creswell, 2009).

In the approach of Glaser (2004), the goal is a conceptual theory that addresses a pattern which is important to those who experience the process, but Glaser does not advocate the full explanation of relationships (see also Jones & Noble, 2007). Glaser recommended a process of sorting the memos in order to create an outline of the theory, and the memos are then used to write up the theory. Over the course of the years, Strauss became more open to constructivist influences on the approach to developing theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), and this adjustment had some impact on the approach and permitted the researcher to become a part of the process and influence the nature of the grounded theory products (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

Strauss and Corbin (1990; Corbin & Strauss, 2008) indicated multiple ways in which the literature can be used. These ways included using it to identify initial questions, concepts, and variables and for making comparisons during the course of the research, though they did emphasize that care needs to be taken to not let it interfere with creativity and the data. Cutliffe (2000) stated that a review of the literature might be needed to clarify concepts that impact the theory. On the other hand, Glaser (1978, 2004) affirmed that there should not be too much reading and work done in the literature as it could interfere with being open to what would emerge from the data. He indicated that

literature could be used later in the process but only after a core category had emerged from the coding process (Glaser, 1978, 2004). The relative importance of induction and deduction in the research process impacted choices regarding how to use the literature. Heath and Cowley (2004) observed that Glaser tended to be strict in maintaining inductive approaches while Strauss utilized the literature and questioning in ways that had elements of deduction

Schools of Thought

Grounded theory has been extensively utilized since it was first proposed, and there are different schools of thought which have emerged over time and which impact the nature of the methods that it uses (Jones & Noble, 2007). Grounded theory emerged as the result of the work of Glaser and Strauss (1967), but gradually differences became evident about a central aspect of the methodology, which is data analysis (Walker & Myrick, 2006). This progression of ideas resulted in a debate between Glaser and Strauss, and a series of foundational books from each of them outlining differing views on grounded theory with important works of Strauss being done with Corbin (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 1978, 1992; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). These debates were often difficult to follow as both schools of thought used what appeared to be similar steps and language though their underlying meaning was different (Walker & Myrick, 2006).

Glaser is generally considered to have kept more aligned with the original grounded theory approach (Heath & Cowley, 2004). An important point of departure

came between Glaser and Strauss regarding analytical techniques for grounded theory. Glaser (1992) stated that everything in grounded theory is emergent and the researcher should only have a broad topic at the beginning (also Jones & Noble, 2007). Strauss (1987) increasingly emphasized that it was legitimate for researchers to bring themselves into the process, and he proposed procedures and questions that seemed to go against Glaser's approach of allowing everything to emerge (also Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Glaser (1992) referred to the techniques of Strauss as resulting in *full conceptual description*, which he did not see as being grounded theory. A number of debates surrounding coding and data analysis are linked to this issue. Another important distinction between them was regarding the development of theory. Glaser (1992) sought to generate a conceptual theory that reflected the perspective of the participants, while Strauss sought to have a theory that was *conceptually dense* and accounted for complexity and variation (Strauss, 1987; Jones & Noble, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Glaser and Strauss both initially reflected an objectivist perspective which assumes that data has a reality in and of itself which is generalizable and that the researcher can be objective (Charmaz, 2006). A work by Strauss and Corbin (1994) began to reveal a more relativistic approach as they made statements that reflected less of a commitment to positivism (see also Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006a, 2006b). How far they moved in that direction is a matter of debate, but in contrast to the original positivist perspective of Glaser and Strauss (1967), a clear constructivist perspective began to emerge with other researchers (Charmaz, 2006). Constructivists assume that the data and analysis are constructed, do not have a reality in and of themselves and are only

provisional, and that there are multiple realities (Charmaz, 2006). This position affirms important ideas about the participants and researchers co-constructing meaning, correcting imbalances in power, and being inclusive of the researcher's and participants' stories in the process (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006b). In their review of grounded theory in management research, Jones and Noble (2007) identified the predominance of the thinking of Strauss in grounded theory research.

Grounded Theory in Management Research

While grounded theory has its origins in sociology, it has extended into a variety of fields which include management and organizational studies (Goulding, 2002; Locke, 2001). Grounded theory has four characteristics that are useful in the study of management and organizations (Locke, 2001). The first of these is that it can account for the complexity of the settings in which processes occur. Secondly, grounded theory can generate understandings that are useful to practitioners. Thirdly, it is useful in the development of theory for new processes and situations. Finally, it can give new insights in areas in which there is existing theory. Grounded theory also utilizes systematic procedures which can be helpful in research (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

Grounded theory has been utilized in many aspects of leadership, management, and organizational research. Examples of literature reviews related to grounded theory include Parry (1998) and his overview of grounded theory in leadership research, Locke (2001) and her review of the management and organization literature, and Jones and Noble (2007) and their analysis of studies published in the management literature since

2002. While not specifically focused on this methodology, Bryman's (2004) review of qualitative literature on leadership identifies grounded theory as the most commonly used method of data analysis found in qualitative research on leadership. Suddaby (2006) provides insight on the use of grounded theory in research based on having been a reviewer of article submissions to a prominent management journal.

There are four themes which emerged from an analysis of these reviews and which are relevant to the use of grounded theory. A first theme is that quantitative and qualitative research on leadership has been focused on the person of the leader rather than on the leadership process itself (Parry, 1998). This focus in the literature on the person of the leader is further limited by a strong focus on senior leadership (Bryman, 2004; Parry, 1998).

A second theme that emerged is the importance of context. It was significant in studies to understand the sector and specific circumstances which impacted the style of leadership (Bryman, 2004). The framing of research regularly returned to the use of words that conveyed setting, circumstances, and events, and contributed to a sense of the centrality of context (Bryman, 2004; Locke, 2001; Parry, 1998). This tendency was not only identified as important in management research but also as one of the appealing aspects of grounded theory (Locke, 2001). A third theme that emerged was the issue of change. Parry (1998) indicated that this concept is central to a definition of leadership, which involves influencing others and impacting activities and relationships between people. In qualitative research in general, there is much literature about change processes and the leader involved in it (Bryman, 2004). In her review of the literature, Locke found

that there are numerous examples of stage or phase models in grounded theory that describe process and what leads from one stage or phase to the next.

A final theme that emerged in the leadership and management literature was that grounded theory was often not fully, consistently, or correctly implemented. Jones and Noble (2007) found that of 32 objectivist studies, 14 did not even meet the requirement of standard data collection and analysis procedures. There also appeared to be problems with the partial use of grounded theory methods which decreased their validity and reliability (Parry, 1998), qualitative researchers not detailing the analytic process (Bryman, 2004), and some researchers claiming grounded theory as a methodology but without implementing procedures consistent with it (Suddaby, 2006). The themes of needing to look at leadership processes, understanding the context, managing change, and establishing methodological rigor in grounded theory implementation all can be used as criteria in evaluating the application of grounded theory in studying faith-based transnational partnerships.

Summary of Usefulness in Addressing the Research Question

Locke (2001) described four reasons why grounded theory was appealing for management studies, and these reasons address some of the criteria for usefulness in studying faith-based transnational partnerships as a sub-set of this research. For instance, grounded theory places a great deal of emphasis on complexity and context (Locke, 2001) and this emphasis aligns with examining the diversity of context and circumstances in which nonprofit management takes place (Bryman, 2004; Silverman & Taliento,

2006). In addition, the methodology focuses on processes (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) so it is able to investigate accountability process as well as social change processes of nonprofits (Parry, 1998). Grounded theory also has a focus on theory generation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Moving beyond theory generation, grounded theory has an ability to engage multiple stakeholders. Its methodology seeks to understand how participants have experienced a phenomenon (Creswell, 2007), and this can create a place for multiple stakeholders' perspectives (Maak & Pless, 2006) in a way what would not be accomplished through quantitative methods that do not focus on participants' perspectives (Creswell, 2009). Also, the fact that grounded theory engages participants can be used as a means to motivate staff through their participation and ability to influence with their own perspectives.

While grounded theory is quite relevant, there remain the challenges of meeting its methodological demands in a reality of limited resources. One of the reasons that procedures are sometimes not followed is that they are demanding and time-consuming (Suddaby, 2006). This is an even greater challenge for nonprofits with more limited human and financial resources to invest in research. In addition, there are challenges of carrying out such research within an organizational context; there may be an expectation of quick results, or it may be difficult to maintain the longer-term access needed for theoretical sampling (Locke, 2001). Other methodological challenges include the complexity of managing the process, the inability to know ahead of time when theoretical saturation will occur, and the management of a lot of data (Hunter, Hari, Eggbu, & Kelly,

2005). There are also organizations that may expect broader validity and reliability, but this type of research is only substantive to the specific setting (Parry, 1998). These constraints are related to the methodology and its resource demands, yet there are potential ways to mitigate them through good design and procedures. Overall, they do not diminish the many ways in which grounded theory is very useful in understanding accountability in faith-based transnational partnerships.

Organizational Typologies

There are multiple terms used to describe civil society organizations, and it is necessary to understand general terms, then further focus on organizations that are faith-based, and then those that are within the specific religious tradition of the proposed research. *Civil society* is sometimes referred to as the nonprofit sector or the third sector (Teegan, Doh, & Vachani, 2004). The nonprofit sector stands in contrast with the public sector and the private sector, the latter referring to market-related organizations. In the context of this third sector, the terms *nonprofit organization* (NPO), *private voluntary organization* (PVO), and *nongovernment organization* (NGO) are often used interchangeably (Vakil, 1997).

The term *nongovernmental organization* was first used by the United Nations in 1950 (Vakil, 1997), though there continues to be a classification problem resulting from the unclear definition of the term which results in not having a clear unit of analysis and capacity to generalize (Vakil, 1997). Lindenberg and Bryant (2001) characterized NGOs as fulfilling a public service through the provision of a good or service and as not being

able to distribute profits, being voluntary, and being driven by values with ideological elements. Another definition came from Vakil (1997) and focused on operations, describing NGOs as "self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people" (p. 2060).

Within the category of NGOs, Uphoff (1995) differentiated between those that are membership organizations, cooperatives, and service organizations, and he indicated that most NGOs probably fall in the third category. Vakil (1997) also indicated that they can be described based on the sector on which they focus and on whether they are based at the international, national, regional, or community level.

In the broad category of NGOs there is a sub-sector of religious organizations which have been increasingly referred to as *faith-based organizations* (FBOs), with varying definitions and characteristics associated with that categorization. Jeavons (2004) indicated that clearly defining the term is difficult yet necessary, while Sider and Unruh (2004) stated that there is a great deal of confusion about the meaning of the term.

One approach to clarifying the terminology of faith-based organizations came from Jeavons's (1997) description of the seven characteristics of religious organizations: (a) they self-identify as religious, (b) their staff and volunteers are religiously committed, (c) their resources come primarily from religious individuals or organizations, (d) their services are religious in nature, (e) their religious beliefs guide their decision processes, (f) their power derives from religious sources, and (g) their interaction is primarily with other religious organizations and structures. Jeavons also stated that religious organizations reflect these characteristics to varying degrees. Another view is that of

Clarke (2006), who described some of their characteristics including that they draw on spiritual values, they have a great capacity to mobilize followers of those values, they are well networked locally and internationally, they are highly embedded, and they are less dependent on donor funding.

Smith and Sosin (2001) referred to *faith-related organizations* and defined them as having at least one of the following characteristics: (a) a formal funding or administrative relationship to a religious body, (b) a past history of such a relationship, (c) a commitment to work within the parameters of a religion, or (d) a commitment to work with others of the same religion. The researchers then sought to measure the degree of the characteristics by looking at the sources of resources, the relationship to religious authorities, and the degree of religious culture in the organization (Smith & Sosin, 2001). A different approach has been utilized by Unruh (2004) in which she sought to understand religious elements in delivering social services and then the strategies by which they were or were not incorporated into the program. Unruh identified nine elements: (a) the organization's religious descriptions of itself, (b) the utilization of religious articles, such as music or posters, in the environment, (c) invitations to religious activities, (d) prayer, (e) use of religious texts and materials, (f) singing and worship, (g) faith testimonials, (h) religious teaching, and (i) invitations to religious commitments. These elements can be included to different degrees, and there are five strategies to do so (Unruh, 2004, p. 330). They can be *implicit* and not significantly present. Secondly, they can be *invitational*, and the opportunity can be given outside of the context of the social services. Thirdly, they can be *relational* and visible through the contact with staff or

volunteers. Next they can be *integrated but optional*, requiring the clients to decline and finally they can be *integrated and mandatory*.

Sider and Unruh (2004) took the five strategies presented by Unruh (2004) and created a typology for social service organizations. It has a continuum that includes the categories of faith-permeated, faith-centered, faith-affiliated, faith background, faith-secular partnership, and secular (Sider & Unruh, 2004, p. 112). It identified both organizational characteristics and program characteristics associated with each of these, and captured the important idea that the characteristics of an organization and the characteristics of its program may have significantly different religious elements. This approach began to address the important need to determine the degree of faith-related aspects within program service delivery (Fischer & Stelter, 2006).

Clarke (2006) looked at faith-based organizations working in international development and presented a typology of the five major types (p. 840), three of which are applicable to this research. First of all, there are *faith-based representative organizations* which take positions on doctrinal matters and can be seen as denominations in the Evangelical Christian tradition or the Roman Catholic Church. The second relevant category is that of *faith-based missionary organizations* which spread faith messages and also carry out other humanitarian activities. *Faith-based charitable or development organizations* are a third category, and they seek to motivate those of the same tradition to address the needs of the poor. They consist of organizations such as World Vision or Caritas International.

In understanding the types of organizations that will be the focus of the research, it is helpful to also understand a bit more about *Evangelical parachurch organizations* that are faith-based. Wuthnow (1998) described the importance of special purpose groups in American religion, which have a specific purpose and mobilize resources towards that end. He indicated that they have a long history in the United States, though they have grown dramatically in recent years. They dedicate themselves to many types of activity from supporting missions, to administering charitable activities, to social reform. The growth of these organizations parallels a decline in the importance of religious denominational structures and represents a "significant form of restructuring in American religion" (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 101). Special interest groups can be considered *parachurch* organizations in the Evangelical Christian tradition, and these have been central to the Evangelical Christian movement in the post World War II period (VanderPol, 2011; Wuthnow, 1988).

Transnational Religious Connections

Wuthnow and Offutt (2008, p. 209) defined *transnational religious connections* as "flows of people, goods, services and information across national boundaries. They are facilitated by transnational organizations and by broader trends in the global political economy." Flows of people take the form of migration, religious workers, and short-term volunteers all of which have significantly increased (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008). For instance, in 2001 over 1.3 million Americans participated as short-term mission volunteers (Wuthnow, 2009). Flows of resources have included remittances, religious

funding, humanitarian aid, and religious products (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008). Financial donations have grown rapidly, and American churches and their members spend close to $4 billion annually on international ministries with 44% of churches reporting that they place a great emphasis on international ministry (Wuthnow, 2009). In the 1990s, giving to religion grew by 70 percent, and donations tripled to international organizations; indeed, many of the largest humanitarian organizations are religious, and their budgets have grown dramatically in this period (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008).

Evangelical Christian teaching emphasizes the *Great Commission* in the Bible, which is doctrine urging the taking of the Christian message to other parts of the world and making disciples (Butin, 2001; VanderPol, 2011; Wuthnow, 2009). For instance in the Bible, Mathew 28: 19, 20 is often cited and states: "Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you" (New International Version). Another often quoted passage in the Bible is Acts 1: 8, which states: "You will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, and in all Judea and Samaria, and to the ends of the earth" (New International Version). Therefore, there has long been a mandate for local congregations and individuals to participate in activities beyond the work of the local (Wuthnow, 2009). In the past, missionary societies or missionary boards conducted this work, and for most people, it involved contributing resources.

Over the course of the post World War II period, Evangelical Christians (Evangelicals) have again broadened their commitment to transnational ministry and become much more concerned about humanitarian assistance (VanderPol, 2010;

Wuthnow, 2009). More and more, the activities are characterized by a desire to fulfill the *Great Commandments* of Mathew 22: 37-39 in the Bible which states: "Jesus replied: 'Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: Love your neighbor as yourself.'"(New International Version). The Evangelical Christian teaching of love of neighbors has led to their commitment to seek to help the poor (Myers, 2011) which has shown itself in numerous ways. This doctrine has fueled the tremendous growth of humanitarian assistance funded and carried out by Evangelical Christians (Wuthnow, 2009). This commitment has been dramatically shaped and given expression as a consequence of some key developments.

Wuthnow (2009) described five factors that have contributed to the explosive growth of transnational religious ties. The first is the increase in international communication that has resulted from more frequent international travel and simply the availability of more information about the rest of the world. This change has shown itself in the great increase of travel for pleasure and business and the specific aspect of vast numbers of short-term mission volunteers. A second factor is that there are more U.S. organizations and foreign congregations and organizations with which to partner and cooperate. This factor is especially critical as transnational organizations have been central to creating transnational religious ties (Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008; Wuthnow, 2009).

A third factor is the enormous increase in the financial resources of U.S. churches. Gardner (2000) described this growth as having occurred due to the expanding population

of the U.S., the higher percentage of self-proclaimed Evangelicals, the higher-than-average giving of Evangelicals, the shifting of donations from denominations to parachurch organizations, and a response to church teaching. Hamilton (2000) drew attention to the specialized focus of parachurch organizations and their aggressive marketing, higher-than-average giving by Evangelicals, and simply a growing concern for humanitarian matters as driving growth. Another factor has been the growth of mega-churches that have initiated their own international ministries. Finally, there is a factor that Wuthnow (2009) called *saturation,* which means an effort to develop ministries within churches that are more attractive to congregants and can help address slowing growth rates.

Parachurch organizations have shaped Evangelical concern for the rest of the world, especially as regards humanitarian aid, and have been a channel by which that concern is expressed (VanderPol, 2010). As a result, there is a great demand on such organizations to help individuals and churches engage in different ways, including financial giving, partnerships, and short-term missions (Bassett, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008; Lister, 2000; VanderPol, 2010; Wuthnow, 2009; Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008).

In examining transnational connections, three research-based studies were identified for evaluation. Wuthnow (2009) conducted the very extensive *Global Issues Survey* which included telephone surveys of 2,231 church members and much more extensive qualitative interviews with approximately 300 pastors, church leaders, and leaders of international organizations. The survey identified the patterns of transnational religious connections that exist in U.S. churches in general. The research could be

characterized as using mixed methods through the use of a quantitative survey as well as qualitative, semi-structured interviews. The results were highly relevant for this research in that it was quite comprehensive and pointed to information that informed this research as it related to North American churches and donors.

Ebaugh (2004) examined the nature of the transnational religious ties of six American congregations in Houston and those of their same religion in their country of origin. The sample was purposeful, and it involved sending researchers to the community of origin for at least two months to conduct interviews and gather other information. In looking at these case studies, Ebaugh identified ties that represent transfers of monetary resources, norms and practices, and social capital or prestige. These are different types of influences from the U.S. congregations back to the other countries. In addition, she identifies the pathways of these ties, which in these cases were largely individual-to-individual relationships. The research conducted by Ebaugh had some limited applicability for this research. First of all, it sought to examine the relationship on both the U.S. side and in the country of origin. This inquiry adds complexity but reflects a key choice that needed to be made, which is whether or not the sample should seek to capture the complete chain of the transnational religious connection. The other aspect that was relevant is that the research identified the kinds of flows that exist in transnational relationships. While the list is not comprehensive, it pointed to the kinds of flows or accountabilities for which processes that are coordinated by an intermediary might need to exist.

A third study that was identified for evaluation of transnational religious connections was an ethnographic study of the connection that exists in programs in which a financial sponsor in one country sends financial resources to conduct a program in another country through an intermediary organization (Bornstein, 2001). Bornstein (2001) explored the experience of a Canadian sponsor, the intermediating organization, and a boy sponsored in Zimbabwe. The research involved extensive field work in the international headquarters of the intermediary organization, World Vision, as well as in Zimbabwe, where the child and local office were located. The research enabled Bornstein to look at the process of how a religious non-governmental organization linked the donor to the person who received the aid. The examination of this connection enabled a much deeper and richer understanding of one of many types of transnational religious connections and one familiar to millions of donors and beneficiaries. The research was useful in that it sought to look at a relationship among three parties: the sponsor, World Vision, and the child. This study captured the distinct perspective of those in the chain. Because of the depth of the research, the researcher was able to step back and seek to understand deeper meanings of child sponsorship. The lessons taken from this research probably could be applied to others who find themselves in this narrow subculture of child sponsorship, but its lessons were not more broadly applicable or transferable to the dissertation research.

VanderPol (2010) referred to a gap that exists in the study of Evangelical parachurch organizations addressing poverty. It is part of a broader gap that he described in religious studies wherein the focus is usually on denominations and churches. This

result contrasts interestingly with the finding of Clarke (2006) that development studies traditionally ignore the aspect of faith in development and of faith-based organizations. From different perspectives, VanderPol and Clarke each pointed to the value of further study of Evangelical organizations addressing humanitarian activities. In terms of an operational aspect, there is broad recognition from both scholars (Lister, 2000; VanderPol, 2010; Wuthnow, 2009; Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008) and practitioners (Bassett, 1994; Butin, 2001; James, 2008) of the need to better understand transnational partnerships.

Accountability

There are a number of issues that are driving increased expectations of NGO accountability. First of all NGOs have experienced significant growth, and attract far more funding than they did in the past (Jordan, 2007; Jordan & Van Tujil, 2006). Even as they grow, the public and NGOs themselves have begun to question "the myth of NGO infallibility" (Najam, 1996a, p. 339), and their reputation has begun to be tarnished by examples of organizations which do not live up to high standards of behavior (Steffek & Hahn, 2010b). As they have become more influential and sometimes antagonistic, other institutions have begun to also scrutinize them in terms of their own accountability and legitimacy (Charnovitz, 2006; Goetz & Jenkins, 2002; Jordan, 2007). They are seen as not having the same accountability as governments, which are accountable to the electorate, or of businesses whose products are ultimately subject to consumer choice (Kovach, 2006). They are also criticized for often not being participatory or democratic

in their internal processes even as they espouse such positions externally (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). These factors have led to increasingly asking questions about NGOs' effectiveness, reliability, and legitimacy (Jordan, 2005).

In considering accountability of NGOs, there are many interpretations of the term. It is a complicated and changing term (Mulgan, 2000), and Mordaunt (2006) reflected on the fact that different parties in a relationship may have different definitions and different stakeholders have differing expectations. As a result of this variation, there are numerous definitions of *accountability*. For instance, one of the more important definitions came from Edwards and Hulme (1996) and referred to accountability as "the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" (p. 967). Slim (2002) referred to the accountability of NGOs as a process in which the NGO holds itself responsible for beliefs and actions in a way that involves stakeholders and addresses what it learns. Ebrahim (2003b) wrote extensively on the subject of accountability and has proposed a definition of accountability as "the means through which individuals and organizations are held externally to account for their actions and as the means by which they take internal responsibility for continuously shaping and scrutinizing organizational mission, goals and performance" (p. 194).

As there are multiple definitions of accountability, in many ways it is easier to understand the term by delineating its subcomponents. Ebrahim (2003a) referred to accountability as having multiple dimensions, including the actors involved, the mechanisms it utilizes, how results are measured, and the different types of functional

and strategic responses that organizations have. Another approach is to determine who seeks the accountability, who is to be accountable, where accountability is being sought, how it is established, and for what it is sought (Goetz & Jenkins, 2002). Callamard (2006) described five initial operational principles developed by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP): "Who is accountable; to whom; for what; how; for what outcomes" (p. 185).

Power is central to accountability, and Weisband and Ebrahim (2007) affirmed that "asymmetries in resources become important in influencing who is able to hold whom accountable" (p. 11). Related to this concept, Edwards and Hulme (1996) indicated that there are downward accountabilities to beneficiaries, partner organizations, and staff as well as upward accountabilities to donors, boards of directors, and others with power. The danger is that accountability primarily becomes upwards towards donors and the powerful, and that the interests of those served by the organization and those who are less powerful are not taken into account (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Organizations tend to focus on these patrons at the expense of clients and even the organization's own mission, and they sometimes engage in the "sham of accountability" to beneficiaries (Najam, 1996a, p. 346). In addition, accountability is not simply bilateral; rather, nonprofits have accountabilities to multiple stakeholders at the same time, those including donors, regulators, beneficiaries, themselves, etc. (Ebrahim, 2003b, 2010). These different stakeholders have competing demands (Ebrahim, 2003b) and negotiation among them becomes vital for the organization (Edwards & Hulme, 1995a, 1995b).

Accountability also must look at the unique challenges with management and staff in organizations. Owen, Swift, Humphrey, and Bowerman (2000) identified the issue of *management capture* in which managers control processes and information to project an image rather than being accountable, especially to society in general. This focus on image can negatively impact the degree to which they are accountable. This problem can be more acute the further removed beneficiaries are from decision-making (Avina, 1993). Chambers (1995) indicated that if the behavior of development professionals became more focused on clients rather than the self, then programs would be transformed. Townsend and Townsend (2004) and Townsend, Porter, and Mawdsley (2004) referred to the desires of NGOs to improve their own situation and of their self-serving behavior while Steffek and Hahn (2010b) indicated organizations are often actually advocating for their own interests rather than those of the poor. Ellerman (2002) developed the idea of how organizations become invested in approaches for reasons of protecting their brand and fundraising, and this emphasis also can contribute to challenges of organizational accountability. Each of these issues points to the challenge of making sure that accountability is not controlled by management. Yet another way to see it is through a framework of *functional accountability,* which refers to short-term uses of resources and impacts, and *strategic accountability,* which refers to the impacts in the broader environment (Avina, 1993; Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

In his seminal work, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Hirshman (1970) developed an idea that can be important in identifying mechanisms for accountability. His central idea was related to how customers or members of an organization can react to the inevitable

failings of management that occasionally need to be addressed. *Exit* is either to stop purchasing the product or to leave the organization while *voice* is "any attempt at all to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual petition to the management directly in charge" (Hirshman, 1970, p. 30). A third idea is *loyalty* which reflects the organization's efforts to "repress voice alongside exit" (Hirshman, 1970, p. 93). From an organizational point of view, voice is a "mechanism with considerable usefulness for maintaining performance [and] institutions can be designed in such a way that the cost of individual and collective action would be reduced" (Hirshman, 1970, p. 42). Therefore, organizations need to create mechanisms which affirm voice as a means to identify their failings. These concepts apply to understanding NGO relationships in different ways. For instance, for a community working with an NGO, the option is usually one of "take it or leave it" (Uphoff, 1995, p. 19; Ebrahim, 2007, p. 205) which is the equivalent of either loyalty or exit. This is not usually a tenable option (Ebrahim, 2003b; Najam, 1996), and the community is often left in a situation in which it has to assess its options and the extent to which it can exercise voice (Ebrahim, 2003b).

In practice, accountability requires specific mechanisms and Ebrahim (2003a) identified five mechanisms through which accountability is exercised: disclosure statements, performance assessment and evaluation, participation, self-regulation, and social auditing. He differentiated between some of these which are tools, others which are processes, and still others which are a mix of both. Another set of mechanisms is more internally driven and is reflected in management practices. According to Jordan (2005)

these include boards, procedures for complaints, conflict-of-interest policies, whistleblower policies, and the use of ombudsmen to be responsive to the perspectives of external stakeholders. The primary driver of most of the current accountability mechanisms are donors and government (Jordan, 2005).

There are a number of challenges with the concept of accountability. Weisband and Ebrahim (2007) asked if the focus on accountability is actually achieving what it sets out do to. They questioned the "normative assumptions, particularly the notion that more accountability is necessarily better" (Weisband & Ebrahim, 2007, p. 15) especially as the mechanisms tend to reinforce current power relations and interests. Accountability tends to prioritize donor needs and perspectives and may be prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller organizations (Jordan, 2005). Another challenge of accountability is the current bias towards the linear which is reflected in the use of the logical framework. Uphoff (1995) indicated that accountability does not so easily permit such a linear and reductionist approach. Biggs and Neame (1995) found that the world does not function in practice as linear models indicate that it should. Such practices of defining objectives at the beginning also present an obstacle to being participatory (Bornstein, 2006). This type of approach may also overemphasize short-term quantitative goals, standardized indicators, a focus on the project, and hierarchical approaches (Edwards & Hulme, 1995b).

Yet another challenge is how to integrate accountability with learning. For instance, Ebrahim (2007) referred to the need to move from "seeing evaluations as report cards of performance to a means of improvement" (p. 211). He continued, "control-

oriented structures enable routine error-corrections and quality control (i.e. single-loop learning), but tend to discourage fundamental forms for change and innovation (i.e. double-loop learning)" (Ebrahim, 2007, p. 215). This idea borrows from the terminology of Argris and Schon (1996) in which single-loop focuses on immediate goals while double-loop focuses on modifying longer-term organizational approaches.

Finally, a unique challenge with international NGOs is accountability in global or transnational activities. They are global in nature but operate in a way that impacts individuals in other countries, and this impact can create a disconnection in their accountability (Kovach, 2006), and there is a clear need to a have a transnational approach (Charnovitz, 2006). They impact the lives of ordinary people but are not significantly subjected to the authority of the states where they operate (Goetz & Jenkins, 2002).

Accountability can vary based on the characteristics of organizations. Ebrahim (2003b, 2010) identified three types of organizations and how accountability varies amongst them. These are membership organizations, service organizations, and policy advocacy networks, and he compared them based on to whom they are accountable, their mechanisms of accountability, and their characteristics of accountability. Accountability varied as they have different mechanisms and different constituencies to which they respond. Steffek and Hahn (2010a) also indicated that within the realm of NGOs, there cannot be one standard means of evaluation that applies to all them. Another way that accountability can vary is based on organizational maturity. Avina (1993, p. 455) identified four stages in an NGO's life cycle which are start-up, expansion, consolidation,

and close-out. Avina indicated that understanding the stage is important to understanding the kinds of issues that it is likely to face and the nature of its relationships to key stakeholders, including donors and beneficiaries.

Accountability is closely related to agency theory. Ebrahim stated the following:

> In short, a principal-agent perspective contributes to our understanding of accountability by focusing attention on relationships between actors (principals and agents) and the strategies used by principals to have their agendas fulfilled. This perspective falls short, however, in addressing accountability problems arising from incongruent interests between principals and agents, internal rather than external mechanisms, the roles of principals in shaping agent performance, and ambiguities and conflict arising from multiple principals. (2003b, pp. 198-199)

Accountability is often perceived as an issue of oversight and is frequently seen as a principal-agent problem (Ebrahim, 2009). Nonetheless, it is often more ambiguous in practice in NGOs (Ebrahim, 2009). Fry (1995) described accountability in terms that are interactive between a principal and an agent and in which both are accountable and in which there are "conversations of accountability" (p. 190) as the relationship evolves. For the agent, the quality of such relationships is dependent on its having a voice, seeing the principal's intent as congruent with the greater good, and the history of the relationship and how the principal has treated the agent.

Ebrahim (2003b; 2007) identified how the NGO in its relationships with clients and communities, funders and sector regulators, can be both a principal and an agent which complicates the application of the theory. Agency theory was seen as limited by Brown and Moore (2001) because there are many different stakeholders and the very work of NGOs often concerns seeking to change power relationships. Brown (2007) also

commented that agency theory is limited in reference to accountability because it is focused on two-way relationships, it is more hierarchical than is often the case where there are multiple accountabilities, it assumes very clear and fixed contracts when that is often not the case, and it does not recognize evolving expectations and roles. Ebrahim (2003b) indicated that in practice NGOs are principals, and those they help are their agents, and that to change this the *voice* (as Hirshman would say) for the beneficiaries would have to be increased.

Research was identified on accountability in the literature that is relevant to faith-based transnational partnership. Bornstein (2006) carried out in-depth interviews, documentation review, and observation to look at 30 NGOs in South Africa and how they were impacted by monitoring and evaluation used for accountability. In the United States, Campbell (2002) conducted research that involved surveys and looked at the challenges between achieving project-level goals versus public goals. Lewis (2007) used a case study of a large Bangladeshi NGO, while Shah and Shah (1995) conducted a case study that explored the participatory methodologies used to increase the accountability of an NGO to the village institutions and communities which it professed to serve in India.

There were also gaps in the literature. Ebrahim (2005, 2009) identified a need for looking at accountability in the context of power relationships and multi-directional relationships, at how a focus on short-term accountability hinders learning and innovation, and at the need to study the effectiveness of different approaches to accountability.

Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory has its origin largely in the work of Edward Freeman in the book, *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach* (1984). Freeman believed that a new framework was needed for management which better accounted for the external environment and helped managers respond to it more effectively. Freeman (1984) defined a stakeholder as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives" (p. 25). In this work, he identified the importance of rationally understanding the relationships with stakeholders which required identifying them and their interests, as well as the processes through which these relationships are managed. Freeman (1984) also discussed a concept of *voluntarism* in which "an organization must on its own will undertake to satisfy its key stakeholders" (p. 74). Several propositions were put forward about how voluntarism needed to be implemented within the organization. Overall, stakeholder theory offered a framework in which management was more cognizant and proactive in managing the external environment and responding to those with a stake in the organization.

Stakeholder theory can be justified in three distinct ways, those being descriptive/empirical, instrumental, and normative justifications (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The descriptive/empirical approach simply describes actual behavior of managers (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995). The instrumental approach examines cause and effect and what occurs based on managers' behaviors or if they pursue certain actions (Jones, 1995). The normative approach seeks to reflect moral expectations of how organizations should function (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Jones (1995) summarized

these different approaches succinctly by indicating that they address: "what happens? what happens if? and what should happen?, respectively" (p. 406).

Nevertheless, Acontacopoulous and Meric (2005) stated that these three approaches to justifying the theory sometimes are less clear in practice. A review of the literature by Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz (2008) found all three approaches to the theory being used, with normative being the most common followed by descriptive, and instrumental being a distant third (p. 1159). Ultimately, stakeholder theory is normative and differs from the competing theory of stockholder theory because it explicitly addresses values and their fundamental place in the management of organizations (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). In fact, Acontacopoulous and Meric (2005) made a strong critique to those who see the matter from an instrumental perspective. The fact that stakeholder theory is normative brings a moral perspective to the justification and one which becomes the actual basis for seeing stakeholders not as a means to an end but rather as the end in themselves (Maak & Pless, 2006).

Freeman provided a definition of stakeholders as "any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm's objectives" (Freeman, 1985, p. 25). Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) indicated in a literature review a number of other definitions and narrower approaches. They indicated that narrow approaches respond to the reality of limited resources and time to work with stakeholders and to the need to keep to those stakeholders which have direct relevance to the central economic activities of the organization. In their work, they proposed that stakeholders and their importance

are based on the attributes of the power, legitimacy, and urgency, which their claims present. The degree to which these attributes or a combination of them exists, determines the *salience* of stakeholder claims, which is the degree to which the organization will prioritize the varying claims of stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997, p. 869). Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz (2008) indicated that in the literature the normative issue of "Which stakeholders should managers then pay attention to" and the descriptive issue of "Which stakeholders do managers really care about" (p. 1161) were of central importance. The researchers found that normative criteria for identifying stakeholders included their level of formal power, their taking of risks, or even their lack of power.

There are a number of ways to manage stakeholders. In his original work, Freeman (1984) identified four transactional approaches to stakeholders that range from ignoring the stakeholder to overtly negotiating with them. Owen, Swift, Humphrey, and Bowerman (2000, p. 85) addressed the issue of *management capture* in which management controls stakeholder inclusion based on its own goals and interests. This concept reflects a process of managing stakeholders. Rasche and Esser (2006) identified the need to move toward stakeholder accountability in which there is dialog with stakeholders from the very beginning and in which stakeholders, rather than management, define accountability. This change requires a shift in approach from a leader-subordinate relationship with stakeholders to a leader-stakeholder approach which goes against traditional leadership approaches (Maak & Pless, 2006).

Management has a unique role in stakeholder theory. Management is the one stakeholder of the organization that enters into relationship or implicit contracts with all

other stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992). Members of management are different from all other stakeholders and are the "centre of the nexus" of contracts (p. 134). In this role, they are responsible for the processes that link stakeholders to the organization and which must be understood and managed to be effective with the external environment represented through the stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). This notion is similar to the idea that management is the stakeholder that is at the center of stakeholder theory who must contract with the other stakeholders of the firm (Jones, 1995). Stated in a different way, Donaldson and Preston (1995) identified managers as being responsible to carry out activities and use resources in a way that benefits stakeholders. Rowley (1997) examined stakeholder theory from a network theory perspective and pointed out, however, that often stakeholders have their own relationships which can significantly impact their relationships to the organization. If stakeholder approaches are to be successful, management must promote the voluntarism to which Freeman (1984) referred and which implies an intentional effort to take into account the stakeholders. Pointer and Orlikoff (2002) applied the stakeholder concept to the boards of organizations, indicating that they are to work as agents of stakeholders to represent and advance their interests. Based on this concept, the board is to identify, understand, and act on behalf of the stakeholders.

One of the central challenges in stakeholder theory is prioritizing the differing interests of many stakeholders. *Balancing* is a process of understanding and addressing the competing demands of stakeholders (Reynolds, Schultz, & Hekman, 2006, p. 286). An important concept is whether management should seek to achieve balance within each individual decision or across the decisions of the organization; theorists generally state it

is better to do so across all decisions (Reynolds et al., 2006). One reason for that belief is *resource divisibility* and the fact that sometimes it is not possible to divide resources amongst stakeholders. Resource divisibility and the relative importance of the demands of the stakeholder were found to largely drive the balancing of stakeholder claims (Reynolds et al., 2006).

It is necessary also to identify how management responds to stakeholders. Oliver (1991) identified the reality that organizations face pressures from diverse external actors and created a typology of how they respond which is relevant to stakeholder theory. There are five strategic responses, *acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance,* and *manipulation* (Oliver, 1991). The strategy of compromise is the one which best seeks to balance the interests of stakeholders. Rowley (1997) identified four responses of the organization to its stakeholders; they emerge from the use of network theory, and he labels them *subordinate, compromiser, solitarian,* and *commander*. The response labeled *compromiser* is the one that most seeks to balance stakeholder interests. The interesting aspect of Rowley's analysis is that he indicated that the response is a function of the degree of *centrality* of the organization in the network of stakeholders and the *density* of the relationships between stakeholders. Both Oliver's and Rowley's ideas are descriptive rather than normative in nature.

Stakeholder theory and agency theory have some interesting similarities and differences. Hill and Jones (1992) identified that both agency theory and stakeholder theory begin with the concept of contracts, and they identified certain similarities which led them to see principal-agent relationships as a subset of stakeholder-agent

relationships (p. 134). Differences that emerged are the inclusion of implicit contracts in stakeholder theory (Hill & Jones, 1992) and the classification of stakeholder theory as normative and not instrumental (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Maak & Pless, 2006). In fact, stakeholder theory is different in that it gives legitimacy to many stakeholders who have no formal contractual relationship (Antonacopoulou & Meric, 2005). In agency theory, the participants in the relationship are obvious and their interests are quite explicit based on an implied contract, but in stakeholder theory, stakeholders must be identified and the nature of the relationship clarified (Freeman, 1984). Another important difference concerns the identification of the principal and the agent. In agency theory, the organization may often be seen as the principal, based on the contract. Nonetheless, in stakeholder theory, the organization is generally seen as the agent of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Hill & Jones, 1992).

A fundamental criticism of stakeholder theory is that it violates stockholder theory, which gives one clear objective for the organization, which is value maximization (Jensen, 2001). Jensen (2001) argued that because of this limitation, stakeholder theory does not help the organization to choose between competing decisions, and that lack of clarity can result in self-interested behavior of managers. Goodpaster (1991) called this the *stakeholder paradox* in which management has both a fiduciary responsibility to stockholders and an accountability to stakeholders which weakens the relationship to the stockholder. In response, Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (2003) indicated that stakeholder theory is consistent with value maximization and is needed as organizations function in much more complex external environments in which they have no choice but to engage

with stakeholders and in doing so it supports value maximization. A second criticism of stakeholder theory is simply that there is not an instrumental justification for use of stakeholder theory, but that it is rather values-laden and a reflection of an ideology and should be seen and used accordingly (Antonacopoulou & Meric, 2005).

There appear to be a number of significant gaps in the literature on stakeholder theory. Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz (2008) have conducted a broad literature review and indicated that there is need for more qualitative research using stakeholder theory and a need to apply the theory to a variety of other kinds of organizations, including nonprofit organizations. Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (2003) indicated that research has focused too narrowly on large, multinational corporations, and they identified nonprofit organizations as one of the under-researched categories of organizations. Maak and Pless (2006) indicated that there is need to focus more on the role of the leadership in stakeholder relationships.

Partnership

A starting point in understanding international partnerships is the concept of the *aid chain*. This metaphorical chain extends from the donor to the beneficiary and in between there are different points at which a variety of organizations intervene (Harrison, 2007; Morse & McNamara, 2006). Along this chain, there exists the opportunity to form partnerships. Ashman (2001) indicated that rather than simple two-party relationships, it may be increasingly important to think of partnership chains (p. 93).

There are both normative and instrumental justifications for partnership (Brinkerhoff, 2002a, 2002b). The normative justification is championed by advocates of NGOs and sees partnership as a legitimate end in itself and also as reflective of more democratic and ethical approaches to carrying out international development. There are also instrumental justifications in the literature, and they focus on efficiency and effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2002a). Nonetheless, there is little evidence to support the instrumental argument about how performance is impacted by partnership (Brinkerhoff, 2002a). Under the label of partnership, there is a wide array of relationships, those ranging from sub-contracting to relationships of equality (Morse & McNamara, 2006). In general, the idealized conceptions of partnership are not realized in practice for a variety of reasons (Fowler, 1998).

Different authors identified some of the factors in successful partnership. Fowler (1998) focused on trust, while Ashman (2001) included trust but also identified individual relationships, good communication, reciprocal influence, and learning together. Trust, confidence, support of senior leadership, clarity of goals, compatibility, healthy levels of conflict, and capacity to meet expectations are factors identified by Brinkerhoff (2002a). Success factors entered into the definition of partnership, and Brinkerhoff (2002a) used an extensive review of the literature to craft the following definition:

> Partnership is a dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of labor based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner. Partnership encompasses mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision-making, mutual accountability, and transparency. (p. 21)

Central concepts related to partnership are *mutuality*, which captures the values of partnership, and *organizational identity,* which captures the reasons why respective partners are chosen (Brinkerhoff, 2002a, 2002b). Success factors largely fall within these two broad categories.

Partnerships are generally formed between Northern and Southern NGOs, the former generally providing financial resources and the latter generally receiving financial resources. Lister (2000) indicated that those higher up on the aid chain (the donors) use the term partnership more. Ashman (2001) found that there are significant gaps in satisfaction between U.S. organizations and their Southern partners, with the former being much more satisfied with the partnership arrangements. This finding is consistent with Lister's (2000) result that partnership is seen as imposed from Northern NGOs as part of the way that they justify their ongoing role. Critics have argued that ultimately the rhetoric of partnership will continue to be used, even when the practice is not aligned with it, as it benefits the Northern NGOs (Fowler, 1998).

The literature revealed that there are a number of barriers to overcome for successful partnership. Northern organizations often have junior staff prescribing policies and procedures for Southern partners, and what are seemingly smaller issues for Northern NGOs are very significant policy-level issues for the Southern NGOs (Fowler, 1998). Ashman (2001) found that internal systems of Northern NGOs, including policies, procedures, and controls, created barriers to the partnership principles they espoused. Furthermore, Ashman identified that the partnership principles were often in

contradiction with the accountability principles for the Northern partner. He summarized the overall barriers as follows:

> These policies, procedures, and cultures are components of internal systems designed to ensure accountability and management control. A deeper analysis of these systems suggests that they were not designed for collaboration with Southern NGOs. They were designed to enable the PVOs to carry out core tasks like resource mobilization and program management in the context of norms and sanctions establishing upward accountability to donors and governance bodies. (Ashman, 2001, p. 87)

There are four frameworks that have been identified to look at partnership relationships (Morse & McNamara, 2006). These include the analysis of power between partners (Lister, 2000), discourse between partners (Hastings, 1999), interdependence (Bantham, Celuch, & Kasouf, 2003), and performance (Brinkerhoff, 2002a). The last framework is the most practical and provides a clear approach to evaluate or measure the actual partnership.

In general, there is little research that actually evaluated the effectiveness of partnership in achieving more successful international development (Morse & McNamara, 2006). The Brinkerhoff (2002a) framework, which is strongest in potentially evaluating partnership effectiveness, appears to not have been applied very broadly, leaving open the question of its application in practice.

Examples of partnership were found in the literature. Ashman (2001) carried out a cross-case analysis of four partnerships between U.S. PVOs and African NGOs. It utilized multiple case analysis, action research, and intergroup theory to develop themes for a theory. A major finding of the research was how the internal systems of the PVO created barriers to partnership.

Another case study focused on the relationship of a U.S. NGO and a local NGO in a Central American country (Lister, 2000). Lister applied a framework focused on power to evaluate the relationship. Morse & McNamara (2006) also utilized a case study and did so to look at a long-term partnership between church-based donors in Europe and a Catholic diocese in Nigeria. They used a multi-analytic approach in which four different partnership frameworks were applied to the narrative of the case study.

Intermediation

Howells (2006), in a comprehensive literature review on intermediation, identified the distinction that exists between studying intermediary organizations and the intermediation process. The literature is primarily focused on the process of intermediation with much of what is written examining economic models of intermediation focused on transaction costs (Biglaiser, 1993). A strand within this body of research is intermediation in development aid but with a focus on the process (Rowat & Seabright, 2006; Warner, 2003).

The definition of Hackett (1992) is useful as he provided a broad view of two types of intermediaries: the merchant who buys and sells goods and the broker who facilitates without purchasing or selling. Biglaiser's (1993) focus is narrower, only addressing the role of the merchant, and he stated the following:

> In many markets there are agents who trade but do not originally own a good, do not physically alter the good, and receive no consumption value from possessing the good. These agents are middlemen, who make profits by buying a good from one individual and selling it to another at a higher price. (p. 212)

Curchod (2004) stated that intermediation is "any activity of a firm that consists in adding a link in the chain or a system of interrelations among suppliers, clients and partners, with the objective of facilitating these interrelations and to derive profits from them" (p. 3).

Carroll (1992) gave a definition of intermediary nongovernmental organizations and defined them as organizations that

> Carry on classical intermediary-type functions in which they "mediate" or build bridges between their beneficiaries and the institutions holding financial, economic, and political resources. They exemplify the kind of brokering, negotiating, and risk-shouldering activities that make this institutional sector so useful to poor and isolated beneficiaries and so appealing to donor agencies. (pp. 26-27)

These organizations are also referred to as *bridging organizations* (Brown, 1991) and *support organizations* (Brown & Kaelegaonkar, 2002). Sanyal (2006) indicated that these are distinct from traditional Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in that they are in the middle of local, national, and international organizations, and they carry out a number of functions not understood to be traditional activities of NGOs.

The need for intermediation is often caused by situations in which transactions of services or products have certain types of costs. Ellis (2003) indicated that these costs can be *search* costs which are for finding information and identifying potential partners, *contracting* costs related to setting up the relationship, *monitoring* costs which are verification of the terms of the relationship, and *enforcement* costs when agreements are not met. Biglaiser (1993) emphasized that there are situations when it is hard to judge quality in a transaction and the cost of developing the expertise to judge is too high. In

the international realm, Mahnke, Wareham, and Bjorn-Andersen (2008) indicated that parties to transactions often need intermediation for greater international experience, new competencies, greater relational ability, and the bridging of cultural differences.

In the narrower domain of NGOs, the need for intermediation reflects broader trends. Edwards, Hulme, and Wallace (1999) commented on the fact that the roles of international NGOs have been increasingly questioned, and they are shifting from direct implementation to building the capacity of others to implement. Carroll (1992) and Sanyal (2006) also saw the greater need for capacity building of local institutions. Edwards et al. (1999) described an aspect of learning which intermediation reflects, and this observation resonates with important roles that intermediaries have exercised in business (Howells, 2006; Smedlund, 2006).

There are a variety of advantages and disadvantages in intermediation. It first of all can reduce the transaction costs associated with searching, contracting, monitoring, and enforcing (Ellis, 2003). Good intermediation provides expertise which helps determine quality and avoid adverse selection (Biglaiser, 1993; Biglaiser & Friedman, 1994; Curchod, 2004). In this capacity, the intermediary is usually considered to be more trustworthy than the other party (Biglaiser, 1993). Howells (2006) described the critical role that intermediaries can play in innovation as they are involved in transferring knowledge, supporting decision-making, evaluating solutions, identifying potential partners, and providing assistance in making agreements. They can also be helpful in matching diffuse partners or potential partners with each other (Ellis, 2003). Mahnke, Wareham, and Bjorn-Anderson (2008) stated that intermediaries bridge cultural

differences and cognitive differences, assist in setting up the relationship, and help in managing the relationship.

Another advantage in the case of international NGOs is that they are often considered to be more reliable and easier to work with than local partners, though this situation is gradually changing (Edwards, Hulme, & Wallace, 1999). In addition, Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002) indicated that NGOs' values-based approaches and their proximity and knowledge of local groups make them useful. They identify five broad functions for NGOs that include capacity building, resource mobilization, knowledge transfer, building other supportive relationships, and creating links to different sectors.

Specific threats arise to the intermediary. For instance, intermediation of information is central to what intermediaries do (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003). Over time, the maturation of markets and relationships can result in the elimination of the need of this function because information flows more directly, due to new technologies and the internet, and the need for an intermediary decreases (Ellis, 2003; Curchod, 2004). In addition, the other participants in the relationship learn from their experiences and therefore have less need of intermediation (Mahnke, Wareham, & Bjorn-Andersen, 2008).

International NGOs that are intermediaries also have the threat of new competitors in the form of other NGOs, businesses, and consultancies, as well as local organizations that no longer need intermediaries (Edwards, Hulme, & Wallace, 1999). The latter both increasingly want to represent themselves and are able to receive direct funding (Edwards et al., 1999). Brown and Kelgaonkar (2002) identified four distinct

types of threats to such organizations, which are their own legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of partners, their relationships to the state, their relationships to the market, and their relationship to international agencies that fund them.

Opportunism is a risk with intermediaries and Curchod (2004) indicated how intermediaries seek to gain power over suppliers and customers rather than increasing their independence. Intermediaries accomplish this gain in power by building up barriers designed to retain their role in the relationship, such as by having their services designed into the supplier's product. Ellis (2003) indicated that such opportunism develops even more easily in the uncertainty and cultural distance implied in international exchanges. It can simply be hard to have proper feedback on performance when working with aid agencies (Rowat & Seabright, 2006). In seeking to reduce intermediation problems in international aid with intermediation, Zetland (2007) found that selection of quality intermediaries was more critical than the actual monitoring of them.

Carroll's (1992) research on intermediary NGOs indicated that evaluation tends to be focused either on the "effectiveness and efficiency with which the organizations channel services and resources" or "intangible goals of participation, raised awareness, and enhanced self-reliance" (p. 27). Carroll indicated that both focuses ought to be evaluated. Furthermore, he found that formal accountability mechanisms were not as effective as previously assumed and that more open processes guided by ethical principles were more useful.

The literature related to intermediary organizations is very extensive in terms of looking at economic models of intermediation focused on transaction costs (Biglaiser,

1993; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003) and that same approach is prominent in the literature focused on intermediation in development aid (Rowat & Seabright, 2006). It should be noted that there is significant literature discussing intermediation in development aid (Nielson & Tierney, 2003; Warner, 2003) though very little of it is based on actual research.

Areas that emerged as important for further research were the nature of the decline of mediated relationships (Ellis, 2003), the spectrum of intermediaries, their functions and roles (Howells, 2006), and the extent to which transnational intermediation may be much like the extension of consultancy services (Mahnke, Wareham, & Bjorn-Andersen, 2008).

Synthesis of Research Findings

The research established a number of key issues. First of all, it was clear that agency theory is a relevant theoretical framework with which to analyze faith-based transnational partnerships, as they also involve the same issues of principal and agent in structuring their relationships. The literature on accountability identified a number of issues that challenge a conception of principal-agent relationships as being simply dyadic. The literature on stakeholder theory served as an opposing theory to principal-agency theory; however, it is a theory with little in the way of instrumental justification as it is normative. The literature on faith-based transnational partnerships identified common aspects to the connections made in these activities and provided a clear typology of the type of religious organizations that function as intermediaries. The literature review on

partnership provided definitions for partnership relationships as well as analytic frameworks that can be used to evaluate partnership from different points of view. The literature on intermediation demonstrated the vital role that intermediary organizations play in innovation but also the importance of determining the optimal functions for the intermediary. A review of research methodologies made it evident that the case study is far and away the most common way to look at the topic and related themes. Nonetheless, a highly relevant research project was identified using grounded theory which appeared to be the only approach that could adequately address the research question. Grounded theory is unique amongst the qualitative approaches in that it seeks to achieve a systematic understanding of a phenomenon and develop it into an explanation or theory (Creswell, 2007), and that was the purpose of this research. Grounded theory also has systematic procedures that have been developed which can guide the researcher (Creswell, 2007).

Critique of Previous Research

There was a demonstrated need for more research on the management of transnational religious connections, and Wuthnow and Offutt (2008) specifically recommended the study of the "organizational mechanisms through which they are refracted" (p. 228). Wuthnow (2009) has gathered information that is amongst the most comprehensive that exists but is primarily descriptive, and he indicated that there is a need to understand the transnational partnerships that are vital in making these connections. A review of the literature revealed that there was still relatively little written

about transnational connections, and what exists was often focused on descriptive information on the flows of resources and people, not on the many other aspects of this phenomenon. In fact, Ebaugh (2004) affirmed that there are few comparative studies of transnational religious ties. There was a gap in the literature on transnational religious connection in providing theoretical explanations of the roles and processes which underlie it.

The literature on accountability was very broad, providing useful constructs that can be applied to faith-based transnational partnerships, yet Ebrahim (2005, 2009) identified the need that still exists to look at ultimate effectiveness of accountability, issues of power, multi-directional relationships, and how a short-term focus impacts learning. Brinkerhoff (2002a) provided a good review of partnership and the research by Lister (2000) and Morse and Tierney (2003) are but two of many examples of cases in the literature which examined partnership between religious entities. The partnership literature provided a strong foundation for research on faith-based transnational partnership, but there was a general gap to which Brinkerhoff (2002a) pointed in the use of frameworks to evaluate partnerships' effectiveness.

The literature on intermediation was made up of significant literature on economic modeling of the transactions that take place and why intermediation is needed. The focus was strongly on the transaction costs of such relationships. Nonetheless, Howells (2006) described the functions of intermediation in organizations in general and went beyond the aspect of transaction costs to explain many other functions that intermediation includes. Even so, there was not literature evaluating the importance of

intermediation in transnational religious partnerships and how it may differ from its application in other settings, and this gap in the literature merits further exploration.

Finally, there emerged a need to more closely study how agency theory relates to faith-based transnational partnerships. Such partnerships manage issues of how the principal and agent reconcile sometimes differing goals, asymmetric information, and distinct risk tolerance. Nonetheless, there seemed to have been almost no application of agency theory to these very common partnerships. Also, there needed to be more explanation of situations involving multiple principals, multiple agents, and control mechanisms built more around social context than formal contracts.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the academic literature was reviewed in order to understand critical aspects of the theoretical foundation, methodology, and other substantive areas in the literature. Agency theory was developed as the theoretical foundation, and its constructs and applicability to faith-based partnerships were examined. Methodological issues were identified and the grounded theory methodology was reviewed for its applicability to the research. Finally, the literature was reviewed in other substantive areas related to the research those being organizational typologies, transnational religious connections, accountability, stakeholder theory, partnership, and intermediation. Finally, the literature was synthesized and a critique was made of the literature.

CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

The grounded theory methodology was reviewed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the methodological model and research design is clarified. In addition, critical decisions on the role of the researcher; population and sample; and data collection, preparation, and analysis are developed, along with the expected findings.

Purpose of the Study

The research study generated a framework explaining the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations in transnational partnerships to stakeholders, specifically supporting organizations and implementing organizations. The framework can be used by practitioners in faith-based intermediary organizations, and supporting and implementing organizations, to more effectively structure, manage, and evaluate these relationships. Transnational religious connections or partnerships refer to the flow of people, services, goods, and other resources across national boundaries between those of the same religious tradition (Wuthnow, 2009; Wuthnow & Offutt, 2008).

Methodological Model

The methodology was derived from the grounded theory work of Strauss and Corbin (1990; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Grounded theory research utilizes a process to analysis data out of which a theory can emerge (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007;

Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Scott, 2004; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The work of Strauss and Corbin was selected as it provides a systematic set of procedures and therefore greater guidance to the novice researcher (1990; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007). A central aspect of the original grounded theory approach is the *constant comparative method* which consists of four stages: (a) comparing data in conceptual categories, (b) the integration of categories, (c) outlining a theory, (d) and then writing up the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This approach was the foundation of the methodological model.

Research Design

The central question of the research was as follows: What are the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations working in transnational partnerships to the supporting organizations, churches, and individuals that provide resources and to the implementing organizations, churches, and individuals that carry out the activities of the partnership? In order to address the research question, a grounded theory approach was utilized as it is the qualitative approach that seeks to develop theories and possible explanations, and developing tentative hypotheses for a theory and framework is central to the purpose of this research. The specific grounded theory approach that was used was that of Strauss and Corbin (1990; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

Role of the Researcher

The researcher had worked in faith-based transnational partnerships and collaborated with implementing organizations though he had not collaborated with

supporting organizations. His employer at the time of the research was a faith-based intermediary organization. Because of his current role, he intentionally excluded that organization from being part of the sample of faith-based intermediary organizations, and he excluded any implementing organization that worked with it from being part of the sample. This restriction was easy to achieve as the organization had no current or past partnerships or activities in Costa Rica, and he simply excluded it from the list of potential faith-based intermediary organizations.

Target Population and Sampling

Population

The target population was in the United States and Costa Rica where the research took place, and it was composed of individuals who had been directly involved in a faith-based transnational partnership and who were from the Evangelical Christian religious tradition. The population consisted of three sub-groups (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. Representation of a faith-based transnational partnership.

First of all, the study population included individuals associated with faith-based organizations that served as intermediaries in these partnerships and which are referred to as *faith-based intermediary organizations*. Secondly, it included individuals associated with organizations, churches, and individuals that provided financial, technical, and volunteer support for the partnership, and which are referred to as *supporting organizations*. Finally, it included individuals associated with organizations and churches that implement the activities of the partnership, and which are referred to as *implementing organizations*.

Barrett, Johnson, and Crossing (2007), leading scholars on global trends in Christianity, indicated that data on global Christianity needs to be seen more in an "impressionistic" (p. 26) manner due to different definitions of terms and categories that

overlap. In understanding the population in this research, it was best to see some of the numbers more from this impressionistic perspective.

As regards U.S. faith-based intermediary organizations, Wuthnow (2009) indicated that they have grown dramatically as part of the growth in transnational connections. For instance, the Accord Network is a group of 60 Evangelical NGOs addressing poverty around the world with budgets totaling over five billion dollars (Accord, 2011). There is not exact information for Evangelical denominations, but there are over 1,000 Christian denominations in the United Sates (Mandryk, 2010), and many serve as intermediaries for affiliated local churches in other countries. Also, Protestant Christian missionaries from the United States, the great majority of whom are Evangelical, are also a sizable population, and 700 Protestant Christian organizations reported sending long-term staff overseas, those being an estimated 43,500 in 2010 (Mandryk, 2010). These individuals frequently serve in intermediary roles. It is important to recognize that many organizations do not send international staff and simply carry out their work through visits and long-distance communication. Therefore, the potential number of intermediary organizations extended well into the thousands.

As regards supporting organizations, Wuthnow (2009) reported that the majority of U.S. churches engage in overseas activities and over a million members participate in short-term international missions trips every year, and churches have dramatically increased their international financial giving in recent years. Mandryk (2010) reported the existence of over 525,000 local Christian congregations in the U.S. with a large

percentage being Evangelical, as this sub-group represented over 29% of the US population.

Finally, there was the matter of the implementing organizations in Costa Rica. In 2009, the population of Costa Rica was 4.2 million with over 13% being Evangelical (CIA World Factbook, 2010). A conservative estimate of local Evangelical Christian congregations would be over 4,500 churches (Mandryk, 2010). Beyond this there would be hundreds of faith-based NGOs, schools, orphanages, and other social service organizations carrying out activities many with local support.

Sample Size

As the research utilized grounded theory, it sought a sample that was representative of these overall populations. The sample was originally intended to be of 21 individuals but was contemplated to be as high as 30 individuals if this proved necessary in order to gather additional information. This size was considered to be appropriate by Creswell (2007) and Morse (2000) though in grounded theory the sample size can be lower or higher depending on how the research is designed and whether or not the researcher is seeking to produce simply a substantive theory or a formal theory that applies across substantive areas (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The adequacy of the sample in grounded theory is determined based on theoretical saturation of categories and representative concepts rather than judged based on representativeness of the population as in quantitative research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The study sought to establish tentative hypotheses in one substantive area though

it sought to reflect the four stages of the constant comparative method as originally proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967).

Sampling Method

The researcher used a sequential sampling approach with selective and theoretical sampling which is the normal approach in seeking to follow grounded theory procedures (Draucker, Matsolf, Ross, & Rusk, 2007). The researcher began with *selective sampling* of individuals that were able to contribute to understanding the phenomenon and meet certain criterion (Draucker et al., 2007). The coding associated with this was open coding. As the process moved forward, it then used *theoretical sampling,* which is an approach in which individuals are selected that can address emerging categories which have been identified after the initial open-ended interviews and their coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Draucker et al., 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

In the research study the sample was chosen based on their involvement in a transnational partnership, their ability to participate within the prescribed time period, and their having specific knowledge regarding the actual coordination of the partnership relationships. As data emerged from the interviews, theoretical sampling was used to further explore concepts, categories and relationships between categories, and the researcher interviewed those specific participants best able to provide additional information. In grounded theory, the researcher can cease data collection when saturation has occurred which is when no additional data is emerging and the properties and dimensions of categories are complete (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

One of the strategies used to keep this within the parameters of the sample size was to reduce complexity by limiting the categories that emerged and this was considered acceptable given that the research sought tentative hypotheses for a substantive theory rather than the development of a formal theory.

Data Collection and Preparation Procedures

Sampling

The sample consisted of three sub-groups those being employees or individuals associated with faith-based intermediary organizations; employees of or individuals associated with implementing organizations; and employees of or individuals associated with supporting organizations.

The selection of participants associated with faith-based intermediary organizations consisted in several steps.

1. In order to identify the participants, the researcher compiled a list of potential intermediary organizations that met certain criteria. (a) The organization was a member of the Accord Network or the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) in the United States. Both of these bodies are Evangelical member organizations that affirm the *Statement of Faith* of the WEA (World Evangelical Alliance, 2011) or the NAE in the United States (National Association of Evangelicals, 2011). (b) The organization had staff based in either the United States or Costa Rica. These locations were selected as they were easily accessible to the researcher. (c) The organization served as a faith-

based transnational intermediary in some kind of humanitarian activity and not exclusively spiritual activities. Such activities included supporting schools, orphanages, feeding centers, community development, disaster relief, addressing child trafficking, etc.

2. The researcher sent a *recruitment letter* via email to approximately 10 potential key informants associated with organizations from the list of intermediary organizations. See Appendixes A and B.
3. The researcher scheduled a face-to-face or telephone meeting to provide additional information to potential key informants. The purpose of the meeting was to: (a) explain the research; (b) inquire about their interest in participating; (c) confirm that the individual had led, managed, coordinated, collaborated in or facilitated a transnational partnership as the intermediary; (d) deliver a template of the informed consent form for review. See Appendixes C and D.
4. The researcher sought to have seven key informants in the sample that were associated with faith-based intermediary organizations.
5. The researcher scheduled the first interview and presented the Capella University Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved *informed consent form* for a signature.

The selection of participants associated with implementing organizations was as follows:

1. In order to identify the participants, the researcher compiled a list of potential implementing organizations that met certain criteria. (a) The organization was

either a member of the *Federación Alianza Evangélica Costarricense* (FAEC) in Costa Rica (Federación Alianza Evangélica Costarricense, 2011) or affirmed the Statement of Faith of the WEA (World Evangelical Alliance, 2011). (b) The organization was in Costa Rica. (c) The organization served as an implementing organization in some kind of humanitarian activity and not exclusively spiritual activities. Such activities included schools, orphanages, feeding centers, community development, disaster relief, addressing child trafficking, etc.

2. The researcher sent a recruitment letter via email to approximately 10 potential key informants associated with organizations from the list of implementing organizations.
3. The researcher scheduled a face-to-face or telephone meeting to provide additional information to potential key informants. The purpose of the meeting was to: (a) explain the research; (b) inquire about their interest in participating; (c) confirm that the individual had led, managed, coordinated, collaborated in or facilitated a transnational partnership as the implementing organization; (d) deliver a template of the informed consent form for review.
4. The researcher sought to have seven key informants in the sample that were associated with implementing organizations.
5. The researcher scheduled the first interview and presented the Capella University IRB-approved informed consent form for a signature.

The selection of participants associated with supporting organizations was as follows:

1. In order to identify the participants, the researcher compiled a list of potential supporting organizations that met certain criteria. (a) The organization was a member of the Accord Network or the NAE in the United States. Both of these bodies are Evangelical member organizations that affirm the Statement of Faith of the WEA (World Evangelical Alliance, 2011) or the NAE (National Association of Evangelicals, 2011). (b) The organization was in the United States. (c) The organization served as a support organization and provided support or resources for some kind of human service activity and was not exclusively focused on spiritual activities. Such activities included supporting schools, orphanages, feeding centers, community development, disaster relief, addressing child trafficking, etc.
2. The researcher sent a recruitment letter via email to approximately 10 potential key informants associated with supporting organizations.
3. The researcher scheduled a face-to-face or telephone meeting to provide additional information to potential key informants associated with supporting organizations. The purpose of the meeting was to: (a) explain the research; (b) inquire about their interest in participating; (c) confirm that the individual had led, managed, coordinated, collaborated in or facilitated a transnational partnership as the intermediary; (d) deliver a template of the informed consent form for review.

4. The researcher sought to have seven key informants in the sample associated with supporting organizations.
5. The researcher scheduled the first interview and presented the Capella University IRB-approved informed consent form for a signature.

Protection of Participants

Faith-based transnational partnerships involve both important relationships and important flows of resources. One risk that needed to be managed was to avoid the release of any kind of information that could create any tensions or strains between parties in a partnership as sensitive points of view were expressed. A second risk that needed to be managed was that no information be released that could actually threaten a formal partnership and the completion of its activities or the provision of funding because of a negative reaction of one of the parties.

Confidentiality of information was absolute. The first thing that was done to mitigate risks was that the researcher sought to only include one of the parties in any specific transnational partnership (faith-based intermediary, supporting or implementing organization) in the research sample. Secondly, the researcher maintained all of the data in a secure computer and in a locked filing cabinet. Finally, the actually dissertation did not attribute any information to a specific organization and no names of key informants were included.

The most important ethical issue in this research was related to *informed consent*. This required that potential participants be informed of the nature of the research ahead of

time and they be given the choice about whether or not they would participate (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Such informed consent required obtaining their agreement of participation in writing.

The following process was put in place to protect participants by using informed consent.

1. A consent form for the US context was developed in English and a similar form was developed in Spanish for the Costa Rica context. The form addressed all IRB requirements including the nature of the research, information on what the participation involved, a statement about the voluntary nature of participation, the commitment that the responses would be confidential, and contact information of the researcher. See Appendixes C and D.
2. The process and forms were reviewed and approved through Capella University's IRB process. It was anticipated that the research would have some additional IRB requirements since it was conducted in two different countries with two different languages.
3. The researcher met with potential participants or spoke with them by telephone and explained the research and then provided the informed consent form to the potential participants for their revision and decision about whether or not they would participate.

Data Collection

Data was collected through interviews based on a series of open-ended questions derived from the key research question and all the interviews were conducted by the researcher and audio recorded. Interviews were in dispersed locations and either in a location of mutual convenience to the participant and researcher or by telephone. A first interview was generally a face-to-face interview if in Costa Rica but was often by telephone with the participants in the US. If conducted, second interviews were either by telephone or face-to-face.

Because of the nature of the grounded theory process, after the initial interview and through theoretical sampling, the researcher went back to a few participants to investigate new categories and relationships which emerged in the research. After the process had been exhausted and new understandings were no longer emerging about the categories, the data collection process ended as theoretical saturation had been reached (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Data Preparation

There were two critical aspects of preparing the data for analysis. First of all, audio recordings were transcribed. Each transcript was then uploaded directly into a software program for the type of data and the type of analysis that would be conducted. The researcher used MAXQDA (2012) as the software program as it had all the necessary functions to store, code, analyze and retrieve data in a grounded theory approach. Finally,

some sections of the transcriptions that were in Spanish were translated into English to support memos or other aspects of the process. Note that all memos were written in English.

Data Protection

The data that was collected was considered confidential. The information was stored on a password protected computer and it was kept on a back-up drive. Hard copy information collected from participants as well as the back-up drive was kept in a locked filing cabinet in the researcher's home office.

Measures and Research Questions

The measures utilized were the verbal information that was provided by the participants through one-on-one interviews. The interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed for analysis. It was estimated that half the interviews would be conducted in English and half in Spanish. The interviews that were conducted in Spanish were transcribed to Spanish and later some sections of them were translated to English. Wherever a participant was able to effectively communicate in English, preference was given to conducting the interview in that language so as to minimize issues of subsequent translation. Detailed interview questions were structured around six basic questions which address the primary research question.

The central question of the research was as follows: What are the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations working in transnational

partnerships to the supporting organizations, churches and individuals that provide resources and to the implementing organizations, churches, and individuals that carry out the activities of the partnership? In order to address the central question, there were six broad questions that were used to explore the phenomenon. The questions are listed below and potential follow-up questions associated with each question are listed in Appendix E.

1. What are the general reasons that intermediary organizations, supporting organizations and implementing organizations enter into faith-based transnational partnerships?
2. What are the processes that need to be managed by the intermediary organization, supporting organizations and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
3. How is accountability managed in faith-based transnational partnerships?
4. Who is accountable to whom in faith-based transnational partnerships?
5. What are the major areas of similarities and differences that arise between organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
6. What are the elements that need to be defined in contractual relationships between intermediary organizations, supporting organizations and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?

Data Analysis Procedures

Data was analyzed at three main levels through processes of open coding, axial coding, and selective coding or the integration of categories (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Open coding involved analyzing the data in order to identify concepts that emerged from it (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). These concepts were defined in terms of properties that described a concept and dimensions which were variations within the property. The process moved from raw data to concepts. In order to do this, the researcher first read the data in order to get an overall feel for it. He then read it again and, where a concept emerged, he wrote a memo. A memo is a written analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and in this case an analysis of data that leads to identifying a concept and inter-relationships. These memos evolved and took varying forms. The product of the open coding was raw data that had been coded and memos analyzing concepts that had emerged.

Axial coding followed which is a process in which concepts and categories from open coding are related to each other (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). It should be noted that axial and open coding are not completely linear as axial coding can occur during open coding as the analysis of data reveals relationships between concepts. In addition, in carrying out axial coding as well as open coding, new questions emerged. For this reason, after the initial open-ended interviews, theoretical sampling occurred in which new questions were asked of a participant or participants in order to develop categories. It was during both axial coding and the process of integrating

categories that constant comparison between categories was utilized (Scott, 2004). The product of the axial coding was additional raw data that had been coded as well as updated and new memos that clarified concepts and related them to each other.

Finally, there was a process of *integrating categories* that had emerged (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This process is also called selective coding (Creswell, 2007; Scott, 2004) and it was the key step to develop tentative hypotheses for a theory explaining the accountability of intermediary organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships. This step required detailed review of the memos and sought to understand how they all fit together. Ultimately, a core category emerged and other categories linked to it. In the latter process a story or narrative statement began to emerge (Creswell, 2007). The product of the integration of categories or selective coding was an understanding of the core category and the links with other categories, as well as the basic story line of the tentative hypotheses related to faith-based transnational partnerships.

Scott (2004) provides an example of a *conditional relationship guide* which helps to organize the information that emerges related to categories and their interrelationships by answering six questions the last of which is the consequence of each category which is a process. These consequences or processes are then related to a core category through a *reflective coding matrix* (Scott). The use of these tools helped to bridge analysis, interpretation and theory development. Once the tentative hypotheses of the theory had emerged, they were validated with a small number of participants as well as by a comparison with the relevant academic literature.

Expected Findings

The theoretical framework that was utilized was agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Based on agency theory, it was believed that what would be found was that the contractual relationship in these partnerships was being developed largely based on an assumption that the principal is the faith-based intermediary organization and the implementing and supporting organizations are its agents. It was expected that this would be revealed to be occurring not because it best addresses the needs of the implementing and supporting organizations but rather because it is a historically accepted solution that, up until recently, could not be changed due to lack of information and direct access of supporting organizations and implementing organizations to each other.

A second major area of expected findings was related to the nature of accountability. It was expected that the accountability would largely be upward with the implementing organizations being accountable to the faith-based intermediary organization. Nonetheless, it was expected that the accountability of the intermediary organization to supporting organizations would vary significantly depending specifically on the financial resource level provided by the supporting organization.

A third area of expected findings was surrounding the roles and processes involved in faith-based transnational partnerships. It was expected to reveal the essential roles of each in these relationships as well as the conditions that give rise to them. As importantly, it was expected to capture both the rhetoric and the reality of ideas surrounding stakeholders and partnership.

A final area of expected findings was the development of an effective framework for the structuring, managing and evaluating faith-based transnational partnerships. It was expected that this would be built off of the tentative hypotheses that were developed and would serve as a practical tool for practitioners involved in these partnerships. The actual research results are described in Chapter 4 and discussed in Chapter 5, and all the expected findings are addressed.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the methodological model and research design were clarified. In addition, critical decisions on the role of the researcher; population and sample; and data collection, preparation and analysis were developed, along with the expected findings.

CHAPTER 4. RESULTS

Chapter Introduction

The methodology and procedures for the research study were outlined in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the actual application of data collection, preparation, and analysis procedures is discussed, and analytical categories and interrelationships are captured through the use of the conditional relationship guide and reflective coding matrix. The results for the six research questions are presented and illustrated through significant use of the voice of the research participants, and related to key categories that emerged as a result of the coding and analytical processes.

Research Methodology Applied to Data Collection and Preparation

The researcher submitted the proposal and supplemental documentation to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Capella University, and the research was determined to be exempt in accordance with federal regulations, 45 CFR 46, 101(a) and approval was given on January 9, 2012 to initiate research activities (see Appendix G).

The research was conducted both in the United States and Costa Rica. Therefore, in preparation for the field interviews, Costa Rican laws and regulations were consulted. The regulations focus on bioethics and medical research and do not address this type of research (Ley General de Salud, 1974). The regulations do address informed consent and the authorization of *Scientific Ethics Committees* (CEC) for medical research. A National Council for Health Research (CONIS) accredits these committees, five of which exist in medical-related government institutions, and two in private health institutions. Important

documents that communicate regulations are a general health law and two presidential decrees (Ley General de Salud, 1974; Decreto Ejecutivo n. 27349-S, 1998; Decreto Ejecutivo n. 31078, 2003). The regulations include clarifying the purpose, methodology, duration, benefits, and risks of the research. They establish that there cannot be compensation, only the covering of expenses, and also that the consent should be signed. Those expectations are used for medical research and were considered important elements to also include in the consent form for this research. As regards the more general research context, there are no regulations and expectations that guide nonmedical research. This information on Costa Rican regulations was also further confirmed by consulting the *International Compilation of Human Research Protections* of the United States government (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). It should be noted that in recent years in Costa Rica, there has been significant debate about the authority of current legislation over the area of medical research (Monteiro, 2007). This information was provided to the IRB as part of seeking approval for the research through Supplemental Form O: International Research.

In accordance with what was submitted to the IRB, certain documents required certified translations from English to Spanish. In the IRB process, a commitment was made to do this for the informed consent form and the recruitment letter, both of which had been included with the proposal in English and referred to in Supplemental Form J: Use of Translations and Interpreters. Certified translations of these two documents were obtained from an official government translator and Supplemental Form K: Certification of Translation was subsequently submitted to the IRB (see Appendixes B and D for the

Spanish translations.). In addition to these two documents, a certified translation for the detailed interview questions from the proposal was also obtained though it was not required by the IRB (see Appendix F).

Role of the Researcher

The researcher is an employee of a faith-based organization, but he excluded any participant from the organization in which he is employed. His work is in the implementing environment, and he further excluded having any participants from implementing organizations that partner with his organization. These exclusions ensured compliance with Supplemental Form I: Conflict of Interest Management Plan, which was submitted to the IRB with the research proposal.

Population, Sampling Method, and Sample Size

The target population in the United States and Costa Rica consisted of individuals who had been directly involved in a faith-based transnational partnership and who were from the Evangelical Christian religious tradition. To identify participants from this religious tradition, the researcher identified organizations and churches in these two countries which were associated with the NAE in the United States, the Accord Network in the United States, the *Federación Alianza Evangelica Costarricense* in Costa Rica, or those which affirmed the *Statement of Faith* of the World Evangelical Alliance.

The recruitment letter was sent via email (see Appendixes A and B) and then potential participants were contacted to determine if they had directly participated in a

transnational partnership either in a supporting, intermediary, or implementing organization and to confirm if they were willing to participate in the research. Upon confirming that they had participated in a transnational partnership and agreed to be in the research, the informed consent form was emailed to them (see Appendixes C and D). Informed consent was discussed and the form signed prior to the interview. The selection process was designed to get a relatively equal distribution of participants from supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations.

Nineteen individuals participated in the research; six were from implementing organizations, seven from intermediary organizations, and six from supporting organizations, though a majority of them had served in multiple organizations, and many of them had also served in more than one type of organization. Due to confidentiality issues, the names of organizations, the names of individuals, the exact titles of positions, and the names of countries of some activities are not being provided, but Table 1 provides some general information about roles, organizational type, and years of experience of each participant.

Table 1. Research Participants

Participant	Nature of Experience	Years of Experience
0034	Director in ecclesiastical organization and pastor in implementing church; past voluntary experience with implementing and intermediary NGOs	29
0036	Program manager at implementation level for a major, intermediary nongovernmental organization (NGO)	11
0042	Executive director of an implementing charitable foundation; past regional director in two large intermediary NGOs and field director for a US mega-church	23
0048	Missions director of a large supporting church	11
0051	Board member of a globally-active theological seminary and major donor	12
0057	Missions chairman of supporting church and board member and consultant to major mission agency; past experience on implementing organization boards	27
0059	Past global field director in a large intermediary NGO and multiple positions as a missionary	24
0074	General director of large school; past regional director for intermediary NGO and executive director for large implementing NGO	28
0077	Professor of missiology; past missionary and pastor of a supporting church	15
0079	Executive director of implementing NGO; past work as a missionary	15
0080	Pastor in implementing church and anthropologist	8
0081	Regional director in a large denominational mission agency	5
0082	Program manager and administrator of an implementing NGO	15
0084	Executive director of large implementing NGO	22
0085	Missions pastor of a large supporting church; past administrator in two mission agencies	25
0087	Regional director in a large intermediary NGO; past positions in US and internationally in three other intermediary NGOs	23
0088	Regional director in a major intermediary NGO and theologian; past experience directing a seminary and as a pastor	Over 16
0089	Missionary for major denominational mission agency	7
0099	Director of overseas giving in a support-providing foundation	5

The participants' experience covered a broad range of humanitarian activities including emergency relief; community development; micro-enterprise development; children's programs including foster care, residential care, sponsorship, and formal schooling; housing and construction; and programs focused on sexual and physical abuse and human trafficking.

Saturation was reached with a sample of 19, which was slightly smaller than the 21 that was originally proposed. There was sufficient breadth generated through the interviews, and the researcher decided that it was more important to develop more depth with the slightly smaller sample than to add more participants.

Protection of Participants

The primary means of protecting participants was a rigorous informed consent form and process. This form was initially prepared in English and approved through the Capella University IRB before commencing research. In addition, though formal Costa Rican regulations for this type of research do not exist, the form met and exceeded the informed consent regulations for bio-medical research in Costa Rica. A certified Spanish translation of the form was used in Costa Rica for native Spanish speakers (see Appendix D). The researcher possesses signed informed consent forms for all 19 participants.

Data Collection, Preparation, and Protection Procedures

Each interview was conducted at a location chosen by the participant or via telephone. Informed consent was discussed and forms signed prior to all interviews, and

the detailed interview questions were used to guide the researcher. As a result of theoretical sampling, the researcher further probed certain issues and updated the detailed interview questions to better respond to the information which emerged from the participants. The initial version of the questions is in Appendix E. Eighteen of the 19 interviews were recorded. In one case, the participant granted informed consent to be interviewed but not recorded. Eleven of the participants were interviewed in English, and eight were interviewed in Spanish. The interview process extended from February to July 2012.

Interviews were transcribed by the researcher and an individual approved to support this activity through the IRB process and who also signed a confidentiality agreement. To further protect confidentiality, the names of the participants were not included in the written transcript; instead, the participants were identified via the last four digits on the electronic audio file name associated with that interview. The one exception was the nineteenth participant who was not audio recorded, and a code of 0099 was simply assigned. These codes are used when referring to the participants in this chapter. There are over 700 pages of transcripts documenting the interviews. Each transcribed interview was uploaded into the qualitative analysis software MAXQDA. This software specifically has abilities to support the open and axial coding process, the writing of memos, and other retrieval and analysis processes.

Data confidentiality was further protected by maintaining information either on a password-protected computer in the home of the researcher or in a locked filing cabinet in the home of the researcher.

Research Methodology Applied to Data Analysis

Data Analysis Procedures

The research process followed the traditional coding and theoretical sampling approach of grounded theory, as espoused by Strauss and Corbin (1990), but there were three distinct phases of conducting interviews of participants. In the first phase, 10 interviews were conducted. Open coding was the focus; 71 codes were generated, and a total of 628 segments in the transcripts were coded. During this phase, numerous memos were also generated, most of them being quite brief and concerning codes and interrelationships, and they helped in the theoretical sampling that took place throughout this phase. At this stage, there was little focus and a proliferation of codes and associated concepts made it difficult to work with the information. To address this, all concepts were reviewed and sixteen broad categories were identified.

In the second phase, another five interviews were conducted; these interviews sought to identify additional information related to the emerging categories. Another 242 segments were coded from these transcripts, and more memos were generated, again those being quite brief. At the end of this phase, the researcher prepared summary memos which better identified properties and dimensions and compared the words of participants related to the categories across interviews. At the end of this phase, the categories were refined, and their number reduced to 13.

In the third phase, another four interviews were conducted. Coding was very focused and narrow on these transcripts and directed only towards the categories, and a

total of 48 additional coded segments were generated. There was a nineteenth interview as well, in which the participant gave consent for an interview but not recording. Therefore, this interview was used more to validate concepts of the emerging theory rather than for category development. Following this process, the categories were significantly reviewed and reshaped, and coding concluded with 10 of them being established.

After these three phases of coding, a c*onditional relationship guide* (Scott, 2004) was developed in order to better understand and describe categories, and this process largely reflects the purposes of axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), and it addresses key questions identified by Strauss and Corbin as part of "opening up the data" (p. 77). Then followed the development of the *reflective coding matrix* (Scott, 2004), which served to more formally identify a core category and interrelationships and which is central to selective coding.

After having completed the categories, the researcher did *member checking* in which he verbally discussed key categories with two of the participants. Based on their feedback, additional changes were made.

Conditional Relationship Guide

In order to develop the conditional relationship guide, a series of relational questions are answered about the category (Scott, 2004, pp. 115-116):

- What is [the category]?
- When does [the category] occur?

- Where does [the category] occur?
- Why does [the category] occur?
- How does [the category] occur?
- With what consequence does [the category] occur?

In carrying out this process, the categories evolved and were modified in different ways. It also became useful to return both to the coded segments and to transcripts of interviews in order to address gaps or issues that the researcher had not yet considered or adequately addressed. The categories that emerged fell into three distinct groupings. The first group consisted of three categories related to partnership formation:

- Recognizing a need for partners
- Finding with whom to partner
- Articulating the characteristics of the partnership

The second group was made up of five categories of services which intermediaries provide and which are of significant importance to supporting and implementing organizations:

- Mobilizing and distributing financial resources
- Interpreting the ongoing partnership
- Communicating and evaluating
- Providing specialized services
- Translating context

The third group was related to the process of intermediary accountability and consists in three categories:

- Recognizing a need for accountability
- Overcoming barriers in intermediary accountability
- Negotiating intermediary accountability

Table 2 lists the eleven categories and the responses to the key questions.

Table 2. Conditional Relationship Guide

Category	Recognizing a Need for Partners
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which an organization sees a need to work together with other organizations
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Time of inability to do an activity on their own; (2) Time of inability to do as much of an activity as they want on their own; (3) Time in which an opportunity unexpectedly presents itself to do an activity with others.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Internal organizational meetings in which they discuss their goals; (2) Contacts initiated by other organizations who explain to them what they could do if they worked together.
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Financial resources are limited; (2) Technical capacity is limited; (3) Ability to be in other locations is limited; (4) Do not want to have to do the activity alone.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Understanding how it might be possible to work with others; (2) Receiving marketing and solicitation messages; (3) Networking
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	Motivation to seek partners

Category	Finding with Whom to Partner
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which an organization chooses to work with a specific organization
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Time in which they are seeking new partners; (2) Time in which they are approached by others seeking partners.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Informal discussions; (2) Informal and formal selection processes.
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) There needs to be a decision point to begin to work together; (2) There are organizations that request to be partners; (3) There are many potential partners for some organizations.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Discussions; (2) Application and selection processes.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) An ability to initiate and carry out activities of the relationship; (2) An understanding of who has power in the relationship to select.

Table 2. Conditional Relationship Guide (cont.)

Category	Articulating the Characteristics of the Partnership
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which the specific parameters of partnership are determined
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Partnership development; (2) Partnership negotiations.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Internal meetings; (2) Negotiations with other organizations; (3) Practices that emerge naturally.
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Each organization wants to clarify those things which help it meet its needs; (2) Starting point is so open-ended and ambiguous that it requires trying to clarify it simply to begin; (3) Patterns of action begin to define the relationship.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Communicating; (2) Negotiating; (3) Imposing.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) An understanding of who has power in the relationship; (2) Ongoing ways of relating to and understanding partners.

Category	Controlling and Distributing Financial Resources
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which resources to carry out an activity or sustain an organization are obtained and distributed by the intermediary
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Time of wanting to start a new program; (2) Time of wanting to expand an existing program; (3) Time of wanting to sustain an organization.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Phone calls, meetings and site visits with supporting organizations; (2) Phone calls, meetings, and site visits with implementing organizations
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Intermediary and implementing organizations need resources; (2) Intermediary and supporting organizations need a way to distribute resources.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Marketing and solicitation; (2) Networking and making contacts; (3) Building a good reputation.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) Power derived from resource control; (2) New programs; (3) Expanded programs; (4) Financially sustainable organizations.

Table 2. Conditional Relationship Guide (cont.)

Category	Interpreting the Ongoing Partnership
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which the intermediary clarifies evolving parameters of the partnership
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Emergence of issues not described when the partnership began; (2) Emergence of misunderstandings and conflict; (3) Unforeseen circumstances; (4) Extension or renewal of the relationship/goals.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Meetings; (2) Written communications and agreements.
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) New situations arise that require clarification; (2) Organizations do not fulfill their responsibilities; (3) New opportunities arise.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Actions taken; (2) Directives given; (3) Negotiations.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) Clarity and continuation of relationship; (2) Conflict resolution; (3) Partnership accountability.

Category	Communicating and Evaluating
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which an organization communicates and evaluates progress
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Ongoing relationship; (2) Pre-defined periods or deadlines.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Informal conversations, correspondence, meetings: (2) Informal visits; (3) Formal reports and meetings; (4) Formal evaluative processes.
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Organization wants to know how the purposes of the partnership are progressing; (2) Desire for accountability.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Ongoing relationship (2) Reporting mechanisms; (3) Evaluative mechanisms.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) Belief that the partnership is functioning as intended; (2) Healthy relationship; (3) Goal accountability.

Table 2. Conditional Relationship Guide (cont.)

Category	Providing Specialized Services
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which added-value services are provided by the intermediary
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: Partnership activities
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Partnership agreements; (2) Goals
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Needs which the organization cannot address for itself; (2) Needs which the organization does not want to have to develop its own capacity to address.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: Negotiations
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) Increased quality and/or breadth of activity; (2) Ability of each organization to remain specialized.

Category	Translating Context
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which cultural, national/regional, and linguistic contextualization takes place
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: All processes
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: All processes
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Contextualization is valued; (2) Organizations are each from very different contexts; (2) Supporting and implementing organizations expect it of the intermediary.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Provision of knowledge and expertise; (2) Willingness to represent the other partner; (3) Adaptation of practices.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) Contextualized relationship and activities; (2) Reduction of power differences; (3) Cultural accountability.

Table 2. Conditional Relationship Guide (cont.)

Category	Recognizing a Need for Accountability
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which an organization decides why intermediary accountability is important and should be sought
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	In: (1) Reflecting on past experiences; (2) Discovering the need for greater accountability in the current relationship; (3) Creating awareness of the value of intermediary accountability
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Partnership agreements; (2) Day-to-day relationships
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Partnership values; (2) Concerns about performance and self-interest of the intermediary; (3) Need to demonstrate results to donors, supporters and beneficiaries; (4) Protection of the interests of the organization.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Reflection; (2) Rethinking historical patterns of relationship.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	Motivation to seek accountability of the intermediary.

Category	Overcoming Barriers in Intermediary Accountability
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which barriers to intermediary accountability are overcome
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Situations that change the balance of power; (2) Situations that change each organizations attitude about power.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Written agreements and communications; (2) Day-to-day relationships and contacts
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Power differentials create barriers to healthy intermediary accountability; (2) Perspectives change due to learning and new knowledge.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Changing the basis of power from money to values; (2) Increasing the direct relationship between supporting and implementing organizations.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	Reduction of intermediary power to appropriate level

Table 2. Conditional Relationship Guide (cont.)

Category	Negotiating Intermediary Accountability
What is [the category]? Using a participant's words helps avoid bias.	Process by which an organization seeks to negotiate intermediary accountability
When does [the category] occur? Using "during ..." helps form the answer.	During: (1) Times when the intermediary is in a relatively weaker position; (2) Times when partnership values are being affirmed; (3) Times when intermediary values mutual learning.
Where does [the category] occur? Using "in …" helps form the answer.	In: (1) Partnership negotiations; (2) Goal-setting; (3) Partnership mechanisms; (4) Accountability mechanisms.
Why does [the category] occur? Using "because …." helps form the answer.	Because: (1) Supporters and implementers see a need for it; (2) Supporters and implementers have the power to make it happen; (3) Supporters and implementers make the values case for it: (4) Supporters and implementers are willing to risk the loss of the relationship.
How does [the category] occur? Using "by …" helps form the answer.	By: (1) Negotiating accountability mechanisms; (2) Threat of suspension of support for the partnership.
With what Consequence does [the category] occur or is [the category] understood?	(1) Greater mutuality in relationship; (2) Reduction of power differential of intermediary; (3) Intermediary accountability.

Reflective Coding Matrix

Once axial coding has been completed through the use of the conditional relationship guide, it is necessary to take that information and convert it into the grounded theory. Strauss and Corbin (1998) advised a process of explaining a story line, relating sub-categories around a core category, relating dimensions across categories, validating data, and completing and further refining categories. The reflective coding matrix, a tool that helps to identify inter-relationships and the core category, accomplishes these tasks.

Based on this approach, the researcher started by reflecting on the categories to determine if there was one that appeared to be broad enough to account for other categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Important categories emerged when the researcher noticed categories with many interrelationships with other categories. The research focused on intermediary accountability, and three of the categories seemed to be especially broad in their relationship and central to the research.

Articulating the characteristics of the partnership captured the important early phase of defining the partnership. It pointed to the foundational issue that the organization that holds power determines many of the characteristics of partnership. *Mobilizing and distributing financial resources* reflected the centrality of financial resources in the experience of partnership and the reality that the control of money is the source of power. *Negotiating intermediary accountability* captured the idea that intermediary accountability must be negotiated and derived from means of influence other than power derived from financial resources.

Based on this analysis, a choice was made for a combined core category of *Optimizing intermediary accountability in partnership*. It broadly encompassed three groupings of categories: partnership formation, partnership services for which intermediaries were to be accountable, and the process of establishing the accountability of intermediaries. Based on the selection of the core category, all other categories were reviewed to incorporate them as sub-categories. That process entailed modifications to them as well as the combination of some of them. The number of categories was reduced from eleven to ten. The category *Overcoming barriers in intermediary accountability* was integrated within *Negotiating intermediary accountability*. Table 3 illustrates these adjustments.

Table 3. Reflective Coding Matrix

Partnership Formation:

Core Category	Optimizing Intermediary Accountability in Partnership		
Processes (action/ interaction)	Recognizing a need for partners	Finding with whom to partner	Articulating the characteristics of the partnership
Properties (characteristics of category)	Partnership motivation	Selection	Partnership structure
Dimensions (property location on continuum)	Religious beliefs Financial resources Receiving needed services Providing needed services	Identifying the process Who selects who Variations on selection Determining the impact of money/power	Power Bilateral or trilateral relationships Personal or institutional relationships Ultimate purpose of partnership Goal selection
Contexts	Desiring or needing to expand organizational activities	Openness to collaborate with others	Asserting relative power and interests
Modes for understanding the consequences (process outcome)	Openness to partnership relationship	Identification of a partnership	Understanding of how the specific partnership will work

Table 3. Reflective Coding Matrix (cont.)

Intermediary Services:

Core Category	Optimizing Intermediary Accountability in Partnership				
Processes (action/ interaction)	Mobilizing and distributing financial resources	Interpreting the ongoing partnership	Communicating and evaluating	Providing specialized services	Translating context
Properties (characteristics of category)	Power derived from resources	Interpretation	Communication	Adding value	Contextualiza-tion
Dimensions (property location on continuum)	Implementer expectations Supporter expectations Dependency Self-interest Goal distortion	Taking initiative Emerging issues Emerging goals Authority Informal accountability	Supporter expectations Ongoing Meaningful – dialogical Trust and openness Evaluation	Technical specialization Geographical coverage Economies of scale Brokering	Seeing the invisible Recognizing cultural differences Reducing imposition
Contexts	Desiring or needing to expand organizational activities	Clarity of responsibility	Commitment to communicating progress	Recognition of mutual need	Respecting and valuing cultural and national differences
Modes for understanding the consequences (process outcome)	Understanding of relative power of each organization in the partnership	Identification and resolution of emerging partnership issues	Effective communication and understanding of partnership progress	Enhanced effectiveness through contribution of each partner	Congruent activities and relationship with cultural and national contexts

Table 3. Reflective Coding Matrix (cont.)

Intermediary Accountability:

Core Category	Optimizing Intermediary Accountability in Partnership	
Processes (action/ interaction)	Recognizing a need for accountability	Negotiating intermediary accountability
Properties (characteristics of category)	Accountability motivation	Accountability structure
Dimensions (property location on continuum)	Realizing goals Increasing credibility for fundraising Reducing risk Affirming values Ensuring beneficiary impact	Identifying mechanisms Supporting organizations asserting accountability Implementing organizations asserting accountability Evolving accountability relationships
Contexts	Conviction of importance of intermediary accountability	Leverage with intermediary to change
Modes for understanding the consequences (process outcome)	Commitment to seek accountability of the intermediary	Achievement of some degree of intermediary accountability

Introduction to Results

The participants in this research shared their experiences and perspectives in response to six research questions, and this is the data that is the basis of the results. The analytical procedures of grounded theory were used to further conceptualize, categorize, and interrelate information. The results are structured in a way that addresses each of the six research questions, and the categories that emerged in the research process are also briefly documented through representative quotes of the participants. As an introduction, even before addressing the issue of partnership, it was important to understand the religious beliefs that predisposed the participants to work with those of the same religion to address humanitarian needs in other parts of the world. They were frequently grounded in religious ideas of *Kingdom of God* as understood by participants. A Missions Director passionately shared her feelings on why her church supported international activities:

> Which leads me to the idea of why do we do this. I think it's because we have to have a theology of Kingdom. We're joining God in His mission. It isn't our mission. It's His mission and we get to join Him, and it's about growth of the Kingdom and the Kingdom is everywhere. It isn't here in our city. It isn't in our country. It's not limited. It has no geopolitical border. So, you know, I think that's the big picture. (Participant 0048)

The language reflected in this research was very religious and not easily understood from those from outside of the religious tradition. A participant from an intermediary organization, who is also a theologian, defined this concept of *Kingdom of God* which so motivated many of the participants.

> The Kingdom of God is the world about which God continues to be dreaming. He has a dream of the world. We imagine in faith that God has a dream of the world, a project for the world. And that project of the world will be achieved only when he is recognized as its owner and king. Therefore, the world that we see today is

> not the world God wants. This is a world of injustice when God wants justice. This is a world of inequality when God wants equality. This is a world of violence when God wants peace. This is a world of division when God wants unity. Therefore the Kingdom of God is to promote this dream and promote this project of the world, of history, of life. (Participant 0088)

This expression points to the deep religious motivations that fuel faith-based transnational partnership. The concept of the Kingdom of God was very real for people, usually involving meanings of both social and spiritual activities, though the balance varied from participant to participant with most seeing them as interrelated and hard to separate from each other. It is hoped that this brief introduction to what proved so important to the participants gives context to their responses to the six research questions.

Results for Question 1

Introduction

The first research question was: What are the general reasons that intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations enter into faith-based transnational partnerships? This question began to identify the motivations of partnership, and in the process, the critical issue of power and its being rooted in control of financial resources, began to become visible. In exploring this first research question, there emerged concepts which eventually contributed to the categories of recognizing the need for partners, finding with whom to partner, and articulating the characteristics of partnership.

Recognizing the Need for Partners

Participants described why they decided to partner with other organizations to carry out activities in other countries. Two reasons were dominant: religious beliefs that specifically encouraged partnership and the need for financial resources. Two additional reasons emerged, as well: the need to receive services and the desire to provide services in which they had self-perceived competency or capacity.

The first and most deeply felt motivation for faith-based transnational partnerships is rooted in biblical teachings that lead to a general commitment to partner with others of the same religion to achieve greater purposes together. A biblical justification was consistent with what was learned in the literature review and a focus on the fulfillment of the *Great Commission* and the *Great Commandments* was used to justify ministry in other places. A commitment to partnership built upon a biblical foundation was a natural extension of this belief, and one participant described his motivation as the pastor of a supporting church in the United States:

> It was probably theological. This was the body of Christ operating and so for me a biblical model would be something like II Corinthians 8 and 9 [in the Bible] where Paul is organizing a collection for the poor in Jerusalem and asking folks in Macedonia and Corinth to share. And part of his teaching on that is talking about the importance of global international partnerships within the body of Christ and also reassuring them that this money is going to get there safely—and send trusted leaders and that kind of thing. So there's a biblical model for partnership within the global body of Christ as well as an obvious effectiveness and specialization, local knowledge, all of that kind of thing. (Participant 0077)

This perspective was characteristic among participants in that it was rooted in religious belief and examples from the Bible which strongly motivated the people in the church or organization. This example refers to two of the more common teachings that

support partnership. The first is of the *body of Christ* which is a concept derived from the passage I Corinthians 12: 12-14 in the Bible:

> Just as a body, though one, has many parts, but all its many parts form one body, so it is with Christ. For we were all baptized by one Spirit so as to form one body — whether Jews or Gentiles, slave or free — and we were all given the one Spirit to drink. Even so the body is not made up of one part but of many. (New International Version)

This passage is a frequently used in religious teaching to motivate people to work together. The other concept to which the participant refers is taken from the book of II Corinthians in the Bible and is about churches in one location helping the needy in a distant location.

The stated Christian beliefs that served as motivation also included concepts of unity (Participant 0079), stewardship (Participant 0057), and the religious community as a body with different parts (Participant 0081). These beliefs were equally important to participants from supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations engaged in partnerships. In some cases, the belief was very closely intertwined with personal biography or religious testimony. For example, one participant shared of how her own life experience and deep faith led to her commitment to help those who experienced various forms of abuse and exploitation (Participant 0089). The religious beliefs were the very foundation upon which a commitment to transnational religious partnership was built. They served to inspire action and often give practical guidance to how to carry it out.

The second motivation for partnership was simply to obtain financial resources. One participant who had worked both in intermediary and implementing organizations stated very directly that some organizations are simply seen as resource providers:

> The obvious answer is because there are people in countries with a lot of resources that have the possibility of requesting, gathering, and making available more resources than what we have or are able to have when we are implementing. . . . Many of these allies are for us resource actors. Therefore we seek an alliance for various types of resources that we are requiring in agreement with our vision. (Participant 0074)

This perspective often carried with it meanings associated with foreigners and historic patterns of relationships. In a characteristic response representative of many participants from supporting, intermediary, and implementing churches, one implementing pastor referred to the reality that people in his country have come to see: "The North American has always been seen as the one brings money, who brings dollars, who can save me, who can help me with my problems, who has a lot of money" (Participant 0080). Participants who were North American acknowledged the same issue over and over, sometimes recognizing it as a problem that was actually caused by North Americans who put money at the center of relationships, such as in the case of missionaries who saw that as their role: "Our history has been, if we need money, we call the mission, and the mission raises money for us" (Participant 0081).

While religious beliefs were always the starting point for exploring these partnerships, in practice, financial resourcing was a more frequent focus of discussion. There was often a little initial reserve in sharing about resources when talking about partnership because it seemed a bit misaligned with the religous motivations, or even to

be a bit worldly or self-interested, yet it turned out to be one of the most prevalent topics of the interviews. A supporting pastor in the United States who was actually quite idealistic expressed his experience as follows: "We hear a lot of talk about how partnership isn't just about money and all that, but I think it is mostly about money because that's the main resource that's lacking there" (Participant 0077).

Financial resources are of course essential to carry out activities, and it became evident that money was the focus of a great deal of activity. Another participant with a long and varied history with intermediaries and implementers stated:

> Everyone was scrambling for resources. It's resource deprived and therefore sometimes your need for resources hinder—are too influential. I mean it's reality. They don't have money. They don't have people. Everybody's scrambling for the same thing. How do you deal with that? (Participant 0059)

The search for financial resources often seemed like a structure built on top of the foundation of religious beliefs, and in practice it was more visible and given great attention.

The third motivation for partnership was the recognition that partners needed services in order to reach organizational or church goals. As one pastor put it, "It seems kind of obvious—like we couldn't do that on our own" (Participant 0079). He specifically referred to partnering with a large, evangelical relief and development agency to address the 2004 tsunami in Asia as an example of something beyond the capacity of his church. That example referred to two things that such organizations sometimes provide; specialized, technical expertise and geographical access, which supporting organizations usually do not have on their own. This same participant affirmed that they

sometimes also generated economies of scale. Another area of specialization was the manner in which many intermediaries essentially served as brokers. The Missions Director of a supporting church strongly affirmed the brokering role that intermediaries played which was so critical as the church sought to respond to situations in other countries (Participant 0048).

A fourth motivation for partnership was that sometimes an organization partnered in order to be able to share some type of non-financial resource. One participant referred to working with a very prominent church in the United States that specifically partnered as a way to share its own methodologies and experiences with others (Participant 0042), while a different participant referred to the fact that the mission agency with which he worked had a purpose in partnering to "give capacity to a partner" (Participant 0059).

Finding with Whom to Partner

Participants indicated the process by which they chose partners, identified which organizations they actually chose, and provided some variations to selecting partners.

First of all, there were different generic approaches to selecting partners. The most common response was that partnerships were largely circumstantial and initially unplanned. They might begin because of a relationship, a chance meeting, a disaster, or any other circumstance or opportunity that suddenly arose. For instance, one person described how her church had entered into partnerships and over the course of the interview shared about one relationship arising from a natural disaster, another arising due to relationships of church members, another because of a tragic car accident, and yet

another because of a personal friendship of the pastor (Participant 0048). Another participant referred to these as "opportunistic" relationships and as a positive way to begin:

> Well, I think that it's a good thing. Because without that . . . it would be somewhat shallow. You would be completely taking somebody else's word for it, which in and of itself may not be bad, but there's no personal relationship there, and the thing that makes . . . partnerships last over a period of years is both a relationship with the implementing parties and knowing how the Lord is using that relationship to advance the kingdom. (Participant 0057)

This serendipitous method seemed to be the most common way partnerships formed, especially from the perspective of many implementing and supporting organizations. Nonetheless, intermediaries and some more formal supporting organizations sometimes brought more systematic approaches to selection, as was the case of a major organization that referred to its more systematic or "scientific" approach to identifying implementing partners which involved formal processes and criteria developed over time (Participant 0036). Other means of choosing partners included partnerships borne of historic relationships, such as mission agencies which partner with local churches that they had birthed (Participant 0085) or universities that form partnerships with organizations linked to alumni or professors (Participant 051).

A second important issue was the realization of who really selects who in partnership. The general experience is that because money is central to partnership, the supporting or intermediary organization generally has much greater power in a selection decision. As one supporting church leader mentioned, his experience was that those seeking money are usually not too selective about who provides it (Participant 0057).

They are in a position where it is hard to say *no*. An issue then arises regarding who has more power, the supporting organization or the intermediary organization. In general, most supporting organizations represent a small part of an intermediary's revenue, leaving the supporting organization with relatively little negotiating power (Participant 0087) and making it relatively easy for the intermediary to say *no*. This, of course, changes dramatically when the supporting organization is larger or when it constitutes a high percentage of the intermediary organization's revenue; then the supporting organization usually has a dominant role. A finding which reveals much about who selects whom is the question of who terminates the partnership, and participants acknowledged that it was rarely the implementer who chose to do so.

A third aspect of selecting partners is that there can actually be other variations on the origin of the partners. For instance, some organizations develop their partner organizations. Large organizations sometimes target community-based organizations or churches and seek to develop them into potential partners (Participant 0036). It has also been common for mission agencies to partner with organizations and churches that they themselves created (Participant 0059).

Articulating the Characteristics of Partnership

The recognition that an organization wants to partner with others then must lead to a process in which an actual partnership is defined. This process also leads to understanding issues of power, bilateral or trilateral partnerships, personal or institutional relationships, the ultimate goal of partnership, and methods for selecting goals.

The first and most important issue impacting transnational partnership is the exercise of power, as it drives decisions on all other aspects of these relationships as they move from aspirational beliefs and values to day-to-day reality. The ability to mobilize resources is central to who is in control and who has power in the partnership, as one participant articulated.

> Look, it has to do with the basic factor of control and power. Hierarchically, if you manage to collect money, the money represents for you the possibility to do things and to have power. You do not transfer that power freely without having some type of guarantee that your interests are going to be met. And how does the chain of hierarchy or the chain of power begin? It begins largely with those that have the possibility of having the resources that make everything else work. Therefore, if I am the one that has economic power, above all economic power, I'm going to guarantee that all the relationships are under my control so that I continue and that I survive. I'm not going to be so naïve as to give economic resources to intermediaries or implementers without guaranteeing my own interests. That is the same as what the intermediary and implementer seek; the difference is that I can require it. The intermediary has to ask it of the donor, the implementer of the intermediary and donor. Everything is structured this way because those that have the power to deliver the money and resources make it that way, plan it that way, and manage it that way. They are never going to have a process that is democratic or horizontal because this is the way that they can control what they need to control to continue. (Participant 0074)

This reality of power, and power derived from control of financial resources, is initially uncomfortable to acknowledge, given the seemingly purer religious motivations and values which motivate seeking partners. Nonetheless, it is foundational to understanding actual partnerships and touches virtually all aspects of these relationships. Financial resources are the primary source of power, but one participant gave a broader view of the exercise of power, describing four things, each of which it its own way is still related to financial resources.

> It seems to me that when we are talking about tensions of power in the relationships with supporting organizations or [implementing] organizations or all of the other partners with whom we relate, the first thing is that each has different self-interest . . . . Therefore that diversity of self-interest that is not so visible, hidden interests, results in some organizations imposing their power . . . . Secondly, there is economic capacity. . . . Here we are. We are providing the money. We are going to say what to do . . . . Another aspect is size. When we begin with a partner with a very different size . . . . There are interests. There is economic capacity. There is size. A fourth factor that I would add is organizational personality and character. There are organizations that are by definition arrogant. They're not open to dialog. (Participant 0088)

A second issue to define in these partnerships is to what extent they are bilateral or trilateral. Transnational partnerships regularly have organizations that are from the supporting and implementing side as well as an intermediary. Nonetheless, it was notable that as the researcher inquired about transnational partnerships, over and over, responses reflected a dyadic relationship, the relationship of intermediary and implementer or of intermediary and supporter. In fact, only in one of the 18 interviews did the initial inquiry get a response that identified a trilateral approach to forming the partnership, and that was a church that worked with a mission from its denomination and with overseas implementing churches of its own denomination (Participant 0085). This finding reflected a recurring theme in the research results, which is that the intermediary is at the center of how these relationships function and has in many ways framed how relationships are understood. In these partnerships, they have perpetuated a system in which there is a bilateral relationship of supporter to intermediary and a bilateral relationship of intermediary to implementer.

The concept of a trilateral relationship in which each organization freely interacts with the other is a radical departure from what the participants have experienced. In fact,

intermediaries put in place obstacles to those direct relationships, especially in giving freedom to the implementing organization to contact the supporting organization (Participant 0080). One participant with over 20 years' experience in intermediaries indicated he had never once seen a case in which a direct relationship of the implementer to the supporter had been encouraged by an intermediary (Participant 0087). This manner of working together has its origins in how these types of relationships emerged historically when communication and transportation were difficult, so well-placed intermediaries were needed, but it has been perpetuated by the intermediaries as part of maintaining their traditional role. The creation of barriers between supporters and implementers, however, is directly at odds with what the global movement towards more direct transnational relationships is encouraging and often demanding.

A third more abstract but fundamental issue to articulate is the extent to which partnership is between people, between institutions, or some other sort of configuration. The most common responses were that partnership is really between people—the reasoning being that those that function always are between people (Participant 0042), that only people get things done (Participant 0085), etc. In relationships that begin with such religiously-driven motivations and arise because of personal contacts, it was natural that participants were to value the personal over the institutional. On the other hand, those who saw them as institutional relationships seemed to focus on more formal expectations (Participant 0036) or on the need for greater continuity (Participant 0080). Interestingly, two of the most experienced participants saw them as relationships between people representing institutions.

> It's always between people representing institutions. That's the complicated thing. I have not even seen one alliance or network that functions against the desire of people, but I have seen networks that function even though the environment, the context is totally against it. Schedules or people work because they want it to. They're friends. They trust. Alliances and trust are established by persons, but unfortunately people can't represent themselves only, but they have to have an institutional representation, or if they work for someone or represent a congregation or project, they can't speak [just] as people. Even though they're people, they have to represent an institution. (Participant 0074)

The understanding of partnership as a personal or institutional relationship impacted everything from the formality of expectations to the importance of formal agreements to the degree of commitment between institutions.

A fourth somewhat invisible aspect of partnership was the degree to which partnership was focused around the relationship as an end in itself, specific activity goals, financial contribution, or seeking an opportunity to exercise a specific role. A desire for relationship was evident in most participants but especially in supporters who really desired to maintain relations with the implementers but often were unable to do so.

> There's one [partnership] in [Country A] that's a network and they run both oral and traditional Bible schools for men and women. But this oral Bible school for women . . . these are women that are the poorest of the poor [and] they're out in these villages . . . . The nature of the relationship with them . . . it's with the leader of the organization. But these people who are on the field, we are never going to have a relationship with them, and they are never going to have a relationship with our church, and I think one of the struggles that we've had. . . . We're a 4,000 member church and to partner with a small, indigenous, fifty- person church—that kind of thing is really hard because we are so so so different. And so as I have tried to formulate some of these partnerships and move and think about them—I'm constantly saying how can our church partner with an organization where there is a director? That's never going to be a holistic partnership . . . it's going to be a financial relationship. (Participant 0048)

Implementers focused more on the desire of stability and a long-term relationship with the intermediary or the supporter, though the latter often was not an option given to them. A frustration with the focus on short-term goals and how they resulted in a short relationship was expressed by an implementing pastor:

> Who ends them? In my experience the supporting group has ended them in having a short-term vision. It's as if in its agenda the plan for 2012 then is going to [be] bring support groups for 50 churches. Fulfilled that! Okay, I'm finished. (Participant 0080)

This phenomenon pointed to a broader issue of the degree of commitment to the relationship with some intermediaries or supporters focused more on a one-time commitment, while the implementers always wanted a more sustained relationship. Intermediaries seemed less concerned then implementers but more concerned than supporters about this issue. This may reflect each type of organization's relative dependence on the stability of the relationship for its own financial survival. This aspect of the partnership was vital to the length of these relationships but was often not visible until after the partnership had been initiated.

A fifth aspect of articulating partnership is simply how goals are selected. Specific expectations varied widely by partnership. They included approaches in which organizations approached each other and simply worked together based on the pre-existing expectations of each (Participant 0057), negotiated simple expectations together (Participant 0081), accepted the expectations of the more powerful organization (Participant 0080), or imposed their expectations on the other (Participant 0036). Overall processes seemed very informal with the exception of very focused supporting groups or

intermediaries that had pre-defined packages and approaches that allowed for little variation.

Results for Question 2

Introduction

The second research question was: What are the processes that need to be managed by the intermediary organization, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships? Faith-based transnational partnerships involve many processes, some of which are particularly important to supporting and implementing organizations and churches. These processes overlap with the factors which motivated partnership in the first place but are not the same because they concern not only values but also action. Five such broad processes emerged as categories. These are processes related to mobilization of financial resources, interpretation of the partnership, communication and evaluation, specialized services, and contextual translation. These processes are what supporting and implementing organizations expect to see successfully managed by intermediaries; therefore, they provide a structure by which intermediaries can subsequently be held accountable.

Mobilizing and Distributing Financial Resources

This process reflects a central motivation of transnational partnership which is obtaining and using resources and the unique perspective and needs that each of the organizations in the relationship chain has in this process. It includes dimensions of the

implementing organizations' perspective and the supporting organizations' perspective, dependency, self-interest, and goal distortion.

A first aspect related to financial resources is that implementers relate directly to the intermediary, and from their perspective, they largely see that intermediary as the donor because it is from the intermediary that they obtain the resources. For many implementing organizations, these resources are essential to whether or not they can carry out their work. They are constantly trying to find those with whom they can partner. As one leader of a Costa Rican implementing organization shared:

> We would like to expand to have [more] intermediaries that help us raise funds. But the issue here is how to have access to those intermediaries. We have a limitation there. How to have them? Who are those intermediaries? Who can help us in that action? (Participant 0084)

There are vastly more potential implementers anxious to receive resources than there are intermediaries to provide them. The result is that most implementers are initially willing to partner with most any intermediary that they can find. The chairman of a supporting church's missions committee reported that his experience was that those seeking support accept it freely without much thought:

> Well, simplistically, I think the way it happens—if a church or an individual wants to support them—they are thrilled, and I doubt there's a lot of investigation on their part if [that] somebody wants to support them. They welcome that with open arms. (Participant 0057)

A second aspect related to financial resources is that supporting organizations, on the other hand, do not have the challenge of obtaining resources but rather of distributing them effectively. Many of them see intermediaries as essential as it is just too difficult to

determine to whom to give in other countries. One pastor indicated, "So I think one principle that comes out of this for me is that I'm really skeptical of giving directly to a grass roots organization overseas that doesn't have some intermediary organization" (Participant 077). His experience was that such intermediary organizations had helped his church make more responsible choices. In addition, his church had once been in a partnership in the Philippines that ended very negatively, which taught them how hard it is to truly know what is happening far away.

A participant who is from a supporting organization and also is himself a major donor described a bit the dilemma faced by those seeking to support international work:

> There are so many different types of organizations and different kinds of projects out there that at some point you have to trust an intermediary, or something like that, in order to just ferret out what's good and what is not good and what's doable and not doable. I don't really know how you can get yourself around that. (Participant 0051)

Many supporting organizations, just like major donors, find that they come to the point that they need to find an organziation that they can trust to steward their donations.

Thirdly, distributing financial resources comes with the challenge of mitigating the dependency that can result from these relationships when they cause excessive dependence of recipients upon donors. Many supporters and intermediaries are increasingly aware of this danger.

> I would characterize it as the benefactor-beneficiary relationship. It's hard for a large North American church to be anywhere without being seen as a benefactor, even if you're trying very hard not to behave that way. I think that's a really difficult angle of partnership from our side. And [also] to not think of ourselves as having all the answers and having all the resources—that kind of stuff, but to be much more humble and even-handed with that I think is really challenging. (Participant 0048)

Dependency came up frequently in the interviews and was described as a historic problem that had been most frequently caused by the intermediary when it did not do its role properly and by the acquiesence of the implementer (Participant 00081):

> If they [the intermediary] don't do it or are incapable of doing it . . . . they produce dependencies on both sides. And they produce power for themselves that is in a sense disrespectful both of the smarts of the donor and the smarts of the recipients: the giftedness of each side. So they steal something from both, produce dependency in order to maintain their existence, whether its individuals or organizations. (Participant 0059)

A part of dependency was to recognize a pervasive reality that the foreigner and foreign organizations are seen through the lens of resource provision in the country where implementation is taking place. One intermediary participant stated, "if you're an expatriate, you have to realize that you have something they need and for most people that isn't you—it's what you represent" (Participant 0059). An intermediary recalled a discussion with an implementing pastor who told him,"when you're working internationally with partnerships, when the gringo shows his face, the assumption that you immediately have in Latin America is everything's paid for. As we said—your party is paid for" (Participant 0079). It was interesting to observe that those on the implementing side were quick to identify this issue, as were some of the intermediaries but not as many. It seemed that implementers were more anxious to break these historic patterns, and it became more of an issue for intermediaries as a means of reducing their financial commitments when they simply became less committed to the partnership.

A fourth aspect related to financial resources was the recogntion that organizations act in their own self-interest and that each organization or church involved in transnational partnership has some of its own goals and its own financial interests. The topic of money and self-interest came up frequently. For instance, when addressing the challenges of intermediaries, one participant with years of experienced described what he saw as the big challenge of partnership:

> Comfort—the status that the ministry provides for the "professional servant." Many necessary things at the level of the base [implementing organizations] are not resolved because of insufficient resoruces. Why? Because this [the intermediary] absorbs much of it . . . . What is the problem of the universal church [referring to religious organizations and churches]? That it has converted into its own reason for being. Therefore it has to sustain itself so the religious activism has to result in money. Why? Because you have to sustain the system. (Participant 0042)

This theme of self-interest of the intermediary and its impact on financial efficiency came up numerous times from the participants. It should be noted, however, that this was not simply something that happens with intermediaries but also happens with implementers. One participant referred to implementing organizations in general:

> [Implementing organizations] open [themselves] up for a heck [*sic*] of a lot of manipulation on either side or self-interest. Manipulation sounds like it's intentional. I'll just say even passive self-interest. So interculturally, self-interest takes place all the time only we seldom read it in the other person and we go either one of two ways. We either say all [are] evil or all manipulative, and therefore I put my walls up really high. Or they're all good-hearted and they have only good intent, and we become naïve. So we have to balance against both. We build trust. There's a saying about trust: trust but inspect. (Participant 0059)

Self-interest also happens with the supporting organizations. While they do generate financial resources, they have different ways in which the actual use of funds

reflect self-interest more than the purpose of the funds or activity. One pastor spoke passionately of his frustration with supporters who pressured them to be as efficient as possible in the partnership, but then those same people spent frivolously on expensive hotels and transportation which consumed very large amounts of resources. He summarized some of those frustrations with the following:

> When the institution thinks that it is doing a favor for the person in need, the person in need can say to the institution, "One moment. You exist because I'm here. You don't exist for yourself." And when the institution thinks that it exists for itself, it lost its sense of service. (Participant 0034)

A fifth aspect related to resource mobilization is that it easily led to goal distortion. An implementing church pastor described how he sought out any assistance he could get to see how he could adapt it to meet the needs of his church. He captured the reality of places with few economic resoures and opportunity when he stated that accepting money for something that is not your priroity is "better than nothing" (Participant 0080). A missionary described how she had seen implementers suddenly promote work to stop sexual trafficking not because they had been committed to that cause but because there was a great deal of donor interest in supporting it (Participant 0089). It is easy for intermediaries and implementers to change and distort goals not because of a sense of purpose but because of financial need.

Another implementing church pastor who had also worked with intermediaries described the problem of the goals of the supporter or intermediary with an analogy.

> One more time, the example of "we [received from the supporting organizations] . . . shoes, and we want to give away shoes," but the thing here is that they're hungry, and therefore, I have to see how to transfer, or how to change the language for that. Because one can arrive in a place and say, "take these, here are

> the things," and everybody is going to be happy with the shoes but hunger will continue and you haven't changed their reality. Therefore there are activities so that one could say, "We were successful. We gave away shoes." And the people here are going to say, "They gave us shoes. They're not that important but they gave us shoes. That's fine." So as one thinks that he achieved a goal the other is thinking: "This didn't make any difference but fine, we received it. We're happy. We're happy but possibly I'm going to sell the shoes so as to eat something today." (Participant 0034)

Overall, the process to mobilize and distribute financial resources was amongst the most central to the research topic. It includes dimensions of the implementing organizations' perspective and the supporting organizations' perspective, dependency, self-interest, and goal distortion.

Interpreting the Ongoing Partnership

Partnership relationships are dynamic, and they evolve over time, as one experienced participant who had worked in both intermediary and implementing organizations indicated.

> You reach agreement about an alliance between two entities or transnational religious actors for a year. It's easy to reach an agreement for a year . . . . The problem is when the relationship begins to be more than a year, and now that it has characteristics of an alliance because the goals begin to be negotiated, and we begin to realize that what we each wanted at the beginning looks like it may not quite be the same anymore. (Participant 0074)

The dynamism of ongoing relationships requires a capacity to take initiative, address emerging issues, manage goals, and exert some authority, each of which is generally in the domain of the intermediary.

The first characteristic is the ability to take initiative in interpreting partnership issues, and it is generally the intermediary that is in the position to do this because of the relationship both with the supporting organization and implementing organizations. One participant with experience as an intermediary in a denominational mission agency described the importance of this bridging role.

> The intermediary can provide overall strategic vision and donor organizations like to know that not only their resource or people or whatever is going to a specific place. It's part of an overall strategy and goal with bigger overall goals, and the intermediary can provide that. Whereas on the ground, a local church may be receiving [but] can't really articulate what the overall strategic goal is for the region. So I see those as two key things the intermediary brings. (Participant 0081)

A second characteristic of interpreting the partnership is the ability to address emerging issues. By virtue of their position, the intermediary is in the best position to address issues which regularly arise. One example would be what an implementer shared about a relationship with the intermediary:

> I'm not approaching him [the intermediary]. He doesn't want to overstep his limits towards me. And so what happened was we just started walking apart and without a lot of interaction. So then when we realized that we did a couple of things. We signed two new agreements. One was a philosophical agreement and one was an operational agreement. And the operational agreement we're signing annually now. And it just defines our relationship. (Participant 0079)

In this case, the intermediary was able to resolve an emerging issue, resulting in a healthier partnership.

A third characteristic of interpreting the partnership is the ongoing need to renegotiate or set new goals in which the intermediary is in the position to interpret what

is appropriate and acceptable to all parties. One mission agency described how it worked with partners and focused primarily on short-term goals.

> And so that's why we find that it's very important that we set short-term goals that are clear and see how we achieve them. We often say in the mission, "Let's take baby steps together. Let's not worry about a hard and formal partnership. Let's just take baby steps and see where God might lead." Where this might go - instead of trying to imagine every potential aspect of what our partnership should involve and then write it all down. Let's just start doing it. (Participant 0081)

Goals require frequent discussion. A couple of supporting organizations specifically mentioned that it concerned them when goals were changed with little consultation with them, which usually reflected a failure of the intermediary (Participant 0051; Participant 0057).

Fourth, the characteristic of having authority is vital to the ability to interpret, and the intermediary tends to have the most power in most of these partnerships, and it is derived primarily by the control of the resources and its size. Even with supporting organizations that have a lot of power, the intermediary is often dominant because so much of interpretation is about the field implementation and issues not agreed to ahead of time. The dynamic of how this works and its impact on the ability of the implementer to say *no* in negotiations was reflected in the words of one implementer.

> The higher you are in the hierarchy, the more times you can say no. The lower you are in the hierarchy the less times that you can say no. Besides, no one asks if you want to say yes or no. It's a condition. Therefore the donor uses the intermediary, and the intermediary comes and intervenes with the assumption that this is the established relationship. You can't give an opinion on that. You can't go to the donor and say, "Look, I don't like the intermediary," because the intermediary himself impedes the communication and will do what he has to do to remain in that position. No, I would say that you can't say no. No one asks if you want to say no and the structure is so strong . . . that if you say no, you could disappear. (Participant 0074)

The fifth characteristic that emerged was that the intermediary is often perceived as important by the supporting organization because it can provide some informal accountability. A pastor from a supporting church reflected on a negative direct experience the church had with an implementer and based on that experience saw a need to have an intermediary: "So I think one principle that comes out of this for me is that I'm really skeptical of giving directly to a grass roots organization overseas that doesn't have some intermediary organization" (Participant 0077). An individual from supporting organization affirmed that the organization valued the accountability that an intermediary could bring with implementing organizations (Participant 0099).

Each of these characteristics was important in understanding the interpretive role played by intermediaries in faith-based transnational partnerships. The dynamism of ongoing relationships requires a capacity to take initiative, address emerging issues, manage goals, and exert authority, each of which is generally in the domain of the intermediary.

Communicating and Evaluating

Communication was consistently identified as one of the most important aspects of successful transnational partnerships. Important dimensions of communication included the unique perspective of supporting organizations as well as the desire that communication be ongoing, meaningful by being dialogical, and trusting and open.

Evaluation was far less prevalent but was a dimension important to some of the participants.

The first dimension was the importance of communication especially to supporting organizations which saw it as essential to partnership.

> So I would say the operative condition that either helped or hindered was closeness of communication or proximity of communication or frequency of communication in every case. Because we're dealing with global issues and we're dealing with something that's happening a long way away. I guess I would say the quality of the feedback would be what either helps or hinders. (Participant 0077)

It makes sense that it would be especially important to supporting organizations as they are geographically removed, and that distance means that they know less about the day-to-day implementation. Communication was a challenge for the supporting organizations, no longer because of technology, but because of the need to balance the perspective of the different organizations in the partnership.

> Partnerships that work have good communication systems set up and working. You know we have all sorts of tools these days to communicate with one another, and yet we seem to be doing poorly at communicating, and poor communication kills the partnership. I think it's important that the national church has to really be involved in a lot of the discussions. Because if it's just, you know, like U.S. churches and the mission team, then we're missing a vital part of what we need to be hearing. So in partnerships that I've seen that struggle along, I would say that there usually isn't enough input from the national church and maybe not enough input from the U.S. churches. It may be a little too field-driven, and yet I understand that the field team – they're the guys driving the boat and they need to have – have the opportunity to do that. So don't want to interfere with their work. (Participant 0085)

A second dimension was simply that communication be ongoing in order to maintain the closeness of the partnership.

> The conditions that hinder [partnership] would be a dearth of feedback from the executing or implementing organization. My experience is that individuals or churches are eager to support people. They're just as eager to get feedback on how the vision of that implementing group is moving forward. And without that, the relationship cools. You know a relationship is a two-party thing. It's not a one-party thing. And so there has to be intentionality on the part of the supporting group, but there has to be accountability and feedback on the part of the implementing group to deepen a relationship in that partnership. Otherwise, it will cool and probably dissipate. (Participant 0057)

A third dimension was that communication be meaningful and the accompanying recognition that lot of it is not satisfying or useful.

> So, you know, some of it is this formal reporting process . . . they're kind of not very satisfying responses because it's not a dialog. I think the more satisfying experiences that I have had is when someone is here and we can sit down as a team. (Participant 0048)

Meaningful communication in this case meant that it be dialogical.

A fourth dimension that emerged was that communication reflects trust and openness. Implementing organizations often perceived distrust by intermediaries and supporting organizations, who they felt held back on sharing things, especially related to money.

> I believe that the intermediary is always going to have more information than the one doing or who wants to do the project. Because on occasions what happened or at least what I could perceive is that there was always something up the sleeve and I consider that part a great lack of trust and that for me is very important. You want me to help you, with great pleasure, but please don't hide anything from me because I won't be able to do what I need to do. (Participant 0034)

At the same time, often times, either the intermediary or the supporting organization assumed that the implementing organization would not be open for the reason that their funding could be jeopardized.

> And I just can't imagine the local, an implementing organization, being up front with me about that or even necessarily having the objectivity to say, yeah, this isn't really working. You should give your money elsewhere. That's the decision I need to make and I need the input of the intermediary organization to help me make that decision. (Participant 0077)

Finally, there was the dimension of evaluation. It was interesting to note that many of the participants said very little about evaluating effectiveness. These relationships seemed to be characterized by little focus on it, though there were exceptions. One constituency that was concerned about evaluation was the larger intermediary organizations that specialized in international development and relief. They were often accountable to their supporters for meeting well-defined technical expectations and also for being perceived as professional in their practice.

The other group that was more frequently concerned was the implementers. This seemed to grow out of a desire to get intermediary and supporting organizations to ask themselves questions about what was effective and to be more careful about their objectives and more prepared to make longer term commitments:

> That was the most difficult thing: not to be able to make relationships with them. Because then that limits us. It was like cutting things off, like we cut the possibility of generating projects, right? I believe that for a project to function, we need a medium-term relationship: at least five years. Five years of a relationship to evaluate the project, to begin to make the project function and to evaluate. Initiation and evaluation of projects are at least five years in order to evaluate and see what happens—what have we achieved? are we okay? do we have to improve?, etc. (Participant 0080)

In at least one case, there was an implementing organization that had seemed to make good progress in helping supporters to be more self-critical and evaluative, but that

success was based on having achieved a strong bargaining position with supporters in which they fit into the implementer's way of doing things:

> There's a meeting on Fridays, which is when the work week ends, and it's exclusively to evaluate. They, as a group, evaluate us and tell us what were the strengths, the limitations that they saw, and we also say to them what were the strengths and limitations that we saw in the group. Then we make agreements because if they want to return, we ought to improve, and they should too. Therefore, we evaluate each other. It's a way of, as we say, giving each other a reciprocal, mutual report. (Participant 0084)

Overall, there was much emphasis on communicating more and some emphasis on evaluation. Important dimensions of this issue were identified, and they included the unique perspective of supporting organizations as well as the desire that communication be ongoing, meaningful by being dialogical, and trusting and open. Evaluation was far less significant a dimension to most of the participants.

Providing Specialized Services

In the course of the interviews, four areas emerged in which intermediaries were perceived as adding value through specialized types of services, those being technical services, geographical knowledge, economies of scale, and other types of brokering.

The first aspect was that intermediaries sometimes possess specialized technical services that supporting organizations did not possess for themselves. The most frequent example of this was in emergency relief.

> So within our church, we started by thinking of internationally-known organizations with a good reputation like [Organization A]. When the tsunami came, we gave. We had an offering, and we gave that through [Organization A] because . . . I know that [Organization A] is very good with relief efforts, and I've seen how they have warehouses around the world, and I think that releases an area

> where economy to scale is helpful, and rapid response is helpful. So in that case, it was helpful to go with something large. (Participant 0077)

A second aspect is that some intermediaries are well-connected in specific regions of the world where a supporting organization may desire to engage. A supporting church Missions Director described such a situation when wanting to engage through an intermediary in a specific country.

> But it's like a trade organization for mission organizations. They try to build the capacity of ministries and missions in [Country A] to be more transparent, to do financial accountability. It's a capacity-building organization. We have worked directly with [them] to identify organizations in [Country A]. And so that direct experience from indigenous leaders who know what's happening to me is really, really important. So I think that's one reason to use an intermediary relationship. (Participant 0048)

A third aspect that emerged is that intermediaries that specialized created economies of scale, at the least the potential for it, which could result in greater efficiency. One implementing organization Executive Director described why he believed some others chose to support his organization.

> So I think one of the reasons they engage is to fulfill their biblical mandate but they feel like they can do it in a way that is simpler and costs less than if they were to develop it all on their own. And so I think that's why some of them engage. (Participant 0079)

A fourth aspect of specialization or added value was simply that they could broker in many different things that could be of help to either supporting or implementing organizations.

Overall, the specialized services were perceived as adding value through technical services, geographical knowledge, economies of scale, and other types of brokering.

Translating Context

Participants from implementing organizations placed great importance on translating context, and sometimes supporting organizations did as well. Characteristics that emerged as important included seeing that which is not visible, recognizing cultural differences, and reducing imposition.

The first characteristic that was identified was to simply realize that there are important differences.

> We don't know the things below the surface. All we see is what we see above the water. And so we assume that one iceberg, my iceberg, is like your iceberg, and they're not. And so that's the facade of travel and the internet and the modern society, and we fail to realize that there are steep and significant differences and differences of perspective. (Participant 0059)

The research seemed to reflect the perspective of implementers and long-term practitioners that the huge growth in short-term travel has reduced knowledge and sensitivity to these issues rather than increased it. As one participant said: "Today, I'm not too sure Americans understand that there needs to be a translation process in understanding needs and helping" (Participant 0059).

The importance of context was clearly more in the minds of participants from implementing organizations than supporting organizations. This would seem natural as the activities were being carried out in their country and context. One pastor of an implementing church expressed the importance of translation and what it should mean for intermediaries.

> I think that many times the intermediary institution ought to train the intermediary personnel. It ought to train them in the nature of the Latin American culture. Because even wanting to do good things, it could be that the things done are not so good. Right? For example, for me the intermediary is the one that investigates and ought to be on site, in the place. He ought to know and be immersed in the culture and to know the culture. At times the intermediary, especially if the processes are very short, is not aware. He believes that he is doing good. (Participant 0080)

The third characteristic grew out of this issue and pointed to a belief that proper translation would reduce imposition on other cultures based on one's own culture.

> Because many times the missionary comes, the supporting group comes, with a very distorted vision of what the country is. Then they form an idea, right, of how to help, but they do it from their perspective. That's called ethnocentrism. Therefore, I'm in the United States in my unique environment [but] the North American doesn't know what it is to live with a dollar a day. They don't know that. Here we do. (Participant 0080)

This reduction of imposition can also extend to what is valued and understood about the projects carried out by these transnational partnerships which helps address "frustration with the pragmatic North American side when things are not necessarily so numerical and successful" (Participant 0042). Overall, translating context resulted in seeing that which is not visible, recognizing cultural differences, and reducing imposition.

Results for Question 3

Introduction

The third research question was: How is accountability managed in faith-based transnational partnerships? Faith-based transnational partnerships have a wide variety of approaches to accountability. In seeking to understand the participants' experiences of

accountability management, the researcher identified themes related to how participants recognized a need for accountability, the degree to which they wanted formality, and an identification of some of the mechanisms of accountability. The process of recognizing a need for accountability became an important category based on the analysis.

Recognizing a Need for Accountability

Participants generated a variety of reasons why accountability is important in partnerships, including goal realization, fundraising credibility, risk reduction, values affirmation, and beneficiary impact.

The first reason that accountability was important was to see how each partner did on their commitments to achieve goals; this was the most common reason for valuing accountability, as was affirmed by a pastor from a supporting church.

> Well, I think it's real important . . . if we've agreed to work together toward a specific set of goals and we've cleared our expectations, then, you know, we all need to be accountable to carry out the parts of the partnership ministry that we have, so I think accountability is important. (Participant 0085)

The importance of this was broadly affirmed across all types of organizations, though the meaning and formality of this expression varied dramatically. The important thing to most participants was that the goals specific to that partnership be the focus of accountability. In addition to looking at the goals themselves, accountability on established goals was sometimes seen as an important aspect of determining if the relationship should continue into the future. A participant who had served in an intermediary stated the following: "because first of all, it helps you to measure the type of

work you are doing, to see if you do or don't have accomplishments, and to know if the relationship ought to be continued or not continue" (Participant 0034). In general, supporting organizations felt it was important to have clear goals to measure the intermediary though their characteristics varied by organization. Implementers also wanted clarity of expectations with the intermediary as that feature was vital in maintaining a good relationship and seeking additional funding from them.

A second reason for accountability was to maintain credibility for fundraising, and this credibility was especially important to the intermediaries but also to the implementers, who were responding to the intermediaries' expectations. Financial resources play a central role in partnerships, and therefore fundraising issues are central. The ability to demonstrate good practices of accountability often builds credibility for fundraising efforts, and its absence could really damage an organization, as one intermediary affirmed. An implementer described what he had observed in intermediary and supporting organizations.

> Because the problem is that they're [donors] going to see me as negligent at the time I make a request, and I'm going to lose donors because I permitted that or because it is known that one of my projects had problems of transparency. Therefore I'm not going to permit that, and it's absolutely intolerable . . . it has a lot do with obtaining resources for my sustainability first. (Participant 0074)

The specific actions or mechanisms that affirmed an organization as accountable varied, but whatever they were in a particular relationship, it was vital to use them to build credibility.

A third reason for accountability is risk reduction, again, especially amongst the intermediaries. Risk varies significantly, but the more risk is perceived, the more

organizations seek to put in place accountability mechanisms. In general, larger organizations and those farther from implementation were better able to address the risk issues that concerned them.

> The higher you are in the relationship chain, normally the organization is more structured. It has more employees. It has more economic commitments, etc. Then that the organization survives and continues becomes an end in itself. Therefore you have experts in what you are doing that want to reduce the risk. (Participant 0074)

Different accountability tools can reduce risk by better identifying what is expected and what is actually occurring in the activities of the partnership.

A fourth reason why accountability was important to participants was values. There are different religion-driven values that impact the commitment to accountablity. They include commitments to integrity (Participant 0048) and stewardship (Participant 0057) but also an understanding that people need accountability due to their own human nature, as one participant identified.

> Some could believe that as Christians we have to have few mechansims or few means of control because there is an innate trust as regards the theoretical profile of the Christian. When I read the Bible, I see the biographies of the great leaders of the Bible and how many made mistakes. I say instead, because we Christians make so many mistakes, we ought to have many mechansims to avoid making mistakes. Therefore the conclusion is that we Christians have to seek controls to mutually protect ourselves programmatically and financially not depending on only one person or a small group of people but opening ourselves up to all of us being accountable in a natural manner. (Participant 0074)

This was another instance in which a belief in a teaching or example in the Bible drove an understanding of the importance of accountability.

A fifth reason accountability was deemed important was simply that it was part of ensuring that beneficiaries were positively impacted. Goals were mentioned frequently, but a pastor went beyond them to more specifically focus on how the actual activities impacted beneficiaries.

> The purpose is to make sure that the folks who are experiencing poverty actually received the benefits that we hoped they would . . . our desire is to work for justice and accountability is obviously really important to make sure that actually happens. We're keenly aware that often it doesn't, and so without accountability, we feel that it's not enough to have good intentions. It's not enough to just hope things work out when you know for a fact that they often don't. So the purpose of an active sense of accountability is really to be good stewards and to assure to the best of our ability that our love actually is working as it should. (Participant 0077)

This issue did not come up frequently, and some of the other interviews with participants revealed that the success of programs was not generally questioned and therefore was not a main reason for accountability. Another participant indicated that he finds that there is a greater need to have both heart and head involved implying that often effectiveness and beneficiary impact is assumed because of good intentions but that it needs to be looked at more critically (Participant 0087).

Overall, participants generated a variety of reasons for why accountability is important in partnerships, including goal realization, fundraising credibility, risk reduction, values affirmation, and beneficiary impact.

Understanding Organizational Formality in Accountability

Accountability varies significantly in the degree of formality that is expected from different organizations. It reflects differences in organizational characteristics, culture, and trust.

A first and very important aspect that emerged is how different accountability can be for different types of organizations. One participant had worked for three Evangelical relief and development agencies, as well as being the Costa Rican representative for a large U.S. mega-church, and he compared some of the differences in how they looked at accountability.

> The three organizations have stakeholders that give them money for very specific types of things towards which they have to direct it. On the other hand, [the mega-church] has a general fund that allows for a little more freedom to do certain types of things. Now [the mega-church] doesn't have a model of development, [but] the others do. The three organizations have their package. They have defined what will be the area in which they will offer technical support . . .these organizations have a very structured system of indicators. Therefore, in a sense, it's imposed because it's international, it's global, and they're not going to change it for this church [an implementing church partner] or community. On the other hand, the mega-church [exercises] less rigidity and more flexibility. (Participant 0043)

This distinction points to characteristics that include organizational type, organizational size, restrictions on funding, technical rigor of the program, etc. Within these findings, one of the issues that emerged was that the non-profit organizations, working more with grants and foundations, required much greater formality than large churches, denominations, and missions, even though the latter managed very significant levels of resources.

A second aspect is how culture shapes understandings of accountability. Accountability varies significantly from culture to culture, and these differences make it difficult to have standardized approaches to accountability.

> I think you know the accountability depends on which piece you are talking about, and when you are going into a different culture, what they want to be accountable for and how they look at accountability is very different than we may look at that. (Participant 0048)

Cultural differences raise issues about when flexibility needs to be incorporated into the approach to practicing accountability.

A third aspect impacting accountability is the matter of trust. Trust is important, both being a motivator of accountability and something that can be undermined by the way accountability is conducted.

> Who do you trust and how do you know you can even trust them? So much of what happens is far away. If we were entering, say as the private investor or an angel investor, and I in turn do a partnership with an entrepreneur, I can see clear results based on the share prices or on my dividends. There's a clear quantitative feedback loop which I can monitor. In the case of this kind of work, I can't check up for myself the impact that's actually being had. I don't know. I have to trust my intermediary organizations, and trust they're telling me the truth, and it's hard to know to what extent I can trust them. I have to base that on my personal knowledge of these people, on their expertise, on my general sense of their trustworthiness, but the challenge is how to discern. (Participant 0077)

These three aspects of varying organizational characteristics, cultural differences, and trust greatly impact the formality with which accountability is practiced.

Identifying Accountability Mechanisms

The interviews revealed many of the common mechanisms that are used in accountability. These included written agreements, reports, email, minutes, site visits, and formal audit or evaluation processes. These methods are fairly traditional, but an interesting variation was the sense that the very act of having a personal relationship was a form of accountability.

> You know, it might happen between me and a pastor just on a pastor-to-pastor level. And it might happen to me as a supporter of a missionary to a missionary on a supporter-missionary level. You know, depending on the relationships, with

> some teams I could walk up to the leader and have a really good conversation about accountability because of our relationship. Where it just wouldn't happen on a different team. (Participant 0085)

The issue of relationship as a form of accountability seemed congruent with a lot of the ways that partnership was perceived in general and was somewhat novel. It was also somewhat notable that while accountability was valued in the discussions, there often did not seem to have been systematic efforts to actually put it in place in a deeper way.

Results for Question 4

Introduction

The fourth research question was: Who is accountable to whom in faith-based transnational partnerships? The responses of the participants revealed again and again that accountability was determined by the organization with greater relative power in the relationship. Participants experienced control of financial resources and, to a much lesser extent, brokering, as sources of power. They also identified issues of supporting organizations as well as implementing organizations asserting needs of accountability, and they pointed to factors that may contribute to evolving accountability relationships.

Mobilizing Resources as a Source of Power

The ability to mobilize resources is the primary source of power in transnational partnership, and this was one of the most consistent observations of participants. One of them described the process of how he had experienced financial resources as the basis of power over his many years in several implementing and intermediary contexts.

> Hierarchically if you manage to collect money, the money represents for you the possibility to do things and to have power. You do not transfer that power freely without having some type of guarantee that your interests are going to be met. Everything is structured this way because those that have the power to deliver the money and resources make it that way, plan it that way, and manage it that way. They are never going to have a process that is democratic or horizontal because this is the way that they can control what they need to control to continue. (Participant 0074)

It is important to understand that it is not simply supporting organizations that are seen as the sources of funds. From the perspective of the implementers, it is actually the intermediary that is perceived as the source of resources even if the intermediary is only the middleman.

> You know, I think another dynamic here is simply that a lot of the partners, implementing partners, probably don't see us as intermediaries because maybe they know consciously or are somewhat aware that we are getting money from support entities, but they know so little about that or it means so little to them that they don't see us an intermediary. They don't see the money as coming from [the donor]; they see the money as coming from us. And when you see the support as coming from that person [intermediary] as opposed to [the donor], that changes a lot. It puts you much less in a position where you can question and call for accountability. (Participant 0087)

The reality is that those who receive money do not see themselves as being able to ask for the accountability of intermediary or supporting organizations. While this convention may be taken for granted in business or in most cultural settings, it does contradict much of the rhetoric of faith-based transnational partnership, which is much more focused on unity, the complementarity of contributions, and overturning traditional ways of relating to each other.

Brokering as a Source of Power

There are a number of roles that intermediaries can play, but one that gives power is the ability to broker relationships between far flung organizations, as a Missions Director of a supporting church affirmed.

> And so that direct experience from indigenous leaders who know what's happening to me is really, really important. So I think that's one reason to use an intermediary relationship. Because I can go to [Country A] … [but] I will never understand [Country A]. If I move there and live the rest of my life there, I will never understand it. We need help with that kind of stuff. So to the degree that an organization can do that …. I look at it more as the broker of relationships. They're in a brokering role. I think that when they're in that brokering role they're really, really helpful. (Participant 0048)

It was, however, interesting that this same leader who so valued the brokering role also indicated that it was not to be assumed that they would automatically get this with all intermediaries.

> If you're looking at integrity and people knowing and genuinely knowing someone . . . I think people on the field are the ones that know that stuff. The problem is that oftentimes when you call into an intermediary organization, you might get the development person or the marketing person or the whatever, and you never really get to talk to anyone on the field. And so in terms of vetting and due diligence and those kinds of things, I think they're really helpful but sometimes I think they say they know and they really don't know. But yeah, I think it's really helpful. There are certain pieces of it that are very helpful. (Participant 0048)

The experience of this individual both points to a perceived potential strength of intermediaries but one that may not always be realized in practice. This is especially the case as intermediaries increasingly use marketing staff and approaches in their work with supporting organizations and may not have the capacity to identify and broker relationships with implementing organizations.

Implementing Organizations Asserting Accountability

In the language of partnership, there are often affirmations of mutual accountability, but few examples of intermediaries being accountable to implementers emerged in this research. A participant from an intermediary who was asked if he had seen intermediary accountability to implementers responded as follows:

> I have to say honestly, very little. I mean and it's again partly related to the issue that they may see themselves . . [as] "We're the receivers. As receivers, we don't." The mentality implicit is that we receive from these guys. They help us, and so who are we to hold them accountable? Yeah, I think there's that kind of mentality. I hope that doesn't exist on our side. I hope that we're not saying who are they to hold us accountable or thinking that or have that mentality. It may exist. It may be subtle and it may be implicit or subconscious but I think when you phrase the question as in what ways are they holding us accountable I would say for the most part they're not. (Participant 0087)

This comment is interesting as this participant expressed a genuine belief in the value of accountability to implementers yet recognized that this was by and large not the practice of organizations serving as intermediaries, and accountability was not something that implementers were demanding. He went on to explain another reason why implementers may not try to hold intermediaries accountable:

> And also why don't they do it? Maybe it's fear. You know maybe there's fear . . . If they're conscious that we are intermediaries, and they were to question us, they may fear that they're going to rock the boat and lose their support. Taking it further—I've never heard of any implementing partner going to the source of the funding, just talking about money here, to the support entity that we have concerns about the intermediary. Maybe you've heard cases of it, but I haven't heard of that. (Participant 0087)

Whatever the cause, it is an entrenched practice that most implementers will not directly question or seek to hold accountable those who fund them. It is equally true, as this research has demonstrated, that they have many concerns about current practice and would wish for more mutuality in relationships.

Supporting Organizations Asserting Accountability

The reality of accountability changes significantly with supporting organizations. Those that are larger or that have well-structured technical expectations tend to be able to exert accountability with intermediaries. That, however, tends not to be the case for smaller supporting organizations and most supporting churches.

> We really had felt as a church that it's hard to give to a big organization like [Organization A] . . . because there's so much pressure on the big organizations to only highlight the positive results. It's a PR machine, and so of course you're going to get back anecdotal, the big anecdotes, and you don't even know where your money goes. You put in the big [Organization A] pot, and it could reappear anywhere in the world in a program that's more or less effective. (Participant 0077)

In several instances, supporting organizations affirmed the issue of simply having to trust intermediaries because it was too difficult to have accountability. One participant who is a major donor expressed it as follows: "There are so many different types of organizations and different kinds of projects out there that at some point you have to trust an intermediary. . . . I don't really know how you can get yourself around that" (Participant 0051).

Overall, the degree to which a supporting organization is able to assert accountability is largely a function of the size of its donation and its own expertise.

Evolving Accountability Relationships

There are many reasons why partnerships evolve, and as they do, the accountability relationship also evolves and can be quite complex, as one implementer acknowledged. A first aspect of how they evolve is through fairly formal changes that emerge.

> I think that when I say there was a lot of trust and *confianza* at the beginning. I think it was because [Person A] and [Person B] and I sat around a table together and we shared a common vision for where we were headed . . . . Then you began to step in, and you implement the model and as you start walking forward, . . . we all think we're all on the same page together. Then you're not quite sure how that works . . . So the confusion comes when [Person A] is not sure . . . what his limits are. I'm in a position where I don't want to impede [Organization A] from doing what they're called to do and so I'm—what ended up happening was there was a large level of independence in [our organization]. [Person A] not wanting to overstep what the limits that he was placing on the organization and not wanting to . . . step in and direct I guess is the right word . . . . And so what happened was we just started walking apart and without a lot of interaction. So then when we realized that, we did a couple of things. We signed two new agreements. One was a philosophical agreement, and one was an operational agreement. And the operational agreement we're signing annually now. And it just defines our relationship. The philosophical agreement talks about shared vision, what we want to see happen, what we would love to see happen. (Participant 0079)

A second aspect is more about personal rather than institutional relationships and how they cause the partnership to evolve in more subtle ways in terms of accountability over time as personal relationships deepen.

> We're learning and growing, and . . .I'm much more likely to ask about these kinds of things [about accountability] after I have developed a three- or four- or five-year relationship. It's very counter-intuitive for me to send a piece of paper and say: "report". (Participant 0048)

This quote reveals something that was evident in several interviews: factors exist that may be challenging the traditional partnership approach based on power derived from financial resources and moving towards something more reflective of the values of partnership.

A third aspect contributing to the evolution of accountability was the importance of organizations learning together in a more reciprocal manner.

> The model we need to develop is a model of reciprocal learning, because what we have as our traditional mission's model that isn't of learning but of teaching-learning. That is to say; the missionary teaches; the follower learns. The Canadian teaches; the Peruvian learns. But I believe that now, with the world as it is, the crisis is not of the Global South. The world is in a global crisis. We need to learn from each other. (Participant 0088)

The importance of accountability to reciprocal learning and its contribution to program improvement was drawn out by multiple participants (Participants 0048, 0074, 0080).

A fourth aspect of evolving accountability was that interviews revealed that the people within organizations are changing because of new ideas which are impacting many organizations. For instance, some referred to a book, *When Helping Hurts: How to Alleviate Poverty Without Hurting the Poor and Yourself* (Corbett & Fikkert, 2009), which is broadly influencing Evangelical supporting organizations and intermediary organizations (Participant 0081; Participant 0048). The book is challenging traditional approaches to transnational relationships and therefore the very place of power and money in these relationships. In addition, the *Lausanne Standards on Giving and Receiving Money in Mission* (Lausanne, 2012) were identified by one participant as

beginning to have an impact on partnerships (Participant 0087) and the role of money and power within them.

A fifth aspect that emerged was that the very understanding of the nature of the activity impacts how accountability was seen by the intermediary and how it evolved over time. For instance, in programs that were formative and less easy to standardize, there tended to be greater openness to accountability of the intermediary as part of broader processes in which ongoing learning is understood to be essential to success (Participant 0091).

Results for Question 5

Introduction

The fifth research question was: What are the major areas of similarities and differences that arise between organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships? The question and sub-questions sought to explore three significant constructs from agency theory which are risk preferences, partial goal conflict, and information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 1989). The responses and analysis revealed that they have some applicability in faith-based transnational partnerships but much less than originally expected largely due to how shared religious beliefs and informal accountability practices impacted them. Rather than any categories emerging from this question, the responses served more to fill out properties, dimensions, and contextual issues in other categories.

Understanding Risk Preferences

A first aspect that emerged from participants is that there are very different degrees of risk that are managed by supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations.

> There is an inverse relationship as to what is the priority of the hierarchy and the base [implementing organization] in the relationship. The hierarchy of the relationship has the priority of organizational stability because there are many challenges of a financial nature and programmatic nature. But as you go down the pyramid, the people think more about fulfilling the mission and vision that they believe God has given them, and they become deep risk-takers in assuming challenges and risks and being flexible. . . . A coordinator of an implementation project or an intermediary is taking risks every day. He's taking risks with networks he doesn't control, with a project that he doesn't control, with beneficiaries he doesn't control. . . . It's very interesting because the further down you are in the hierarchy, the more you have to run risk. It's something that you don't control and they demand of you. And it's demanded by you of others that do control their own risk and simply because they are the hierarchy in the chain, there's no one that controls them. (Participant 0074)

There were different risk preferences, but the significant differences in power meant that implementers largely had to accept risk, and supporting organizations and intermediary organizations largely were able to mitigate their risks. As the participant above identified, a sense of religious purpose may also play into implementers' being willing to take risk because they simply trust as a matter of religious belief. They also were not so businesslike in their manner of assessing risk. It is in the nature of poverty that implementers may naturally be willing to take risks, given the critical needs—and the lack of alternatives—they see every day.

A second aspect of risk preference that emerged is that larger organizations were often focused on protecting their brand for marketing and organizational sustainability,

while implementers were much more concerned with risks related to not fulfilling project commitments and to personal reputation. An implementer characterized how he felt in a situation in which an intermediary was going to suspend a project in order to protect itself:

> She was not measuring the risk that I was going to come out of it with a bad reputation [if she took the action]. The pastor would have a bad reputation with the community. That's when things get polarized in thinking about risk. That's why I say that risk is sometimes relative. To say: "My institution is going to have a damaged reputation" . . . but sometimes they're flying the insitutional flag but letting it overshadow the value of the person. . . . Sometimes you have to take the risk of saying no to the organization. . . . I am not totally in agreement when the institution becomes more important than the human aspect. (Participant 0034)

Risk preferences are a significant difference between supporting organizations, intermediary organizations, and implementing organizations. They are largely resolved in favor of those with power, but the religious aspect and a less businesslike manner of looking at risk generally creates a sense of acceptance by the implementer. Supporting and intermediary organizations tend to focus on risks to brand and fundraising, while the implementer focuses more on those threats to program activities and personal reputations.

Understanding Partial Goal Conflict

An aspect that emerged was that due to the shared religious and humanitarian nature of the activities, there was a high level of agreement on goals between those in partnership. In fact, there was generally not significant negotiation of goals in most of these partnerships, and they were usually largely accepted. A second aspect was that where there was goal conflict, it likely surrounded financial resources and how they were divided up. As one participant from an intermediary organization acknowledged, the

supporting organization often had a concern about the financial efficiency of the intermediary in its role.

> The challenge is to do it and do it I guess with enough efficiency so that you can translate donations or intent into something meaningful. So . . . you have two—kind of like—currency transactions, and you lose value in each one of those. You just do. You lose value in time. You lose value in intent, and so you have to manage those transactions. (Participant 0059)

This same concern about intermediaries and finances was also raised by implementing organizations and even supporting organizations.

In terms of overall goals, partial goal conflict did not arise as a significant issue to the participants as they started with a strong commitment to the same religious and humanitarian purposes. Where conflict did seem to more frequently reveal itself was in the use of financial resources.

Understanding Information Asymmetry

An aspect, which was consistent with traditional agency theory, that did emerge was that the agent or implementer has greater information on performance and may not always be quick to share it, and this was a concern of supporting organizations.

> And I just can't imagine the local, an implementing organization, being upfront with me about that or even necessarily having the objectivity to say, "Yeah, this isn't really working. You should give your money elsewhere." That's the decision I need to make, and I need the input of the intermediary organization to help me make that decision. (Participant 0077)

A major difference is that performance information was not as important to many of the organizations as simply the act of communicating more. That trend reflected the

less professional and performance-oriented side of many of the activities in which communicating was often enough. That finding, of course, dependend on the kind of intermediary and to what degree the activity was technical.

Results for Question 6

Introduction

The sixth research question was: What are the elements that need to be defined in contractual relationships between intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships? The question and its sub-questions sought to explore the extent to which the concept of contracts is relevant in faith-based transnational partnerships since that issue is an important idea within agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). In general, the exploration of this question captured a central idea that emerged and was expressed in how one of the participants characterized things: "Formal agreement that is not built upon dialog is useless . . . because of the differences of power" (Participant 0059). The idea of dialog proved to be important to building trust and as part of jointly developing agreements.

Building Trust

In addressing whether or not a contract of formal agreement was important, a participant from a support church stated:

> I think that those can be helpful. Now having said that, I will say this: that what's on paper is no better than the integrity of the people that make the agreement. And one of the risks of having it on paper is a legalistic approach to something that gets you into spitting contests over details, possibly. The great benefit of a written agreement is to cause the potential partners to do what I just mentioned a little while ago: agree on what the real purpose is and agree on the contributions, whatever they may be, of the individual partners, and agree on a management structure so that they . . . can manage the partnership. You have to have management structure in a partnership. Somebody has to be in charge to carry out the work on the ground. (Participant 0057)

The perspective of this individual was that agreements were valuable in adding some clarity, but they were only as good as the integrity of participants. His comment pointed to the fact that they have limitations.

Another participant from an intermediary discussed how his mission's organization had eliminated a long-standing practice of formal agreements because it was really the relationship rather than a document that made partnerships work.

> In our history in [Mission Agency A], which is the mission of [Denomination A], in the past, we have had written partnership agreements that say we will do this and [the] receiving partner, which is really what it was, will do this. And it was a set of—it was a contract. And invariably, particularly in Latin America, but in other highly relational cultures, contract is only as good as the relationship, and if there is not relationship, contract's just a piece of paper that's not worth anything. And it set expectations based on a certain point of time that doesn't always apply over time, and as circumstances change. And so we are getting away from actually [signing agreements] since I've been in this role we have not signed any partnership agreements. (Participant 0081)

These comments point to the issue of relationship and the knowledge that an agreement by itself does not guarantee anything. Trust was considered foundational, and the concern was expressed that written agreements were sometimes perceived as underming trust or not being culturally appropriate. A participant from a supporting church indicated the following:

> I can see where they could be really helpful in some cultures. More bureaucratic, top-down, male-dominated. I'm thinking of [Country A]. I think they would love that and if it had a seal stamped on it, it would probably be even better. So I can see in some cultures it would be really helpful. I can see in other cultures where it would be perceived as a lack of trust and might not be helpful at all. (Participant 0048)

Another supporting church indicated that they could communicate distrust and may simply be unnecessary in less complex relationships.

> I think in the cases that we mentioned I would not favor them because they wouldn't add much to the real base of the partnership . . . personal relational trust. In that case it seems like adding a formal document would actually feel like an expression of distrust or kind of bureaucratic distance. And so it doesn't seem like it would foster trust, but it would be an indication of mistrust especially from us to the implementing organization. So just a more informal but still clear sense of expectation being expressed I think would be more appropriate especially since the objectives were fairly clear. They weren't complex so I would certainly favor them in the case of maybe bigger organizations where there's less personal connection and maybe more case of legal issues or something like that. Or in the case of whether the objectives are very complex and where an agreement like that could just serve to clarify for both ends. (Participant 0077)

This comment, while generally not being sympathetic to written agreements, did recognize that there was a place for them in less personal relationships with large organizations and when there was great programmatic complexity.

Co-creating Agreements

Initially, there seemed to be a bit of a contradiction between participants' concerns about formal agreements and the strong affirmation in response to other questions about the importance of clarifying goals. However, participants seemed to reconcile the conflict through good process that was participative and horizontal.

> It's one thing to use contracts and another is to see what it says and who made it. I believe it's excellent to have one; however, it's not necessarily excellent how they're made, or the process by which they're made. There my suggestion is to be horizontal [and] try to think about as many possible areas that ought to be defined at the beginning. (Participant 0042)

This reflection on agreements complemented what this same participant indicated about how to set goals.

> There was a lot of opportunity to create it together. It was not simply pre-packaged, brought from America with the instructions to take it as is. No, instead there was a lot of choice to construct together, to respect local agendas, local needs. (Participant 0042)

A supporting church pastor referred to process and the belief that relationship had to come first and later agreements could be developed together.

> I think the formal agreement needs to flow out of the relationships that are developed between U.S. churches and field missionaries and national churches. And if there's not enough relationship, then the formal document really doesn't help, and it could actually hinder real partnership and so. When there is enough relationship built and the trust level is there and all that then you can have a good discussion about: "Okay how will we work together? What are our expectations? What are our goals? What are our objectives? How we gonna [*sic*] do this." And you can formalize those things, and I think formalizing with a document helps keep the expectations and the goals before everybody. It says, "Here's why we're working together," and it gives focus to what we're doing. (Participant 0085)

Yet another participant talked about a supporting church's belief, based on recent experiences, that that they wanted to reach agreements in a new way.

> We were talking with our [Country A] partners of going to one of those churches, and doing a partnership conference, with the folks and their church, so we can explore together what do we think this is. Instead of one person or one piece of the partnership being able to define that, and someone else follow. We have to define it together. (Participant 0048)

The idea of co-creating agreements, just as goals, was seen as the best way to have agreements that clarified goals while affirming partnership.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the actual application of data collection, preparation, and analysis procedures was discussed, and analytical categories and interrelationships were captured through the use of the conditional relationship guide and reflective coding matrix. The results for the six research questions were presented through significant use of the voice of the research participants, and related to key categories that emerged as a result of the coding and analytical processes. Based on this analysis, a core category emerged, *optimizing intermediary accountability in partnership*, which included ten sub-categories related to the broad areas of partnership formation, intermediary services, and intermediary accountability.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Introduction

Results were presented for each of the six research questions in Chapter 4, along with an analysis of the data that emerged in the research, and this included a core category and ten sub-categories. In Chapter 5, the categories are synthesized into a grounded theory; related to the literature, external standards, and practitioner literature; evaluated; and a framework presented for practitioners. Summary conclusions and summary recommendations, both for practitioners and for future research, are then presented.

Synthesis of the Grounded Theory

Faith-based transnational partnerships that are healthy seek to optimize intermediary accountability. The ability to optimize accountability is challenged by a central reality of partnership: that the intermediary, the organization that controls the financial resources, is often the organization that holds other organizations accountable but is not accountable to them. Intermediaries work in this manner with almost all implementing organizations. In the case of supporting organizations, most are small and a minor part of intermediary's revenue, so most often they do not exert any power over the intermediary. This phenomenon is central to the process of how to optimize the accountability of the intermediary, which requires moving beyond power based on the mobilization and control of financial resources. The issue of power and how it impacts intermediary accountability starts with the processes of partnership formation. After

partnerships are formed, intermediary services are provided and parallel to that and to different degrees, intermediary accountability is either established or not practiced.

Faith-based transnational partnerships begin with an organization's or church's decision to carry out an activity, and this leads to three main processes that are part of forming a partnership. Figure 2 illustrates this progression.



Partnership Formation:

- Recognizing a need for partners
- Finding with whom to partner
- Articulating the characteristics of the partnership

Figure 2. Forming a partnership.

The recognition of the need to partner with other organizations and churches is rooted in defined religious beliefs and justifications from the Bible. These are assumed guiding principles for partnership and reflect shared values within the sub-culture of Evangelical Christianity, with a commitment to ideas about partnership being held by many, if not always deeply understood in their implications. A second major motivation that follows quickly behind the religious beliefs that sanction partnership is the motivation to either obtain or distribute resources. Supporting organizations seek channels to effectively distribute resources, while implementing organizations seek to obtain resources for their programs to continue and expand. Intermediary organizations

seek both to obtain resources and to distribute them, but often give greater focus to obtaining them, and are generally headquartered and led by staff within countries that are generating the resources. Beyond motivations rooted in religious beliefs and resource mobilization, supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations also are motivated to receive non-financial services and to offer services that they have to other organizations.

The motivation of each type of organization to work with other organizations leads into selection processes to determine with whom to work. There are a wide variety of organizations in terms of their focuses, their preferred roles, their sizes, their structures, and their financial resources and power. The process of selecting with whom to work is impacted by these variations, and it is most often informal and not readily visible, but in realizing this process, critical issues in the partnership begin to solidify. One of those is who selects who in partnership, and that usually becomes clearer once it is understood who has control of financial resources and the associated power. Most often an organization that controls resources emerges with most of the power in selecting or rejecting potential partnerships. The capacity to generate financial resources and the power that it brings to supporting and intermediary organizations becomes a central aspect of the partnership relationship because it determines who has the capacity to best direct the partnership towards its own objectives.

Selection is intertwined with articulating the very nature of the partnership relationship that will emerge. This is again subject to an understanding of the differing profiles of partners, who controls the resources, and therefore who ultimately has the

power to define key aspects of partnership. Supporting organizations and intermediary organizations emerge as dominant. Another aspect becomes more visible, which is that these relationships are defined as existing between two organizations, one always being the intermediary. This may be the intermediary with the supporting organization or the intermediary with the implementing organization. Trilateral partnerships of supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations rarely occur, largely because they are not the traditional way that these relationships have been conducted and often because it is not in the self-interest of the intermediary. Another important thing that happens is that an understanding emerges about goals and how they are set with variations including acceptance of the goals of the implementer, negotiation of goals, passive acceptance of the goals by supporters and implementers, or imposition of goals by intermediaries.

Intermediary services become the focus after partnership formation. Figure 3 depicts the process flow from the decision to carry out an activity to the process of forming partnerships to the clarification of intermediary services. Arrows go in two directions between the two processes because of the iterative way in which they impact each other and are negotiated.



Intermediary Services:

- Mobilizing and distributing financial resources
- Interpreting the ongoing partnership
- Communicating and evaluating
- Providing specialized services
- Translating context

Figure 3. Clarifying intermediary services.

In order to hold an intermediary accountable, it is necessary to understand the services that either the supporting organization or the implementing organization actually expect from it. These services are often different from the perspective of supporter or implementer. The service that is almost universally focused on and which is the source of power for the intermediary organization is its role as resource provider to implementing organizations and resource distributor for supporting organizations. This is one of five broad categories of services intermediaries provide, but three of the other four are in many ways by-products of dependencies generated by intermediation. That is to say, the other parties do not relate to each other directly , which by definition leaves them dependent on the intermediary to address the needs that this separation creates. Those needs are interpretation of the ongoing partnership and how it works, communicating and evaluating the activities of the partnership, and translating the local contexts of implementer and supporter, each to the other. If a direct relationship existed between

supporter and implementer, each of these services might be addressed directly with the other party. The fifth service is provision of specialized services that are technical, geographical, brokering, and gaining economies of scale; and these are sometimes provided by intermediaries. When there is a commitment of intermediary, supporting, and implementing organizations to seek accountability, the identification of these services can become the core of a framework for accountability.

Intermediary accountability may emerge as a result of forming a partnership and defining intermediary services, though most often it does not, and proactive steps are required to establish intermediary accountability. The arrows in Figure 4 illustrate that accountability to intermediaries can emerge in forming partnerships or clarifying intermediary services, and they are dotted to reflect that this does not always occur.



Figure 4. Establishing intermediary accountability.

The act of significantly holding intermediaries accountable is outside of the experience of most supporting organizations and almost all implementing organizations. Intermediaries' power traditionally is an obstacle. In order to overcome the issue of

power derived from financial resources, supporting and implementing organizations must both recognize the need for intermediary accountability and find ways to negotiate it.

Intermediary accountability must be recognized as something that is important. This happens as it is understood to be vital to realizing goals, increasing credibility for fundraising, reducing risk, ensuring beneficiary impact, affirming values, and learning for improvement. The religious values that motivate partnership can be a powerful foundation to establish intermediary accountability, yet the control of financial resources and the power associated with them is often much greater in practice. Implementing organizations and supporting organizations must recognize why such accountability is so important and make efforts to create awareness about it based on the shared values that are the very foundation of these partnerships.

Once accountability is recognized as important, implementing and supporting organizations must find ways to negotiate it with intermediaries. This process begins simply with greater willingness of implementing and supporting organizations to ask for it based on the values supporting partnership which have already been identified. This also involves identifying practical mechanisms which can be established to create it those being agreements, written communications, audit and evaluation processes, participation, etc. Those mechanisms can support critical processes, including ongoing accountability which contributes to learning, which is central to implementing complex programming, and to the understanding that all the organizations in the partnership chain contribute to success or failure.

Overall, the theory describes the processes that are important in intermediary accountability and which can lead to optimal intermediary accountability under the right conditions in which all organizations in the partnership seek to establish it.

Relationship to the Literature

Agency Theory

Activities are delegated from one party to another in agency theory, and this theory fits the high-level practices of faith-based transnational partnerships, and it was consistently the case that one party had the power to delegate to another, especially in the case of the relationship to the implementing organization. The academic literature assumes this type of relationship exists, and in faith-based partnerships, this is generally an unconscious assumption, especially in the cases in which intermediaries were from the United States. The basis of the power to delegate was the control of financial resources, and this control was consistently reported to be a central aspect of partnership.

While agency theory fit with the grounded theory that emerged at a high level, its more specific constructs did not always fit well at the level of the ongoing practices of faith-based partnerships. *Partial goal conflict* is a construct that was sometimes evidenced, but most conflict did not center on the delegated goals of the relationship but rather on secondary operational aspects of the relationship such as resource use, clarification of ongoing expectations, or better understanding local and cultural differences. Partnership relationships were often simply too complex to clarify and bring together coherently around only a set of goals, and the relationships continued to evolve

and grow in ways beyond the scope or ability to address solely through goals. On the other side, there was mostly strong agreement on goals due to the shared religious values of the organizations that often were the foundation for partnership. The construct of goal conflict proved of limited value at capturing the many expectations that were not goals, at recognizing the evolving nature of the relationship, and at incorporating the reality that shared beliefs and values produced alignment more than specific goals did.

The construct of *information asymmetry* about progress against goals also occurred, but frequently this was perceived more as an issue of inadequate communication, especially for supporters, rather than a significant concern about not being able to ensure fulfillment of the agent's obligations to the principal. In general, there was a fairly tolerant attitude towards fulfillment of specific goals so information was driven more by a desire to know than a deeper accountability purpose. The *policing costs* associated with gathering information were generally not significant because policing simply was not seen as critical in many of the partnerships.

The construct of *risk preferences* was evident especially in relationships with larger intermediaries who carefully protected organizational interests in multiple ways, largely for reasons of protecting their organization's brand, and often using their power to shift risks towards implementing organizations. Implementers were less cognizant of the risks and often accepted high levels of risk largely because it was assumed to be a pre-condition to the partnership and was considered normal in their more precarious contexts of poverty and lack of opportunity

The construct of *contracts* is central to agency theory. There was wide agreement on the value of clear expectations but often skepticism that formal contracts were an effective tool in aligning the interests of principal and agents in these partnerships. This was first of all because of the religious aspect which produced deep alignment based on shared beliefs, identity, and trust. Trust was considered far more important than a contract especially in the culture of the implementing organizations in Costa Rica. Contracts or agreements were seen as valuable when they were developed together but not those determined by a principal alone, as would be implied in agency theory. This belief has largely emerged in recent years, based on many years of learning in the world of faith-based transnational partnerships. It should be noted that within the literature on agency theory, a criticism of the focus on contracts is that it does not adequately account for organizations' simply working with those whose goals naturally align (Eisenhardt, 1985) or focus on human factors that align the agent with the principal (Johnson & Droege, 2004). Faith-based transnational partnerships usually start with organizations that are powerfully aligned in terms of shared religious beliefs and values, and the maintenance of those values as the foundation was far more important in most cases than any kind of written agreement or contract.

Another limitation of traditional agency theory is that it focuses on stable, well-defined, dyadic relationships. The theory, therefore, did not account for the fact supporting organizations were often quite transient in their commitments, that partnerships evolved and became clearer over time, and that intermediaries often worked with multiple implementing organizations. Another issue that was important in the

research results but addressed in only a limited way in the literature was chain agency (Steinberg, 2008), in which there are multiple levels of agents. This situation was common in the field research across supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations. Agency theory provided a general understanding of delegation but often proved too simplistic to fit with the complexity of actual faith-based transnational partnerships.

It should be noted that, in general, agency theory fits much better with large and very formal and structured supporting organizations and intermediaries. They tend to have better defined approaches and goals, but these organizations were not representative of the broader experiences of smaller organizations and their partnerships, especially in the case of implementing organizations.

Organizational Typologies

It became evident in the research process that it was difficult to sometimes generalize about the broad range of organizations and partnerships, and that some sort of more grounded typology for such partnerships would be useful. A number of typologies were reviewed in the literature, and they included those articulated by Smith and Sosin (2001), Jeavons (1997), Unruh (2004), Sider and Unruh (2004), and Clarke (2006). The work by Jeavons (1997) was particularly interesting because amongst the seven characteristics he identified are those related to funding, power, and decision-making, each of which emerged in different ways in the research. Jeavons's typology begins to better identify characteristics surrounding the supporting, intermediary, and

implementing organizations that were the focus of the research. No typology will be suggested at this time, but the work of Jeavons could be adapted and integrated with characteristics of primary activity focus, resource base, and governance/accountability to create a typology that would better capture driving characteristics and variations of faith-based transnational partnerships.

Transnational Religious Connections

The breadth and depth of transnational religious connections were evident in the research process, and the factors that have encouraged them that were identified in the literature were clear. Those factors included international travel, more potential partnering organizations, the resources of the U.S. Evangelical Christian church, the growth of mega-churches, and an effort to develop more compelling activities in supporting congregations (Wuthnow, 2009). The causes permitted the growth, but in many ways, the set of motivations identified in the research process are what have driven organizations to actually pursue them. These include not only the religious beliefs identified in the literature and the research process but also the search of intermediaries and implementers for financial resources and the desire of organizations to provide and receive services. Wuthnow described one factor which points to an aspect of these partnerships which was often mentioned as negative by implementers. The participants observed that there were motivations in some supporting and intermediary organizations that were not altruistic but were more reflective of the desires of supporters to find compelling activities, especially commented on in the case of the short-term missions

movement. There is an extensive and increasingly influential body of practitioners' and popular literature, including books such as that of Corbett and Fikkert (2009), seeking to better address negative motivations in these relationships.

Accountability

A major challenge of accountability is that asymmetric resources determine who is able to hold whom accountable (Weissband & Ebrahim, 2007), and that proved to be the foundational issue in faith-based transnational partnerships. The literature indicated that accountability is primarily to donors and the powerful (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), and that is also the case in these faith-based partnerships. In addition, the literature referred to the unique challenges of holding all types of organizations and staff accountable and warned that they sometimes put their own interests before those of beneficiaries (Chambers, 1995; Steffek & Hahn, 2010b; Townsend, Porter, & Mawdsley, 2004; Townsend & Townsend, 2004). These issues were also identified in this research. The organizations that controlled resources were the ones with power and the ability to hold others accountable. Implementers also identified ways in which intermediaries and supporters reduced their own risk and addressed their own needs at the expense of the implementers, who did not have power. While this imbalance was a problem, findings indicated that the shared religious beliefs, the genuine fraternal relatonship that existed, and the acceptance about this situation as simply the way things work, resulted in this circumstance being largely tolerated by implementing organizations.

Hirschman (1970) in his seminal work, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, outlined the options available to organizations or people when they are in disagreement in organizational contexts. This knowledge is useful in understanding the situations of the less powerful organizations, a category which includes most supporting organizations and almost all implementing organizations. They are in a "take it or leave it" situation when they disagree with the intermediary (Ebrahim, 2007, p. 5; Uphoff, 1995, p. 19). They usually have little choice but to accept the situation and have little ability to influence the intermediary due to the power imbalance.

In the research process, accountability was almost universally affirmed as something that was good, but in day-to-day actions, it was little practiced. This reality was evidenced by the limited number or even total absence of specific mechanisms and accountability tools and by the informality and lack of intentionality of those that existed. Accountability was aspired to far more than it was implemented. The exception was with larger and more formal intermediaries and some large supporting organizations, who often seemed to be the focus of the literature that exists.

The literature did acknowledge that in practice, accountability can be quite ambiguous (Ebrahim, 2009). This consideration was important because the research revealed that accountability is often unclear or emerges over time as the relationship evolves. Fry (1990) described having "conversations of accountability" between principals and agents. This acknowledged the more dialogical and trust-building approach that was affirmed by participants in this research.

Carroll (1992) found in his research that formal accountability mechanisms were not as effective as open processes guided by principles, and Zetland (2007) found that finding effective organizations was actually more important than monitoring organizations. These aspects were very congruent with research findings that formal contracts and processes were far less important than strong relationships and trust for effective accountability.

Stakeholder Theory

In general, the research did not generate significant evidence that intermediaries with power were exploring ways to identify and address the broader needs of stakeholders, especially implementing organizations and beneficiaries. There was much greater willingness by implementing and supporting organizations to acknowledge that there were different stakeholders' perspectives than by intermediaries who had the power. Within the literature, there is a concept of *management capture* in which management advances its own goals and interests at the expense of other stakeholders (Owen, Swift, Humphrey, & Bowman, 2008). That same concept was identified within these partnerships in the form of *intermediary capture*, in which the goals and interests of the intermediary take precedence over those of implementing organizations and supporting organizations.

In his seminal work, *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach*, Freeman (1984) shared a concept of voluntarism in which management voluntarily chooses to address the expectations of its stakeholders. It might be interesting to extend such an idea

to intermediaries in which they would diminish their exercise of power in order to affirm a stakeholder approach that gives a greater role to other organizations in the partnership. Once again, the shared religious values and affirmations of unity would seem to potentially support such an approach in theory but have not yet been broadly acted upon in practice.

Stakeholder theory is justified normatively rather than instrumentally (Antonacopoulou & Meric, 2005), so it does not have such a clear approach to implementation as agency theory does, yet it does seem to much better allow for complexity, negotiation, and an acknowledgment of the needs of implementing and supporting organizations.

Partnership

Four frameworks of partnership were identified in the literature, those being the analysis of power between partners (Lister, 2000), discourse between partners (Hastings, 1999), interdependence (Bantham, Celuch, & Kasouf, 2003), and performance (Brinkerhoff, 2002a). The Brinkerhoff framework was seemingly the most practical and was designed to be used for evaluation. It, however, was based on constructs that emerged from a literature review rather than grounded in field research and ultimately did not fit with what emerged in this research. The framework of Lister (2000), which focused on power, best captured the reality that participants described wherein financial resources and the power that they gave were at the center of how the partnerships functioned. Lister based the framework on the work of Dahl (1957) which looked at

issues of the base of power, the means of power, the scope of power, and the amount of power (Lister, 2000, p. 230). The framework seemed to respond to what was found in this research, which was the centrality of power based in control of financial resources, exercised through the means of funding, and practiced through deciding the parameters of the partnership. Further, a significant amount of power is rooted in the fact that recipient organizations often have few other viable options for partnerships.

The fact that power rooted in control of financial resources was central did not fundamentally change the nature of the factors that made for effective partnership. The research found them to be issues of goal clarity, communication, trust, dialog, etc., all of which were reflected in the literature. The main difference was that in the research, a narrower number of such characteristics emerged as categories.

An important idea that became evident is that of partnership chains (Ashman, 2001). This idea is not well developed in the literature, which tends to focus on dyadic relationships. Nonetheless, much aid in fact involves such chained relationships in the form of a series of connected dyadic relationships. The research made evident that the power of the intermediary is often rooted in being a link in the chain rather than in encouraging a direct relationship between supporting and implementing organizations.

Finally, one other issue in the literature seemed to be consistent with what was found. Ashman (2001) indicated that Northern organizations seemed to be more satisfied with current practices of partnership than Southern organizations, and Fowler (1998) indicated that the current situation benefits Northern NGOs. The research confirmed that this was also the case in faith-based partnerships, which were seen less positively in

terms of partnership by implementing organizations in the South than to the intermediary and supporting organizations in the North.

Intermediation

The two general ways to understand intermediation have been to see the intermediary as either a merchant, who buys and then re-sells, or as a broker who facilitates without buying or selling (Hackett, 1992). Intermediary organizations in faith-based partnerships most often function as merchants who buy the capacity of an implementer to do an activity and then sell that capacity to a supporting organization at a higher price. In the research, two participants literally used the language of having their projects "purchased" by intermediaries. The literature refers to the process of intermediation arising when there are costs to working directly with another party, those being search costs, contracting costs, monitoring costs, and enforcement costs (Ellis, 2003). These concepts are equally relevant to much of what happens in faith-based transnational partnerships. Those costs can actually be associated with services, such as providing expertise in areas of quality and selection (Biglasier, 1993; Biglaiser & Friedman, 1994; Curchod, 2004), helping in matching (Ellis, 2003), and bridging cultural differences (Mahnke, Wareham, & Bjorn-Anderson, 2008). Brown and Kalegaonkar (2002) identified additional functions including capacity building, resource mobilization, knowledge transfer, and building supportive relationships. The services that emerged in the research strongly aligned with those in the literature, even though much of the

literature was based on economic modeling and business applications rather than the nonprofit context.

The literature identified the issue that over time the value of intermediation can be reduced as relationships mature and become more direct (Curchod, 2004; Ellis, 2003) and the organizations learn (Mahnke, Wareham, & Bjorn-Andersen, 2008). This phenomenon emerged also in the research. Some supporting organizations referred to ways in which they increasingly sought to relate directly to implementing organizations because they no longer saw a need for the intermediary, and the cost was not worth it. Some implementing organizations have set up their own marketing departments to work directly with supporting organizations in other countries. In the literature, the opportunism of intermediaries was identified (Curchod, 2004), and it more easily occurred in the distance of international exchanges (Ellis, 2003). While not labeling it as *opportunism*, implementing organizations were quick to recognize that they saw situations in which the interests of intermediaries took precedence over their own interests.

Relationship to External Standards and Practitioner Literature

Faith-based transnational partnerships, especially those with intermediary organizations that are non-governmental organizations, fall within the broader trends of partnership and international humanitarian aid. The field of human rights is at the center of various external standards that impact the state and organizations and transnational activities of organizations. While doctrines about human rights have been developing

since the eighteenth century, the central document of the recent human rights movement is the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (United Nations General Assembly, 1948). It is the foundational document for other human rights documents that have been established since its adoption, and it was important in beginning to build the case that the purpose of development was human well-being (Jonsson, 2004). A more recent document that was approved by the United Nations General Assembly related to humanitarian assistance is the *Declaration on the Right to Development* (United Nations General Assembly, 1986). The document affirms important rights to participation and to self-determination and, as in the case of human rights in general, these are gradually being integrated into practice and rights-based approaches.

An important example of how human rights impact transnational partnership is the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). It is a self-regulatory body (Human Accountability Partnership, 2012a) that has its origins in recommendations that came out of the *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda* (Borton, 2004). It focuses on seven principles of accountability for organizations (Human Accountability Partnership, 2010; see Appendix H). It is important in that it is committed to human rights and therefore does not define accountability simply based on one organization's perspective and goals but rather extends it to all affected populations and then places affected communities at the center of what it means for an organization to be accountable (Callamard, 2006). A critical aspect of the principles is defining a framework for how the organization is accountable to its stakeholders, and it requires also extending the

commitment to principles to its implementing partners (HAP, 2012b). There are some faith-based organizations that are part of HAP.

While the development rights movement and HAP are non-sectarian efforts, they have a great deal of relevance to intermediary faith-based partnerships. In general, the matter of establishing the accountability of organizations is far more advanced in these efforts than within most faith-based organizations, so there is much that can be learned from them, both in articulating this reality and in learning from the practices and tools emerging from them.

Within the Evangelical Christian tradition, some standards have recently emerged which are the *Lausanne Standards* (Lausanne, 2012; see Appendix I). These standards establish five general affirmations and provide very detailed biblical references to support them. While not yet broadly known, they recognize some of the issues of power and money that emerged in this research. These standards can be especially useful because they emanate from the Evangelical Christian tradition, use the religious language of the tradition, and are therefore much more likely to be accepted by adherents of the Evangelical religious tradition. They are, however, still very values-focused and do not have the kind of frameworks, tools, or accountability mechanism that HAP does.

Finally, during this research, it became evident that while there was little in the way of academic literature concerning faith-based transnational partnerships, there is a great amount of normative and practitioner literature that has emerged about them within the Evangelical Christian tradition. Examples of this material included: *When Helping Hurts: How to Alleviate Poverty Without Hurting the Poor and Yourself* (Corbett &

Fikkert, 2009); *Changing the Mind of Missions* (Engel & Dyrness, 2000), *Making Your Partnership Work* (Rickett, 2002), *Building Strategic Relationships: A Practical Guide to Partnering with Non-Western Missions* (Rickett, 2008); *Walking with the Poor* (Myers, 2011); *Maximum Impact Short-Term Missions* (Peterson, Aeschiliman, & Sneed, 2003); *Cross-Cultural Partnership* (Lederleitner, 2010); *Cross-Cultural Servanthood* (Elmer, 2006); and *Well Connected* (Butler, 2005). Few of these resources were research-based, and they were often normative, yet they did reflect a broad experience of these types of relationships within the tradition. They are very important to help drive discussion and appeal to Evangelical Christian values though there continues to be the need to put in place practical mechanisms to overcome the power and money issues that so often prevent the values from being acted upon.

Evaluative Criteria

Grounded Theory Criteria

Grounded theory research can be evaluated by a number of criteria. Strauss and Corbin (1990) provided much of the guidance for this research study, and they provided two sets of criteria. The first set of criteria focuses on the research process itself and includes eight criteria, each of which is related to the degree to which grounded theory procedures have been followed. Chapter 3 outlined a methodology that aligned with grounded theory procedures as described by Strauss and Corbin, and Chapter 4 confirmed that the methodology was followed in the actual research. The second set of criteria from Strauss and Corbin focuses on the degree to which the study itself is empirically

grounded. The use of tools by Scott (2004), which included the conditional relationship guide (see Table 2) and the reflecting coding matrix (see Table 3), was central in ensuring the empirical grounding of the resulting theory, and extensive sourcing from participants in Chapter 4 has been used to illustrate that grounding.

Another approach to evaluating grounded theory can be to use four broad criteria from Charmaz (2006, pp. 182-183), which are *credibility*, *originality*, *resonance,* and *usefulness*. Charmaz provided questions rather than definitions to determine these criteria, and the broad meaning of the questions is paraphrased below.

Credibility reflects the extent to which the research process generated familiarity with the phenomenon and ensures that the categories and theory that emerged are supported by the data. The rigor in adhering to grounded theory procedures has resulted in broad and deep exposure to the perspectives and experiences of individuals experiencing accountability in faith-based transnational partnerships. It has also resulted in a theory that can be directly linked back to participant-generated concepts that were documented in the interview process.

Originality describes the extent to which there are new understandings and conceptualizations of the phenomenon that are significant. While outlined in other sections of the dissertation, there are examples of new ideas that were developed in the theory. For instance, the paradox between the religious values that birth partnership and the reality of power based in financial resources that actually characterized the operational practice of partnership was an important idea that emerged. Another example

was the emergence of concepts of intermediation as being more relevant than concepts of partnership in the study of the phenomenon of faith-based transnational partnerships.

Resonance addresses the extent to which the study makes sense or rings true for participants and helps them understand the phenomenon in greater depth. During the process of both carrying out theoretical sampling and validating the theory, key ideas were broadly affirmed by participants, especially those related to motivations, selection, power, services, and the experience of accountability. The one aspect that was more challenging was simply having the theory resonate equally deeply across the broad range of organizations and partnerships. The solution to accounting for variation was a theory that became more general to be able to incorporate differences.

Usefulness refers to the extent to which the theory has specific implications and can be utilized in practice. A framework has been created that can be used by practitioners to guide them through the process of establishing partnerships in which there will be intermediary accountability. The framework is built directly from the categories of the grounded theory.

Program Theory Criteria

Program theory is a term that is used synonymously with *logic model,* and at its most basic level it explains how an intervention produces an outcome (Funnel & Rogers, 2011). Such models guide many types of programmatic interventions in humanitarian work. Goertzen, Fahlman, Hampton and Jeffrey (2003) utilized grounded theory to develop a logic model for a program and described in detail the process by which this

could be done. In this research on faith-based transnational partnership, the grounded theory approach was not structured to specifically develop a program theory or logic model. The research was exploratory, and it has sought to be more descriptive of participants' experience than instrumental in proposing new programmatic theory, though there was an effort to begin to do the latter by the creation of a framework for practitioners based on the grounded theory.

Nonetheless, criteria for evaluating program theory can be used to assess the potential validity of the tentative theory. Funnel and Rogers (2011, pp. 295-296) provided some simple criteria that can be used for internal and external validation. They will not be used in depth but will briefly be reflected upon.

Criteria for internal validity include clarity of description, an outcomes chain that is central to organizing the theory, evidence of how outcomes address the problem, the plausibility of the overall logic, and definition of change mechanisms that support the outcomes (Funnel & Rogers, 2011). As regards the current research, the grounded theory is clearly explained through a synthesized narrative account and supporting diagrams as well as a reflective coding matrix that outlines categories. In addition, there is a practitioner framework which was developed that complements the grounded theory. Secondly, the theory is built around a core category of optimizing intermediary accountability in partnership to which other categories are linked. Third of all, the theory is built from participants' data about the phenomenon, and actions and mechanisms are outlined to address it. Each of these makes the theory plausible, as does its grounded nature. Nonetheless, it is a new theory, and it has not yet been utilized.

Criteria for external validity include evidence for the theory, whether it is consistent with other theories, whether context is taken into account, the ethical base of the theory, whether it adequately fits its purpose, and whether the theory is worth the efforts that have gone into developing it (Funnel & Rogers, 2011). First of all, the theory is grounded in evidence from practitioners and their experience. Secondly, it is defined in a way that allows for the great variation in context that is part of the phenomenon. As a third point, it does seek to focus its purpose around enhancing intermediary accountability. As regards an ethical base, the theory actually seeks to establish greater consistency of practice with the values espoused by practitioners. It also appeals to the rights that encourage greater accountability of organizations.

This is only a cursory discussion of how the grounded theory might be evaluated with program theory criteria, but it points to the fact that this research seems to address the majority of the criteria for internal and external validity, though this is only tentative.

Framework for Practitioners

Introduction

The research process has generated a grounded theory explaining the characteristics of accountability of intermediary organizations to supporting organizations and implementing organizations. Based on the grounded theory, a framework has been developed which can be used by individuals in supporting and implementing organizations to identify key issues and seek to establish healthy accountability through the stages of forming partnerships, clarifying intermediary services, and establishing

intermediary accountability. It addresses the reality that intermediary accountability is often not consciously sought by implementing and supporting organizations, especially early in the relationship when there is greater opportunity for establishing it. Within the framework itself, concepts of learning, participation, power, and intermediation have been incorporated, as well as the HAP International concept of the accountability framework. In addition, reference is made to the Lausanne Standards as a means of creating dialog about issues of money early in the relationship. The framework is intended to clarify issues in a sequential manner, but it is not essential that it be used in a linear manner.

Partnership Formation

In this stage, organizations are recognizing the need for partnership, forming partnerships, and clarifying the nature of the partnerships. The focus is often primarily on finding partners and initiating the activity of the partnership, and accountability is usually secondary. It is important to integrate accountability issues at this beginning stage in which expectations are still being negotiated and solidified, and before accountability becomes important based on concerns or as a response to a specific problem, and therefore is harder to discuss dispassionately. Key objectives and questions can clarify what each organization expects, reduce issues of power which otherwise can be an obstacle to intermediary accountability, and begin to integrate accountability into the foundational practices, mechanisms, and documentation of the partnership. Table 4 lists key objectives and questions that need to be addressed.

Table 4. Forming a Partnership

Categories	Objectives	Key Questions
Recognizing a need for partners	Determine what is important to your organization in the partnership so as to be more intentional and formal in establishing a relationship that aligns with it.	• What are our organizational motivations for partnering with others at this time? • What are the values that should guide our agreements and practical decisions for a potential partnership? • What agreements and decisions should our organization negotiate towards in a potential partnership?
Finding with whom to partner	Understand how partners are selected so as to determine how much you can influence the intermediary at this stage.	• What is the *base of power* in the potential partnership? • How does each organization select partners? Who does it appear gets to select who? • What is it that we are offering that makes other organizations want to work with us? • Can we use the *Lausanne Standards* to generate a discussion of our potential partnership with the other organization?
Articulating the characteristics of the partnership	Negotiate agreements and operational issues so as to establish precedence for intermediary accountability.	• Can we arrange to co-create agreements and expectations with the intermediary organization? • Is *participation* of stakeholders being valued from the beginning? • Can we find ways to make sure that characteristics of the partnership are based more on shared values than on the *power* based in control of financial resources? • Can we establish an *accountability framework* for all stakeholders as part of the agreement? • What are the goals? How are they set? • Can we find ways to move the agreement towards one that is trilateral and not bilateral, in which our relationship is with more than the intermediary?

Intermediary Services

In order to have accountability, it is necessary to clearly identify the intermediary services that are expected. This aspect of the partnership is often overlooked when the focus is on the overall objectives or activities of the partnership and therefore on the

expectations of the implementer rather than the intermediary. In this stage, it should be clear if the intermediary is a *merchant* that is buying and selling or a *broker* that is facilitating relationships, and that determination should impact the specific definition of the services. Table 5 contains key objectives and questions that need to be addressed.

Table 5. Clarifying Intermediary Services

Categories	Objective	Key Questions
Mobilizing and distributing financial resources	Define the exact expectations of the five key intermediary services so as to have the exact performance around which to build intermediary accountability within the partnership.	• What specific financial mobilization or distribution expectations do we have of the intermediary?
Interpreting the ongoing partnership		• What are the specific mechanisms and expectations to clarify and manage issues that arise in the partnership?
Communicating and evaluating		• What are the mechanisms and expectations for communication about partnership activities? Is *transparency* being valued? • How will the performance of the intermediary be evaluated on key partnership expectations? • Is there a mechanism to *address complaints*?
Providing specialized services		• What are the specific technical, geographical, economies of scale, or brokering expectations that we are expecting of the intermediary?
Translating context		• What are the specific competencies of understanding *cultural differences* and translating local realities, culture and language which we expect of the intermediary? • Who are the specific people with these capacities that will manage the partnership?

Intermediary Accountability

A process of beginning the partnership with an emphasis on accountability and of clarifying expected services is a good foundation. Nonetheless, it becomes necessary to more explicitly recognize the need for accountability, and to create the mechanisms to make it a reality. Table 6 contains key objectives and questions that need to be addressed to achieve this purpose.

Table 6. Establishing Intermediary Accountability

Categories	Objectives	Key questions
Recognizing a need for accountability	Recognize the specific benefits to the partnership that come from intermediary accountability so as to increase each organizations commitment to becoming accountable.	• What are the specific ways in which intermediary accountability will affirm shared religious values? • What are the specific ways in which intermediary accountability will improve program quality, increase fundraising credibility, reduce risk, or improve beneficiary impact? • What are the specific ways in which accountability will contribute to *learning* in this partnership? • How do we appeal to the intermediary to make itself accountable?
Negotiating intermediary accountability	Negotiate the specific mechanisms and objectives to establish intermediary accountability so as to realize the corresponding benefits to the partnership.	• What is the *accountability framework*? • What are the specific objectives for specific intermediary services? • What are the most appropriate mechanisms to establish accountability for the specific objectives?

Overall, the framework describes the objectives that supporting and implementing organizations can seek to achieve and the questions that they need to address to do so. The process will help them to establish the optimal accountability of intermediary organizations with which they work in faith-based transnational partnerships.

Limitations

A limitation of the grounded theory was that it needed to account for significant variation in organizational type and formality. Where this became especially important was in the consideration of expectations of large supporting organizations and large intermediaries. They both sometimes functioned in ways in which there was much greater formality, and there are some supporting organizations that, in practice, have greater power than the intermediary. These variations, however, were the exception. As importantly, while those partnerships seemed to have greater formality at the very beginning, they still needed to be modified or improved upon in the evolving practice of partnership. The resulting theory does account for wide variation and incorporates these kinds of organizations, but they were the most difficult organizations to integrate.

Summary Conclusions

1. Faith-based transnational partnerships amongst Evangelical Christian organizations and churches are initiated based on shared religious beliefs and values, but the operational practice of these partnerships is significantly determined by relative power, and that power is based on control or generation of financial resources. Intermediary organizations tend to have more relative power in the partnerships than most supporting organizations due to relative size. Intermediary organizations almost always have significant relative power compared to implementing organizations due to the control of resources.

2. Faith-based transnational partnerships are largely dyadic or bilateral with the intermediary organization partnering directly with the supporting organization, and the intermediary organization partnering directly with the implementing organization. They are rarely trilateral with supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations joining together in one partnership. This is an historic approach that continues to provide significant power to the intermediary organization but which may be becoming increasingly obsolete, based on the current trends driving transnational religious connections. There are a number of significant benefits to supporting organizations and implementing organizations of negotiating a more focused role for the intermediary and of having more direct relationships with each other. Such direct relationships also help mitigate the traditional challenge of many nonprofit activities: that the individuals or groups that fund the services are not the recipients of the services, thus quality is harder to determine by the funder and harder to demand by the recipient.
3. Accountability in faith-based transnational partnership is determined by relative power, and implementers are almost always upwardly accountable to intermediary and supporting organizations. While some supporting organizations are large enough resource donors to be able to hold intermediary organizations accountable, in general, the level of accountability is limited. Intermediary organizations are rarely accountable to implementing organizations, and supporting organizations are rarely accountable to intermediary organizations or implementing organizations.

4. Accountability is broadly affirmed in faith-based transnational partnerships but often with only limited evidence of formal or more systematic approaches to it. This apparent disconnection is driven by many factors which include an effort to balance accountability with trust of partners, a presumption that the religious motivation and calling proves the value and effectiveness of the activity, and a focus more on the anecdotal than the measured. In addition, while some participants recognized the importance of accountability to learning and improvement, there was not a well-developed understanding of this benefit by many of the participants.
5. Accountability, like the partnership itself, evolves over the course of the relationship. This reality is a consequence of the informality of many aspects of these relationships and the fact that the importance of accountability emerges in practice.
6. Intermediation may be a more useful construct to examine current faith-based transnational partnerships than the normative concepts of partnership. Concepts of intermediation better explain the role of the intermediary and offer greater clarity on how to hold the intermediary accountable.
7. Intermediation in current practice frequently creates dependence on the intermediary. Intermediary organizations sometimes become gatekeepers of implementing organizations' access to financial resources and gatekeepers of supporting organizations' access to implementers' projects in which to invest their resources. Such intermediation may be increasingly less necessary, given the trends driving transnational religious connections, particularly in cases in which intermediation

significantly reduces resources available to implementing organizations without adding significant value in the exchange.

8. Intermediary organizations have roles that they need to increasingly rethink based on the consistently growing phenomenon of transnational religious connections. In the past, they have frequently been merchants who buy and resell projects, and they may need to move increasingly to the role of facilitator of direct relationships between others. This transition will present them with the challenge of creating a sustained role, not by controlling the access of supporting and implementing organizations to each other, but by providing high quality and efficient services that enhance the direct relationships of supporting and implementing organizations.
9. Intermediary accountability can be enhanced in faith-based transnational partnership if supporting and implementing organizations negotiate it from the beginning rather than simply accepting a pre-defined set of expectations. Implementing organizations do not generally advocate the benefits to all organizations of being accountable so much as acquiesce to a situation in which they are the primary organization which is held accountable.
10. Supporting organizations and churches have demonstrated significant ability to learn the lessons of partnership and accountability, and many are reconsidering the nature of their relationships with intermediary and implementing organizations and considering how to better manage the challenges. This trend seems to be an outgrowth of experience, influential books, and recently articulated standards that are raising awareness.

11. Agency theory and the constructs of principal-agent relationships align with the high level practice of power in faith-based transnational partnerships, but its constructs are of mixed value in describing more specific practices. The theory did not adequately account for complexity and variation in these relationships. A stakeholder approach seemed much more relevant, but such approaches do not have significant instrumental justification at this time.

Summary Recommendations

Recommendations for Practitioners

1. Organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships should articulate and operationalize the religious values motivating partnership and accountability into practice as an alternative to power and the control of financial resources as the main determinant in accountability practices.
2. Organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships should seek to be more aware and intentional in mapping out the issue of power and how it impacts decision-making in any specific partnership. The commitment to this would be based on the shared religious values that motivate partnership and a commitment to diminish power differentials.
3. Supporting, intermediary, and implementing organizations should explore when it is better to encourage direct relationships between organizations for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the partnership.

4. Organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships should better understand the multiple benefits of accountability and articulate for themselves what they value in it and the specific ways that they can operationalize it. It is especially important for them to better understand how it contributes to learning and ongoing program improvement.
5. Organizations should be more proactive in advocating appropriate partnership practices with their partners and potential partners. The current increase of awareness is producing positive trends towards better accountability.
6. Organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships should more concretely identify for themselves the roles they seek in the other organizations in the partnership, especially the intermediary organization. A move from the use of the largely normative language of partnership to the much more instrumental and practical language of intermediation may have a greater relevance for actual practice.
7. Organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships should better understand and identify how intermediation either helps or hinders interdependence and utilize it to structure and evaluate each specific partnership.
8. Intermediary organizations should consider refocusing their services on becoming more of a broker than a merchant and on the corresponding services that are of greatest value to supporting and implementing organizations. These adjustments will largely be those of adding efficiency in resource mobilization and distribution, providing specialized technical and geographical services, and increasing the capacity for cultural and local interpretation between supporting and implementing

organizations. They need to act more in alignment with Freeman's idea of voluntarism and work on behalf of the interests of all stakeholders.

9. Implementing and supporting organizations should articulate a clear case for the accountability of all organizations in the relationship, and the intermediary organizations should be integrated into this commitment.
10. Stakeholder theory should be explored as a better means than agency theory of accounting for the complexity of faith-based transnational partnerships and for accommodating a distinct role of intermediary organization as the facilitator of addressing the needs of all stakeholders.
11. Implementing and supporting organizations should better understand the processes of forming partnerships, negotiating services, and establishing accountability, and they should consider the use of a proposed framework as a means to navigate these processes.

Recommendations for Future Research

1. Direct relationships between supporting organizations and implementing organizations. Some supporting organizations believe that an obstacle to direct partnerships between themselves and implementing organizations is that direct relationships are less effective or efficient than working through an intermediary. Research is needed that seeks to identify criteria for effectiveness and efficiency and then to apply them across a variety of types of bilateral relationships as well as trilateral relationships. The purpose of such research would be to better understand

how to measure these partnerships and to begin to generate empirical information about which type of relationship is most effective and under what circumstances.

2. Power in faith-based transnational partnerships. There is a much greater concern about the issue of power amongst implementing organizations, which do not have it, than amongst intermediary or supporting organizations, which tend to have it. It would be useful to map out more deeply the experience of power by the implementing organizations and the various ways it manifests itself in partnership practice.
3. Religious values and accountability. Religious values and culture both affirm and at times impede accountability. Research is needed to better understand these issues, especially given the somewhat informal way that accountability is addressed. The purpose of such research would be to articulate key themes regarding the impact of religious values on accountability.
4. Stakeholder theory and faith-based transnational partnership. Stakeholder theory should be explored as a theoretical framework of faith-based transnational partnership research. The purpose of this research would be to determine the extent to which it describes current practice.
5. Framework to establish intermediary accountability. This research has proposed a framework by which practitioners begin to more intentionally seek the accountability of intermediaries to implementing and supporting organizations. The purpose of such research would be to seek to evaluate a specific partnership using the framework.

6. Normative and practitioner literature on partnership and accountability. Normative and practitioner literature about faith-based transnational partnership and accountability is significant, but it is values-driven, frequently anecdotal, and rarely research-based. Research needs to be carried out to better document the actual practice and effectiveness of the normative and practitioner approaches.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, results were synthesized into a grounded theory; related to the literature, external standards, and practitioner literature; evaluated; and a framework presented for practitioners. Summary conclusions and summary recommendations, both for practitioners and for future research, were then presented.

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APPENDIX A. RECRUITMENT LETTER

[Potential Participant's Name]
[Potential Participant's Address]

Dear [Potential Participant's Name],

I am a graduate learner at Capella University in the United States and am interested in carrying out research which would involve interviewing individuals that have participated in a transnational partnerships between faith-based organizations.

The purpose of the research is to generate a framework that will be used by practitioners in faith-based intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations to more effectively structure, manage and evaluate these relationships.

I would be interested to see if you would consider being a participant or could refer me to other potential participants. I would request the opportunity to meet with you or speak by telephone to further discuss this and I will contact you by telephone during the next week to see if you are available.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Douglas Bassett

[redacted]
Curridabat, San Jose, Costa Rica

APPENDIX B. RECRUITMENT LETTER (SPANISH)

[Nombre del Posible Participante]
[Dirección del Posible Participante]

Estimado [Nombre del Posible Participante]

Yo soy un estudiante de posgrado en la Universidad de Capella en los Estados Unidos y estoy interesado en llevar a cabo una investigación que involucre la entrevista de individuos quienes han participado in sociedades transnacionales entre organizaciones religiosas.

El propósito de la investigación es generar un marco teórico que será utilizado por participantes en organizaciones intermediarias religiosas, organizaciones que proveen apoyo y organizaciones implementadoras para mejorar la estructura, manejo y evaluación de estas relaciones.

Yo estoy interesado en ver si usted consideraría ser participante o podría recomendar a otros posibles participantes. Yo solicitaría la oportunidad de reunirme con usted o hablar por teléfono para hablar más a fondo de esto y le contactaré por teléfono durante la próxima semana para ver si está disponible.

Gracias por su consideración a esta solicitud.

Atentamente.

Douglas Bassett

[redacted]
Curridabat, San Jose, Costa Rica

APPENDIX C. INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Study Title: Faith-Based Transnational Partnerships: Tentative Hypotheses on the Accountability of Intermediary Organizations

Researcher: Douglas Bassett

Email Address and Telephone Number: [redacted]

Research Supervisor: Reid Zimmerman, Ph.D.

Email Address: [redacted]

You are invited to be part of a research study. The researcher is a doctoral learner at Capella University in the School of Public Service Leadership. The information in this form is provided to help you decide if you want to participate. The form describes what you will have to do during the study and the risks and benefits of the study.

If you have any questions about or do not understand something in this form, you should ask the researcher. Do not sign this form unless the researcher has answered your questions and you decide that you want to be part of this study.

WHAT IS THIS STUDY ABOUT?

The researcher wants to learn about the characteristics of accountability in faith-based transnational partnerships so as to generate a framework that will be used by practitioners in faith-based intermediary organizations, supporting organizations, and implementing organizations to more effectively structure, manage and evaluate these relationships.

The researcher also wants to know how people experience and feel about transnational faith-based partnerships.

WHY AM I BEING ASKED TO BE IN THE STUDY?

You are invited to be in the study because you:

- Participated in a faith-based transnational partnership as part of a faith-based intermediary organization, supporting organization, or implementing organization.

If you do not meet the description above, you are not able to be in the study.

HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL BE IN THE STUDY?

It is planned that about 21-30 participants will be in this study.

WHO IS PAYING FOR THIS STUDY?

The researcher is not receiving funds to conduct this study.

WILL IT COST ANYTHING TO BE IN THIS STUDY?

You do not have to pay to be in the study.

HOW LONG WILL I BE IN THE STUDY?

If you decide to be in the study, your participation will be a total of 2-4 hours. You will have to meet in a location of your choice or speak by telephone from 1-3 times.

WHAT WILL HAPPEN DURING THIS STUDY?

If you decide to be in the study and you sign this form, you will do the following things:

- Answer questions about your experiences with faith-based transnational partnerships.

While you are in the study, you must:

- Follow the instructions you are given.
- Tell the researcher if you want to stop being in the study at any time.

WILL I BE RECORDED?

The researcher will audiotape your responses to questions. The researcher will use the audiotape in order to transcribe and analyze your comments to develop a framework about transnational religious partnerships.

WILL BEING IN THIS STUDY HELP ME?

Being in this study will not necessarily help you. Information from this study might help practitioners and researchers help others in the future.

ARE THERE RISKS TO ME IF I AM IN THIS STUDY?

No study is completely risk-free. However, we don't anticipate that you will be harmed or distressed during this study. You may stop being in the study at any time if you become uncomfortable.

WILL I GET PAID?

You will not receive anything for being in the study.

DO I HAVE TO BE IN THIS STUDY?

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can decide not to be in the study and you can change your mind about being in the study at any time. There will be no penalty to you. If you want to stop being in the study, tell the researcher.

The researcher can remove you from the study at any time. This could happen if:

- The researcher believes it is best for you to stop being in the study.
- You do not follow directions about the study.
- You no longer meet the inclusion criteria to participate.

WHO WILL USE AND SHARE INFORMATION ABOUT MY BEING IN THIS STUDY?

Any information you provide in this study that could identify you such as your name, organization, or other personal information will be kept confidential. The transcript of your interview responses will use an identifier instead of your actual name which will be kept separate. In any written reports or publications, no one will be able to identify you.

The researcher will keep the information you provide, both audio recordings and transcripts, in a password protected computer and locked filing cabinet in his home in San Jose, Costa Rica and only the researcher, research supervisor, and transcriber/translator of information will have access to the information.

Even if you leave the study early, the researcher may still be able to use your data, if you do not specifically prohibit it.

LIMITS OF PRIVACY (CONFIDENTIALITY)

Generally speaking, the researcher can assure you that she/he will keep everything you tell him/her or do for the study private. Yet there are times where the researcher cannot keep things private (confidential). The researcher cannot keep things private (confidential) when:

- The researcher finds out that a child or vulnerable adult has been abused
- The researcher finds out that that a person plans to hurt him or herself, such as commit suicide,
- The researcher finds out that a person plans to hurt someone else,

There are laws that require many professionals to take action if they think a person might harm themselves or another, or if a child or adult is being abused. In addition, there are guidelines that researchers must follow to make sure all people are treated with respect and kept safe. In most states, there is a government agency that must be told if someone is being abused or plans to hurt themselves or another person. Please ask any questions you may have about this issue before agreeing to be in the study. It is important that you do not feel betrayed if it turns out that the researcher cannot keep some things private.

WHO CAN I TALK TO ABOUT THIS STUDY?

You can ask questions about the study at any time. You can call the researcher at any time if you have any concerns or complaints. You should call the researcher at the phone number listed on page 1 of this form if you have questions about the study procedures, study costs (if any), study payment (if any), or if you get hurt or sick during the study.

The Capella Research Integrity Office (RIO) has been established to protect the rights and welfare of human research participants. Please contact us at [redacted], for any of the following reasons:

- You have questions about your rights as a research participant.
- You wish to discuss problems or concerns.

- You have suggestions to improve the participant experience.
- You do not feel comfortable talking with the researcher.

You may contact the RIO without giving us your name. We may need to reveal information you provide in order to follow up if you report a problem or concern.

DO YOU WANT TO BE IN THIS STUDY?

I have read this form, and I have been able to ask questions about this study. The researcher has talked with me about this study. The researcher has answered all my questions. I voluntarily agree to be in this study. I agree to allow the use and sharing of my study-related records as described above.

By signing this form, I have not given up any of my legal rights as a research participant. I will get a signed copy of this consent form for my records.

_____

Printed Name of Participant

_____ _____

Signature of Participant Date

I attest that the participant named above had enough time to consider this information, had an opportunity to ask questions, and voluntarily agreed to be in this study.

_____

Printed Name of Researcher

_____ _____

Signature of Researcher Date

DO YOU WISH TO BE AUDIOTAPED IN THIS STUDY?

I voluntarily agree to let the researcher audiotape me for this study. I agree to allow the use of my recordings as described in this form.

_____

Printed Name of Participant

_____ _____

Signature of Participant Date

APPENDIX D. INFORMED CONSENT FORM (SPANISH)

Titulo del Estudio: Sociedades Transnacionales Religiosas: Hipótesis Tentativas en Cuanto a la Rendición de Cuentas de Organizaciones Intermediarias

Investigador: Douglas Bassett

Dirección de Email y Número de Teléfono: [redacted]

Supervisor de la Investigación: Reid Zimmerman, Ph.D.

Dirección de Email: [redacted]

Está usted invitado a ser parte de un estudio de investigación. El investigador es un estudiante de doctorado en la Universidad de Capella en la Facultad de Liderazgo de Servicio Publico. La información en este formulario tiene el propósito de ayudarle a decidir si quiere participar. El formulario describe lo que tendrá que hacer durante el estudio y los riesgos y beneficios del mismo.

Si tiene preguntas en cuanto al formulario o si no lo entiende, usted debe preguntar al investigador. Favor de no firmar este formulario a menos que el investigador haya contestado sus preguntas y usted decida que quiere ser parte del estudio.

¿DE QUÉ TRATA EL ESTUDIO?

El investigador quiere aprender de las características de rendición de cuenta en sociedades transnacionales religiosas para generar un marco teórico que será utilizado por participantes en organizaciones intermediarias religiosas, organizaciones que proveen apoyo y organizaciones implementadoras para mejorar la estructura, manejo y evaluación de estas relaciones.

El investigador también quiere saber como la gente se siente en cuanto a sociedades transnacionales religiosas.

¿POR QUÉ ME HAN PEDIDO ESTAR EN EL ESTUDIO?

Usted esta invitado a estar en el estudio porque usted:

- Participo en una sociedad transnacional religiosa como parte de una organización intermediaria religiosa, organización que provee apoyo, u organización de la implementación.

Si usted no cumple con la descripción mencionada anteriormente, usted no podrá formar parte del estudio.

¿CUÁNTAS PERSONAS ESTARÁN EN EL ESTUDIO?

Se planea que entre 21-30 participantes.

¿QUIÉN ESTA PAGANDO PARA EL ESTUDIO?

El investigador no esta recibiendo fondos para realizar el estudio.

¿TENDRÁ ALGÚN COSTO ESTAR EN EL ESTUDIO?

Usted no tiene que pagar para estar en el estudio.

¿POR CUÁNTO TIEMPO ESTARÉ EN EL ESTUDIO?

Si usted decide estar en el estudio, su participación será de 2-4 horas. Usted tendrá que reunirse en un lugar de su preferencia o hablar por teléfono entre 1 y 3 veces.

¿QUÉ OCURRIRA DURANTE ESTE ESTUDIO?

Si usted decide estar en el estudio y usted firma este formulario, usted hará las siguientes cosas:

- Contestar preguntas con respecto a sus experiencias con sociedades transnacionales religiosas

Mientras usted este en el estudio, usted tiene que:

- Seguir las indicaciones que le han sido dadas.
- Indicar al investigador si quiere dejar de estar en el estudio en cualquier momento.

¿SERÉ GRABADO?

El investigador grabará en audio sus respuestas a las preguntas. El investigador usará la grabación para transcribir y analizar sus comentarios para desarrollar un marco teórico en cuanto a sociedades religiosas transnacionales.

¿ME AYUDARÁ ESTAR EN ESTE ESTUDIO?

La participación en el estudio no necesariamente le ayudara. La información del estudio podría ayudar a los participantes en sociedades religiosas transnacionales e investigadores para ayudar a otros en el futuro.

¿HAY RIESGOS PARA MÍ SI ESTOY EN ESTE ESTUDIO?

Ningún estudio esta totalmente libre de riesgo. Sin embargo, no anticipamos que usted será afectado o se sentirá inquieto durante el estudio. Usted podría dejar de participar en el estudio en cualquier momento que llegue a sentirse incómodo.

¿RECIBIRÉ UN PAGO?

Usted no recibirá nada por participar en el estudio.

¿TENGO QUE ESTAR EN ESTE ESTUDIO?

Su participación en este estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede decidir no estar en el estudio y usted puede cambiar su decisión en cualquier momento en cuanto a estar en el estudio. . No habrá ninguna consecuencia negativa para usted. Si quiere dejar de estar en el estudio, dígalo al investigador.

El investigador puede quitarlo del estudio en cualquier momento. Esto puede ocurrir si:

- El investigador cree que es mejor para usted si usted deja de estar en el estudio.
- Usted no sigue las indicaciones en cuanto al estudio.

- Usted ya no cumple con los criterios de inclusión para participar.

¿QUIÉN USARÁ Y COMPARTIRÁ INFORMACIÓN EN CUANTO A MI PARTICIPACIÓN EN ESTE ESTUDIO?

Cualquier información que usted provea para este estudio que podría identificarle, ya sea su nombre, organización u otra información personal será confidencial. La trascripción de sus repuestas usará un código en vez de su nombre el cual se mantendrá separado. En cualquier informe o publicaciones escritos, nadie podrá identificarle.

El investigador guardará la información que Ud. provea, las grabaciones y las transcripciones, en una computadora protegida con clave y un archivo con llave en su hogar en San José, Costa Rica y solamente el investigador, el supervisor de la investigación y el transcriptor/traductor de la información tendrán acceso a la información.

Aunque Ud. salga anticipadamente del estudio, el investigador podrá usar su información, si usted no lo prohíbe específicamente.

LIMITACIONES DE PRIVACIDAD (CONFIDENCIALIDAD)

En general, el investigador puede asegurar que ella/el mantendrá en privado todo lo que Ud. le diga o haga en cuanto al estudio Sin embargo hay situaciones en que el investigador no mantendrá las cosas en privado (confidencial). El investigador no puede mantener las cosas en privado (confidenciales) cuando:

- El investigador descubre que un niño o adulto vulnerable ha sido abusado.
- El investigador descubre que la persona planea hacer daño a él mismo o ella misma, como cometer suicidio.
- El investigador descubre que una persona planea hacer daño a otro.

Hay leyes que requieren muchos profesionales para tomar acciones si ellos creen que una persona puede dañarse a ella misma o a otros, o si un niño o adulto esta siendo abusado. Además, hay lineamientos que investigadores tienen que seguir para asegurar que todas las personas están siendo tratadas con respeto y están a salvo. En la mayor parte de países, hay una agencia del gobierno que tiene que ser informada si alguien esta siendo abusado o planea hacerse daño a si mismo u otra persona. Favor de hacer las preguntas que tenga al respecto antes de acordar estar en el estudio. Es importante que usted no se sienta traicionado si el investigador no puede mantener ciertas cosas en privado.

¿CON QUIÉN PUEDO HABLAR DE ESTE ESTUDIO?

Usted puede hacer preguntas en cuanto al estudio en cualquier momento. Usted puede llamar al investigador en cualquier momento si tiene dudas o quejas. Usted debe llamar al investigador al número indicado en página 1 de este formulario si tiene preguntas en cuanto a los procedimientos, costos del estudio (si hay), pago del estudio (si hay), o si sufre algún percance o se enferma durante el estudio.

La Oficina de Integridad en Investigación (RIO) de la Universidad de Capella ha sido establecida para proteger los derechos y el bienestar de participantes humanos en

investigaciones. Favor de llamarnos a [redacted], para cualquier de las siguientes razones:

- Usted tiene preguntas en cuanto a sus derechos como participante en la investigación.
- Usted quiere hablar de problemas o inquietudes.
- Usted tiene sugerencias para mejorar la experiencia de participantes.
- Usted no se siente cómodo hablando con el investigador.

Usted puede contactar a RIO sin darnos su nombre. Podríamos necesitar revelar la información que provea para dar seguimiento al problema o inquietud.

QUIERE USTED SER PARTE EN ESTE ESTUDIO?

Yo he leído este formulario, y he podido hacer preguntas en cuanto a este estudio. El investigador ha hablado conmigo en cuanto al mismo. El investigador ha respondido a todas mis preguntas. De mi propia voluntad, estoy de acuerdo en estar en este estudio. Estoy de acuerdo en permitir el uso y en compartir la información relacionada al estudio como esta descrito arriba.

Al firmar este formulario, no he cedido ningún derecho legal como participante de la investigación. Yo recibiré una copia firmada de este formulario de consentimiento para mis archivos.

_____

Nombre del Participante (en letra de imprenta)

_____ _____

Firma del Participante Fecha

Yo certifico que el participante nombrado anteriormente tuvo tiempo suficiente para considerar la información, tuvo la oportunidad de hacer preguntas y voluntariamente acepto a ser parte en este estudio.

_____

Nombre del Investigador (en letra de imprenta)

_____ _____

Firma del Investigador Fecha

¿QUIERE USTED SER GRABADO EN AUDIO ESTE ESTUDIO?

Voluntariamente, estoy de acuerdo en permitir que el investigador me grabe en audio para este estudio. Yo estoy de acuerdo en permitir el uso de las grabaciones como esta descrito en este formulario.

_____

Nombre del Participante (en letra de imprenta)

_____ _____

Firma del Participante Fecha

APPENDIX E. DETAILED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The central question of the proposed research is as follows: What are the characteristics of accountability of faith-based intermediary organizations working in transnational partnerships to the supporting organizations, churches and individuals that provide resources and to the implementing organizations, churches, and individuals that carry out the activities of the partnership? In order to address the central question, there will be seven broad questions that will be used to explore the phenomenon. Potential follow-up questions are listed for each broad question.

1. What are the faith-based transnational partnerships with which you have been involved? Please describe one of them in detail.
   - With whom was the partnership?
   - What was the purpose of the partnership?
   - Approximately how long did the partnership last?
   - Was the partnership successful?

2. What are the general reasons that intermediary organizations, supporting organizations and implementing organizations enter into faith-based transnational partnerships?
   - Why did your organization choose to enter into the partnership?
   - How did you select the partner organizations?
   - Why do you believe the other organizations chose to enter into the partnership?
   - How do you feel that you were selected by partner organizations?
   - What conditions encouraged or hindered working in partnership?
   - After experiencing the partnership, what was positive about it and what was negative about it?

3. What are the processes that need to be managed by the intermediary organization, supporting organizations and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
   - What were the processes that needed to be managed in the partnership?
   - What kind of written documentation was utilized in the partnership and what was its purpose?
   - How were objectives determined? What were they?
   - How was planning conducted? What was included in the plans?
   - How was monitoring and evaluation conducted? What specific items were monitored and evaluated?
   - What is the benefit of having an intermediary organization in between the supporting organizations and implementing organizations?
   - What are the challenges of having an intermediary organization in between the supporting organizations and implementing organizations?

4. How is accountability managed in faith-based transnational partnerships?
    - What was the subject of or purpose of having accountability?
    - What were the mechanisms used to establish accountability?
    - Who defined the purposes and mechanisms of accountability, and who enforced them?
    - How was accountability enforced?
    - Were the purposes and mechanisms of accountability helpful or harmful, and how?

5. Who is accountable to whom in faith-based transnational partnerships?
    - Were you the organization to whom the activity was delegated by another, were you the organization who delegated the task to another, or were you both?
    - Was there more than one organization that delegated tasks in the relationship?
    - Was there more than one organization to which tasks were delegated in the relationship?
    - In your particular role, were you accountable for one task or for many tasks?
    - Did you think the accountability relationship was appropriate? What was positive and what was negative about it?

6. What are the major areas of similarities and differences that arise between organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
    - In what goals or expectations did you agree and in what goals or expectations did you sometimes disagree with the other organizations in the partnership?
    - Were differences in goals resolved? Please describe.
    - In what area did each organization in the partnership have more information than others in the partnership and in what did it have less?
    - Were differences in access to information resolved? Please describe.
    - What were areas of similarity and dissimilarity in the willingness to experience risk in the partnership?

7. What are the elements that need to be defined in contractual relationships between intermediary organizations, supporting organizations and implementing organizations in faith-based transnational partnerships?
    - What specific elements should be defined between organizations in a transnational partnership?
    - Do you favor or disfavor formal contracts and why?
    - If you disfavor contracts, what alternatives do you see to them?

APPENDIX F. DETAILED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (SPANISH)

Posibles Preguntas de Entrevista

La pregunta principal de la investigación propuesta es la siguiente: Cuales son las características de rendición de cuentas de organizaciones intermediarias religiosas trabajando en sociedades transnacionales para con las organizaciones de apoyo, iglesias e individuos que proveen recursos y para con las organizaciones, iglesias e individuas implementadoras que llevan a cabo las actividades de la sociedad? Para responder a la pregunta principal, habrá siete preguntas amplias que serán usadas para explorar el fenómeno. Se proveen preguntas posibles de seguimiento para cada pregunta general.

1. Cuales son las sociedades transnacionales religiosas con las cuales usted ha estado involucrado? Favor de describir una de ellas en detalle.
   - ¿Con quién fue la sociedad?
   - ¿Cuál fue el propósito de la sociedad?
   - ¿Aproximadamente cuánto tiempo duro la sociedad?
   - ¿Fue exitosa la sociedad?
2. ¿Cuáles son las razones generales por las cuales organizaciones intermediarias, organizaciones de apoyo y organizaciones implementadoras se hacen socias de sociedades transnacionales religiosas?
   - ¿Porqué escogió su organización entrar en una relación de sociedad?
   - ¿Cómo escogió las organizaciones socias?
   - ¿Porqué cree que las otras organizaciones escogieron entrar en la relación de sociedad?
   - ¿ Cómo se siente de que las organizaciones socias le escogieron a ustedes?
   - ¿Qué condiciones animaron u obstaculizaron el trabajo en sociedad?
   - ¿Después de haber experimentado la sociedad, qué fue positivo y qué fue negativo en cuanto a ello?
3. ¿Cuáles son los procesos que las organizaciones intermediarias, organizaciones de apoyo y organizaciones implementadoras necesitan manejar en sociedades transnacionales religiosas?
   - ¿Cuáles fueron los procesos que necesitaron ser manejados en la sociedad?
   - ¿ Qué tipo de documentación escrita fue utilizada en la sociedad y cual fue su propósito?
   - ¿Cómo fueron fijados los objetivos? ¿Cuáles fueron esos objetivos?
   - ¿Cómo se llevó a cabo la planificación? ¿Qué se incluyó en los planes?
   - ¿Cómo llevaron a cabo el monitoreo y evaluación? ¿Qué aspectos específicos fueron monitoreados y evaluados?
   - ¿Cuál es el beneficio de tener una organización intermediaria entre las organizaciones de apoyo y las organizaciones implementadoras?

- ¿Cuáles son los retos de tener una organización intermediaria entre las organizaciones de apoyo y las organizaciones implementadoras?

4. ¿Cómo se maneja la rendición de cuentas en sociedades religiosas transnacionales?
   - ¿Cuál fue el enfoque o propósito de la rendición de cuentas?
   - ¿Cuáles fueron los mecanismos usados para establecer la rendición de cuentas?
   - ¿Quién definió el propósito y los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas y quien los hizo cumplir?
   - ¿Cómo fue realizada la rendición de cuentas?
   - ¿Fueron los propósitos y mecanismos de rendición de cuentas de ayuda o dañinos y de qué manera?
5. ¿Quién rinde cuentas a quien en sociedades transnacionales religiosas?
   - ¿Fueron ustedes la organización a quien fueron delegadas las actividad desde implementación de la sociedad, fueron ustedes la organización que delegó la actividades de implementación a otro, o ustedes tuvieron ambos roles?
   - ¿Hubo mas de una organización que delegó las actividades en la sociedad?
   - ¿Hubo más que una organización a quien las actividades de implementación fueron asignados en la sociedad?
   - En su rol especifico, tuvo que rendir cuentas para una actividad importante de implementación, más de una actividad, o ninguna?
   - ¿Cree usted que la relación de rendición de cuentas fue apropiada? ¿Qué fue positivo y que fue negativo?
6. ¿Cuáles son las principales áreas en común y de divergencia que surgen entre organizaciones en sociedades transnacionales religiosas?
   - ¿En qué metas o expectativas estaba Ud. de acuerdo y en qué metas o expectativas estaba Ud. a veces en desacuerdo con las otras organizaciones en la sociedad?
   - ¿Fueron resueltas las diferencias en cuanto a metas? Favor describir.
   - ¿En qué área tuvo cada organización en la sociedad mas información que otras en la sociedad y en cual área tuvo menos.
   - Fueron resueltas las diferencias en cuanto a acceso a información? Favor describir.
   - ¿Cuáles fueron áreas en común y las áreas de divergencia en cuanto a la disposición de experimentar riesgo en la sociedad?
7. ¿Cuáles son los elementos que necesitan ser definidos en relaciones contractuales entre organizaciones intermediarias, organizaciones de apoyo y organizaciones implementadoras en sociedades transnacionales religiosas?
   - ¿Qué elementos específicos deben ser definidos entre organizaciones en una sociedad transnacional?
   - ¿Está a favor o en contra de contratos formales y porqué?
   - Si está usted en contra de los contratos, que alternativas ve usted?

APPENDIX G. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER

CAPELLA UNIVERSITY

Institutional Review Board
225 S. Sixth Street, 9th Floor - Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

To: Douglas Bassett, MBA

From: Capella University's IRB Committee

Date: January 9, 2012

Study: [298395-1] *Faith-based transnational partnerships: Tentative hypotheses on the accountability of intermediary organizations*

RE: Capella University Approval

Your application to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the study named above was determined to be exempt in accordance with the federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.101(a). This determination also indicates that you have fulfilled milestone 6 of Capella University's milestone process.

All research activities must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission. Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this office prior to initiation as your study may no longer meet exemption requirements. Please use the IRB Modification Form for review and approval before initiating the modification. (The IRB Modification Form is also available in the Forms Library in IRBNet.)

Please take special note of the additional conditions of approval described below.

Based on the exemption, this project does not require Continuing Review on an annual basis.

If any unanticipated problems or adverse events occur (e.g., incidents affecting participants or complaints about the study) you must notify the Capella Institutional Review Board within five business days of the incident or complaint. Please file the Adverse Event Report Form, available in the Forms Library of IRBNet.

Monitoring of the consent process or data collection may occur. The IRB will notify you if your study will be audited.

Capella University's IRB is pleased to extend its congratulations to you on the achievement of this major benchmark toward completing your research study.

APPENDIX H. THE HAP PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABILITY

1. Commitment to humanitarian standards and rights
   - Members state their commitment to respect and foster humanitarian standards and the rights of beneficiaries

2. Setting standards and building capacity
   - Members set a framework of accountability to their stakeholders*
   - Members set and periodically review their standards and performance indicators, and revise them if necessary
   - Members provide appropriate training in the use and implementation of standards

3. Communication
   - Members inform, and consult with, stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries and staff, about the standards adopted, programmes to be undertaken and mechanisms available for addressing concerns

4. Participation in programmes
   - Members involve beneficiaries in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and report to them on progress, subject only to serious operational constraints

5. Monitoring and reporting on compliance
   - Members involve beneficiaries and staff when they monitor and revise standards
   - Members regularly monitor and evaluate compliance with standards, using robust processes
   - Members report at least annually to stakeholders, including beneficiaries, on compliance with standards. Reporting may take a variety of forms

6. Addressing complaints
   - Members enable beneficiaries and staff to report complaints and seek redress safely

7. Implementing Partners
   - Members are committed to the implementation of these principles if and when working through implementation partners

From "The 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management." Retrieved on July 19, 2012 from http://www.hapinternational.org/projects/standard/hap-2010-standard.aspx.

APPENDIX I. AFFIRMATIONS FROM THE LAUSANNE STANDARDS

1. Respect and Giftedness
   - WE AFFIRM we are equals in Christ. We are called to be wise and gracious stewards of the gifts God has given each of us, not dominating or ignoring the other. We are willing to grant, earn, and appreciate respect rather than withhold it from others or demand it for ourselves.

2. Cultural-Differences and Interdependency
   - WE AFFIRM that we need each other to fulfill our callings and accomplish our purposes. Some of our cultural differences may seem to divide us, especially differing attitudes toward tasks and goals. But deliberately and prayerfully working through those differences in Christ can bring us into healthy interdependence and enrich our understanding of our Creator.

3. Vision and Communication
   - WE AFFIRM that our God-given vision and calling is only part of God's greater plan. He intends for each of us to cooperate with the other parts of Christ's Body, not dominate, undermine, or manipulate them. So we are free to communicate freely and clearly without half-truths or hidden agendas.

4. Learning and Flexibility
   - WE AFFIRM that each partner will need to be flexible and have a learner's attitude. We are not just learning to partner for the sake of efficient accomplishment of our vision, but learning to love each other and to submit to the lordship of Christ.

5. Trust and Accountability
   - WE AFFIRM that we are accountable to Christ and to each other. Under his lordship we nurture our trust and mutual accountability, which are the inseparable essentials of our relationship.

From "The Lausanne Standards: Giving and receiving money in mission." Retrieved on June 21, 2012 from http://www.lausannestandards.org/.